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Abstract 
This study focuses on the way in which rapid structural changes (such as economic 
development, urbanisation and other demographic factors, and the economic crisis of 
1997) have raised issues that are seen to require a social policy response in the mental 
health care arena under Confucian governance in South Korea. These structural changes 
happened over a couple of hundred years in Western Europe but have taken place over 
only the past 40 years in Korea. The main thrust of the study is on the extent to which 
the decisions about policy responses to perceived social problems, especially the 
increasing number of people with mental health problems, are structurally driven or the 
extent to which they are informed and shaped by Korean politics and culture. 
The industrial and economic base of Korea grew dramatically until the late 1990s. This 
facilitated the development of social policies 
- 
particularly in areas such as education, 
health and housing, which support economic growth. However, although the structure 
of the family changed to be closer to its structure in the West, it could be argued that 
evidence pointing to a broader `Westernisation' of Korean society was premature. 
Confucianism may have been a factor in Korea's development, but it may yet prove a 
hindrance to any further moves to modernity and equalisation of life chances amongst 
its citizens. 
Since the economic crisis of 1997, Korea has experienced a rapid expansion of social 
welfare provision following a series of reforms. These reforms have gone beyond the 
functional minima necessary to deal with social problems caused by the economic 
crisis. However, the government has tended to stress the greater role played by family 
ix 
members, particularly women, in providing care to their elderly relatives, and the 
desirability of multigenerational households over nuclear families. A similar emphasis 
on the caring roles of the family and community is also seen in the Korean state's 
renewed public emphasis on the country's Confucian cultural tradition. 
As a result of this, there has been a tension between the increased emphasis given to the 
role of the informal carer within mental health policy as the Korean government has 
introduced a community-based scheme which assumes that families want to care and 
those with mental health problems want to be cared for by their families. Accordingly, 
the main burden of care falls upon women. This still tends to be ignored by policy 
makers. 
Despite the country's rapid demographic, economic and social changes, there has been a 
widening gap between the population's expectations and needs and health and social 
service provision in the mental health arena. Neither long-term care services nor 
personal social services are well developed for those with long-term mental health 
problems. In addition there is a marked disparity between the acute services, which are 
predominantly provided by private sector organisations in a highly competitive market 
and broadly achieve high standards, and public primary care and rudimentary residential 
services in the mental health arena. In this context, it could be argued that Korean 
mental health policy is concerned with maintaining social order rather than care and 
treatment of those with mental health problems. 
X 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1. Background of the Study 
In this study, the main focus is on the way in which rapid structural changes (such as 
economic development, urbanisation and other demographic factors, and the economic 
crisis of 1997) have raised issues that are seen to require a social policy response in the 
mental health care arena under Confucian governance in South Korea (henceforth 
Korea). These structural changes happened over a couple of hundred years in Western 
Europe but have taken place over only the past 40 years in Korea. The main thrust of 
the study is on the extent to which the decisions about policy responses to perceived 
social problems, especially the increasing number of people with mental health 
problems, are structurally driven or the extent to which they are informed and shaped by 
Korean politics and culture. 
Since the 1960s Korea has experienced rapid economic growth alongside the three other 
`tigers', Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. Korea is known as one of the most 
successful cases of intentional economic growth. Over three and a half decades, from 
1961 to 1996, it grew from a country ravaged by war to the world's 11th largest 
economy with a per capita gross domestic product exceeding US$10,000 and is now a 
member of the rich nations' club, the OECD. Korea has actively adopted various 
aspects of Western social welfare programmes into its own systems according to their 
prospective cultural, political and social backgrounds. 
I 
Over this time period, social and economic changes have occurred in many areas of 
Korean society, these include the social service system, health care system and 
governmental structure. Many social programmes, such as public assistance, social 
security, welfare for individuals with psychological and developmental disabilities and 
health care insurance were established. This illustrates that there has been an increasing 
emphasis placed on governmental responsibilities. However, social development still 
lags far behind economic growth, even though Korea has achieved remarkable 
economic growth over the last three decades (Kwon, S. W. 1993; Goodman and Peng, 
1996; Yousefi, 1997). 
The growth of capitalism and mass democracy is an important historical force behind 
the emergence of the welfare state in Western societies. Also, it is said that `as the 
degree and the method of responsibility for meeting social needs varies from country to 
country, historical and socio-cultural conditions are important in determining the 
particular shape of their social welfare systems' (Sherer 1987, pp. 290-1). As noted, 
unlike other advanced countries across Western Europe and North America, Korea has 
experienced considerable social and economic changes (industrialisation and 
urbanisation) over a very short period of time. 
The appearance of state policies for those with mental health problems in the Korean 
welfare regime shares much with advanced Western welfare regimes. This is mainly 
because they have been initiated under international pressures for protecting the 
individual human rights of those with mental health problems and promoting mental 
health care provision. Despite the superficial similarity, their practical functioning, in 
2 
reality, is inextricably bound up with socio-cultural traditions in Korean society. 
Along with the expansion of welfare policy programmes, Korean mental health policy 
and practice has been developed to protect individual human rights alongside reasons of 
social order. To achieve this goal the Korean government established its mental health 
policy and formulated mental health legislation to provide those with mental health 
problems with care services. The government aimed in this way to overcome the 
disparity between the needs of people with mental health problems and the availability 
of services. In the wake of the economic crisis of 1997, Korea had to manage a financial 
moratorium with the help of the IMF. Under these circumstances, Korean welfare 
programmes, including mental health care, were constrained by budgetary 
considerations. 
Within this socio-economic context, significant changes have occurred in the mental 
health care system. In December 1995 the Mental Health Act was passed for the first 
time and the act has been in operation since March 1997. Traditionally, mental health 
care in Korea was hospital-centred, characterised by long in-patient stays and 
insufficient support services to allow people with mental health problems to live in the 
community. In addition, if a physician believed that an individual was able to leave the 
hospital, the family would have to accept responsibility for the care and protection of 
the relative. Beginning in the late 1990s, community integration of people with mental 
health problems became an official goal of Korean mental health policy. This 
integration requires significant changes in the Korean value system and service 
organisation of mental health services. In order to achieve this goal, the community 
mental health system has been established. The community mental health service 
3 
system includes social rehabilitation centres for people with mental health problems, 
community mental health centres and `general' health centres. 
With the creation of an industrial society, the concentration of the population into urban 
centres, the urgent and massive social problems arising from phenomenally rapid 
urbanisation, and the undermining of more traditional family and community systems of 
social support and control have resulted in the problems of welfare becoming a societal 
rather than a family problem. Nevertheless, the development of social policy continues 
to be facilitated by Confucian values. In Korean society, citizens are under strong moral 
and, sometimes, political pressure to keep familial problems within the family and to 
abstain from resorting to social or governmental measures in an effort to meet familial 
needs (Kim, 1990; Chung, 1991). Apparently, the Korean family, which is strongly 
rooted in a Confucian ideal, is itself a serious problem which needs to be solved by state 
intervention, rather than a problem-solver, which the Korean welfare regime had 
assumed. 
More importantly, the Korean welfare regime is grounded on `the minimisation of state 
responsibility and the maximisation of family responsibility' as the cornerstone for 
social provision, underpinned by Confucian familism (Won, 2004). Based on this logic, 
the Korean welfare regime has given way to the family or the private sector bearing 
responsibility for social provision (Jones, 1993; Goodman and Peng, 1996; Goodman, 
White and Kwon, 1998; Kwon, 1997,1998; Kim, Soo-Young, 2000; Lee, K. A., 2001; 
Sung, S. R., 2002). 
The political structure's emphasis on economic development makes it difficult to 
4 
moderate any social stress factors through the development of a countervailing social 
welfare infrastructure. There has indeed been a deliberate governmental strategy not to 
develop a supporting social infrastructure or a modem welfare state package of social 
services and income policy programme such as might assist the elderly and their 
informal caregivers. It could be argued that Korea retains a strong cultural tradition and 
repeated affirmation of the values and practice of Confucianism. In this respect this 
feature will be considered in relation to the way mental health policy has been 
addressed. In addition, this study considers the extent to which the Korean government 
is truly Confucianist or whether it embraces Confucianism in certain policy areas 
because it suits them to do so in terms of benefit to the state. 
1.2. Significance of the Study 
The case of Korea can be especially worth investigating among the East Asian countries, 
given the fact that the economy developed so fast and so effectively up to the end of 
1997 and then fell so heavily in the wake of the financial crisis. This study might 
provide an interesting test case for the debate on the globalisation hypothesis, which 
suggests that the role of the state will decrease. Also this study might enable us to put 
Korean mental health policy onto the map of international comparison. 
There has been for some time a call for, systematic research on the emerging Korean 
welfare systems. Recent studies (Kwon, 1995; Goodman and Peng, 1996) have started a 
systematic analysis, but we are still a long way from a systematic understanding of 
mental health policy in Korea. There are two features of special interest in Korea. As in 
5 
other East Asian countries, there is a strong cultural tradition and repeated affirmation 
of the values and practices of Confucianism. The first is that, among its many 
expressions, it leads governments to assert that the family is and should be responsible 
for the material support and care of people with enduring/ongoing mental health 
problems and therefore claim that it is not necessary to develop social security, income 
support or formal care services for people with mental health problems. Secondly, the 
enthusiastic pursuit of a capitalist model of economic development with strong 
influences from the United States has encouraged even Korea's `responsible' 
government to argue that their primary responsibility is to create a legal and fiscal 
environment that is conducive to business, which translates into low personal and 
corporate taxation and a minimal welfare state. 
This study examines factors which contribute to policy making in the mental health 
arena. This might enable us to put Korean mental health policy onto the map of 
international comparison. Also relatively few resources are currently available which 
enable the examination of mental health programmes and policies in Korea. One of the 
aims of this study is to provide the reader with up-to-date information on mental health 
policy and practice outside Western European and North American countries. This study 
will attempt to enrich our understanding of mental health policy as the development of 
mental health services has dealt fairly exclusively with a limited number of countries. A 
great deal of research has been conducted on the mental health policy of countries in 
Western Europe and North America to the extent that our understanding of the mental 
health policy in these countries can be described as comprehensive. Mental health 
policy in other countries, especially East Asian countries, has been given far less 
attention than their economies and politics. In connection with this, the study will help 
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broaden the base of understanding of mental health policy. Only Korea will be analysed 
in depth, but its mental health policy analysis will highlight how it differs markedly 
from other countries. 
This study will be interesting on a number of fronts. First, the policy examined (the 
introduction of community mental health centres) is an approach which failed in the 
USA and the reasoning behind its introduction in Korea bears examination. Second, 
there is a specific cultural focus upon a Confucianist policy approach, which may have 
been adopted as a cloak to justify cost cutting (like Scull). Third, the thesis could 
provide a vehicle for understanding the policy process in South Korea, similar to the 
contribution of Hall, Land, Parker and Webb's 'Change, Choice and Conflict in Social 
Policy' 
- 
though that policy framework is not specifically adopted. Fourth, explanatory 
international models of mental health policy have largely ignored Asia and this work 
could provide a useful contribution. 
As the policy of CMHCs was not successful in the USA, this study will try to show why, 
or if, it could succeed in Korea. One element of the collapse of the system in the USA 
was finance. The parallel of economic crisis therefore raises a question for the success 
(or otherwise) of the model in Korea. This study attempts to demonstrate this. Also the 
study will look at the `Confucian Welfare State' alongside these other `western' 
arguments such as Scull's work on decarceration. Also this study will consider the 
extent to which the Korean government is truly Confucianist or whether it embraces 
Confucianism in certain policy areas because it suits them to do so in terms of benefits 
to the state in that the Korean government has adopted a policy which has failed in the 
USA. 
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1.3. Research Questions and Objectives of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to analyse Korean mental health policy making. In other 
words, investigate how and why the mental health policy has been developed in Korea. 
In recent years, both the nature of and priorities for mental health policy have 
undergone important changes in Korea. There have been some questions about these 
changes: 
1. How has this come about, and what are the essential elements of contemporary policy 
and practice? 
2. What forms of policy and practice have emerged in mental health care and what types 
of knowledge inform this? 
3. What organisational changes, policy directions, and economic and social 
developments have contributed to the development of mental health services in 
Korea? 
In order to find answers to these questions, the aims of this study are as follows: 
1. To examine how the nature of mental health policy is related to the changing 
rationalities and technologies of government in Korea. 
2. To explore the way in which rapid structural changes (such as economic 
development, urbanisation and other demographic factors, and the economic crisis 
of 1997) have raised issues that are seen to require a social policy response in 
Korea. 
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3. To examine the extent to which the decisions about policy responses to perceived 
social problems are structurally driven or the extent to which they are informed and 
shaped by Korean politics and culture. 
4. To explore the policy responses to perceived social problems including the 
increasing number of people with mental health problems and the way in which 
other social problems are individualised within families and whether these policies 
are informed and shaped by Korean politics and culture. 
Its aim is to enhance our understanding of contemporary practice of governance by 
focusing on the analysis of a particular problem: mental health problems. To this end, 
the objectives of this study are as follows: 
1. To clarify the policy direction which was the primary influence on mental health 
policy making. 
2. To examine actual welfare development in Korea which is perhaps best explored, 
first, by examining the period leading up to the economic crisis in 1997, and second, 
by examining the period following that crisis. 
3. To explore the structural and cultural factors in Korea commencing with the 
background of the historical development of social policy and the evolution of mental 
health policy. 
4. To explore the changing role of the state in providing mental health care services for 
those with mental health problems during the industrialisation period. 
5. To examine the relationship between the economic situation in the aftermath of the 
economic crisis of 1997 and social policy making. 
6. To explore the policy responses to mental health problems and examine the way in 
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which caring for people with mental health problems was individualised within 
families prior to the economic crisis of 1997. 
1.4. Research Methods 
This study is an analytic case study that is both theoretical and practical, providing the 
rules for the formation of statements and the changing rules and priorities of day-to-day 
practice in the mental health care arena. In addition, through this study the nature of 
mental health policy is related to the changing rationalities and technologies of 
government. Archival data were used extensively in this research. Interviews conducted 
informally were used to enhance the reliability and validity of archival data 
This study is also framed by theoretical orientations and expectations derived from past 
comparative historical work on mental health and social policy involving both 
qualitative and quantitative research. The interpretation and causal analysis of a 
particular history would not be possible without such an empirically informed 
theoretical framework, as there is no way to examine a case without guiding ideas 
(Ruschemeyer and Stephens, 1997; Rueschmuyer et al., 1992). Essentially, an 
appropriate conceptualisation, that is, a historically grounded definition of a case, is an 
important part of the whole research project with `theoretical, substantive, and 
historical' interest with which case-oriented and historically oriented studies are 
associated (Ragin, 1997; Skocpol, 1984). 
It is said that analytic case studies have value in that they throw light on a particular 
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history, that is, its own particularity and diversity against general trends (Ragin and 
Zaret, 1983). As Rueschemeyer et al. (1992, p. 32) point out, `case centred research can 
examine the particular context of seemingly simple facts and take into account that their 
analytic meaning often depends on the historical context. ' Not only is a historical 
analysis essential for a meaningful understanding, but it is also crucial for a causal 
analysis because many present-day social patterns and institutions have deep and, often, 
well-hidden historical roots. The past persists throughout history because once social 
patterns are established, they are highly resistant to change (Rueschemeyer and 
Stephens, 1997). Equally important, a historical analysis pays attention to the 
sequencing of historical events or conditions, which helps to figure out whether a 
different sequencing matters in producing a present outcome. Even a single case study 
has a great potential to contribute to a causal analysis if its theoretical expectations are 
specific enough with `comparative awareness and especially a longer time span of 
investigation' (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992, p. 33). 
The use of case studies has proved an attractive way of illustrating and conveying the 
rich detail of various kinds of events. It allows a more in-depth analysis of a chosen case. 
Case studies can throw an important light on political processes and such processes are 
significant determinants of policy designs (Colin, 1993; Rubin and Babbie, 1993). 
One of the concerns of this study is to understand how social changes have affected the 
course of social welfare development in general and mental health policy and practice in 
particular in Korea. This study will examine the major forces leading to 'the 
development of Korean mental health policy and practice since the 1960s as a case 
study. In identifying the forces that have influenced welfare policy development in 
11 
Korea, the study can begin by looking at structural and cultural influences that could, 
theoretically, have played a prominent role in this process. 
As noted before, this study is a single-case study on state intervention in Korea in 
mental health care since the late 1960s. To make clear the research methods of this study, 
let me start with two related issues: the use of an historical approach in policy studies 
and the validity of a single-case study. According to Skocpol (1984, pp. 362-386), there 
have been three major research strategies which have brought history into theoretical 
ideas: `applying a general model to history, using concepts to interpret history and 
analysing causal regularities in history'. Each of these strategies may be applied to a 
single historical case or to two or more cases through comparative historical 
investigations. To classify this study in terms of Skocpol's, it is a single case study 
adopting interpretative research strategy. Historically-oriented interpretative research is 
a type of empirical study in the way that it attempts to account for specific historical 
outcomes or processes chosen for study because of `their significance for current 
institutional arrangements or for social life in general' (Ragin 1987, p. 3). Thus, this 
study primarily involves meaningful interpretations of broad historical patterns with 
respect to state intervention in Korea since the 1960s. 
For the purposes of the analysis, this study will consider the industrialisation era in 
terms of historical periods: from the early 1970s to the early 1990s, from the early 
1990s to the mid-1990s, and from the mid-1990s to present. In order to achieve these 
objectives, this study deals with the dynamic process of state intervention in mental 
health policy in Korea since the early 1960s, when the state started to pursue 
industrialisation according to the Economic Development Plan. Thus, the time span is 
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four decades, including five political regimes: the Park Chung Hee regime (1961-1979); 
the Chun Doo Whan regime (1980-1987); the Rho Tae Woo regime (1988-1992); the 
Kim Young Sam regime (1993-1997); and the Kim Dae Jung regime (1998-present). 
This study will examine how the different institutions of the family, the market and the 
State have been co-ordinated and balanced and how this has changed across the four 
periods. Although the study will be concerned with the shifting balance between the 
three institutions, particular attention to the changing role of the state will be given. This 
is not because the state plays a primary role in providing welfare, certainly not in mental 
health care where the family is central, but because the State is the crucial organiser in 
establishing the mix, relationships and boundaries between the institutions. It is 
therefore important to identify the political decisions, settlements and changes which 
have shaped and modified the balance and composition of the three institutions. This 
study is particularly concerned to make explicit embedded assumptions, often unstated, 
about the role of the family, the position of those with mental health problems and the 
nature of social citizenship, all of which are key to understanding the changing nature 
and role of mental health policy and practice. 
However, one would raise a question with respect to the validity of interpretative 
historical approach applied to a single case in that it would have the risk of plunging 
into anecdote or historical narrative. In particular, from the perspective of those 
concerned with universally applicable deductive theory, any studies choosing `historical 
interpretations can be criticised as being non-theoretical, since they have been 
motivated by substantive issues rather than a theoretical programme' (Immergut 1998, 
p. 27). The danger is probably greater for single case studies, since they are not 
concerned with `establishing explanations that hold well across other countries' 
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(Skocpol 1984, p. 372). The researchers therefore have to be very cautious in doing 
research design with interpretative historical approach. To avoid the risk, the following 
research strategies will be applied. 
First, as Ragin points out, the most valuable feature of the case-oriented approach is the 
fact that it engendered an extensive dialogue between the investigator's ideas (theory) 
and the data (evidence) (1987, p. 49). This feature is also a crucial aspect of the 
historical approach. In order to produce historically interpretative, causally analytical 
explanations, the investigator needs to pay attention to matters of conceptual 
clarification and apply explicit concepts to the study. Hence this study will put forward 
the concept of 'governmentality', which has been developed by Foucaudian, and then 
use this concept to examine the causes, patterns and consequences of state intervention 
in mental health policy and practice over time. This study also draws on Foucault's 
work (the geneology of modem forms of governance) to develop an analysis of the 
forms of reasoning and acting that underpin and articulate the governance of mental 
health problems by examining the case of Korean mental health policy. It is deductive in 
the way that these theoretical concepts serve as guides in the examination of causally 
relevant patterns in the policy changes. Thus, this study is not only aimed at historically 
interpretative investigation; it also seeks to develop causally analytic explanations that 
would contribute to stimulating the development of substantive theories. This study also 
provides a substantive analysis of contemporary governance of mental health problems. 
In order to analyse mental health policy making in Korea, this study will draw heavily 
on recent Foucauldian work on `governmentality' (see Chapter 4). This concept will be 
useful in such a context because of the innovative ways in which it helps us to describe 
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`the amalgamation of an array of governmental technologies (methods of intervening in 
the non-discursive world constructed by political rationalities) that work across private 
and public boundaries to realise, or at least attempt to realise, governmental 
programmes' (Rose 1993, p. 286). By this means it is possible to understand that the 
emergence in Korea of a specific governmental interest in mental health policy is 
characterised by certain reproductive regularities and capacities which are amenable and 
open to intervention. A brief genealogical approach will provide an opportunity to trace 
the threads of a concern with mental health policy making, its amalgamation with other 
governmental technologies and forms of reasoning, and its eventual deployment within 
the context of mental health policy making. 
In this connection, it could be argued that we need to understand governmentality in a 
number of distinct ways. This study proposes here to examine the application of 
governmentality in problematising mental health policy making in a Korean context 
from three fronts. First, the concept of governmentality will be used as a particular 
method or way of understanding the `conduct of conduct 
-a form of activity aiming to 
shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons' (Burchell, Gordon, and 
Miller 1991, p. 2). Second, using the conceptual framework of `governmentality', it 
could be argued that one of the most important aspects of this shift is that neo-liberal 
forms of social policy governance re-code and re-problematise the function of the 
mental health care system, predominantly in terms of an economics discourse. Finally, 
the government's rationale for fostering `Confucianism' will be examined in order to 
look at the moral discourse on the family. This does appear to have been useful in 
legitimating their suppression of demands for welfare programmes. 
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It could be argued that adopting an historical approach has a number of advantages. 
First, it provides a comparative base. Second, by considering change over time, it is 
possible to identify specific forces and the role they play in the construction of mental 
health policy and practice. Third, there is some degree of continuity' in mental health 
policy (e. g. Confucian influences) over time. 
This study retraces the preconditions of mental health policy development and its 
associated socio-cultural background. Also the study will illustrate how social order 
determined the patterns of mental health policy, which offer a new path to travel to this 
different cultural world. Taking the Confucian Korean state into its frame of reference, it 
will consider how mental health policy types are intertwined with specific cultural 
norms (see Chapter 4), family institutions (also see Chapter 4) and models of social 
policy (see Chapter 5 and 6). 
Also, the development of mental health policy in Korea, as elsewhere, can not be 
considered in isolation from wider economic and socio-political developments. 
Therefore, for a better understanding of the dynamics that have driven the development 
of mental health policy, wider economic and socio-political developments need to be 
presented. It is believed here that without an examination of the environment in which 
the current policy is formulated, any study of the policy would be incomplete. The 
1 In effect, social life in Korea is affected by Confucianism; therefore, politics has a strong Confucian tint. 
Leaders are depicted as patriarchal figures and the state is ideally seen as the extreme extension of one's 
family (Kim Kwang-ok 1988, p10). A "true" Confucianist would probably say that state ideologies in 
Korea are distorted Confucianism. Confucianism has been reformed, reinterpreted, revitalized or distorted (according to one's preference) several times in its long existence as a political and philosophy in Korea. 
Moreover, Confucianism is not a pure creed, uncontaminated by other ideas and beliefs. However, the 
fact remains that political leaders in Korea, in their efforts to mould the population ideologically in each 
of their respective territories, rely on ideas and formulations found in the Confucian classics and 
transmitted to each new generation in the processes of socialization and education. 
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examination of the current environment, however, can only be complete if its historical 
development is satisfactorily grasped. This study intends to address the general task by 
presenting detailed accounts of (a) the general economic and socio-political 
developments throughout the history of Korea with special reference to developments in 
mental health care, and (b) the development of Korean mental health policy in the same 
period. Moreover, in order to put the analysis of mental health policy in perspective and 
to make it easier to place the current policy initiatives, it seems necessary to introduce 
the mental health status and mental health care system of the country. 
In this regard, it is necessary to examine how these processes operate in socially and 
historically specific situations, and how the development of particular institutional 
arrangements, which are themselves shaped by a range of social forces, affect the 
processes of policy shift towards community-based mental health care in Korea 
(Busfield 1996, p. 191). 
Second, the historical approach attempts to account for `significant historical outcomes 
or processes by piecing evidence together in a manner sensitive to historical chronology 
and by offering limited historical generalisation which are sensitive to context' (Ragin 
1987, p3). Thus, the choice and use of historical evidence is crucial for doing the 
research. There are a wide variety of documentary sources at our disposal for the 
research, but we should pay attention to particular materials due to the limited time 
available. Scott suggests four criteria that can be taken into account in assessing the 
quality of the historical materials: `authenticity, credibility, representativeness and 
meaning' (Scott 1990, p. 6). Bearing these criteria in mind, primary sources for this 
study are collected from government documents, official statistics, legislation and 
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reports and comments in magazines and newspapers. The fieldwork for the primary 
sources has been done mainly in the National Assembly Library in Korea, the British 
Library and several internet web-sites of the Korean government or private 
organisations. Secondary sources, including books, journals, working papers, and Ph. D. 
dissertations have been collected from the National Assembly Library in Korea, the 
Library of the University of Nottingham, and through interlibrary loans. 
Archival data are used extensively in this research. A great number of previous studies 
that analysed the social policy-making process in Korea are utilised as historical 
documents. More specifically, this research employs these studies as a reference to the 
social policy-making process in Korea. In particular, the White Paper of Health and 
Social Welfare Yearbook (1962-1994) published by the Ministry of Health and Social 
Affairs, and the White Paper of Health and Welfare Yearbook (1995-2003) published by 
the Ministry of Health and Welfare are a rich informational source for understanding the 
development of mental health policy from the 1960s to the present. These publications 
were released specifically as a historical document that records the development of 
major social welfare programmes in Korea, and it is upon this that this study largely 
focuses. 
Numerous research reports by mental health policy experts as well as much scholarly 
work was adequately examined to extend the understanding of mental health policy- 
making in Korea. Their analytic viewpoints and accurate description of mental health 
policy development in Korea furnished rich information. 
Newspapers, magazines, and government and international statistics offer social, 
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political, and economic facts related to mental health policy development in Korea. 
Newspapers and magazines also provide several valuable interviews used for the 
analysis. 
Interviews are primarily used to enhance the reliability and validity of archival data. 
Interviews were informally conducted (see Appendix II). Interviewees recommended 
reliable informational sources and enabled me to be aware of current issues. They 
deepened my understanding of mental health policy and services and the mental health 
policy making process in Korea. Their major role in my study is to confirm and clarify 
information drawn from the primary and secondary literature. 
Interviewees include the following: Researcher in Korea Institute of Health and Social 
Affairs (Soh, Tongwoo), Psychiatrists (Kim, Jinhak and Lee, Hoyoung), Nurse (Kim, 
Suzy), Mental Health Social Worker (Yoo, Soohyun), Social Work Expert (Park, 
Jongsam), Social Rehabilitation Centre Worker (Lee, Bongwon), and Civil Servant 
(Park, Soochun) (see Appendix I). 
My initial fieldwork took place in April-June 2000; additional fieldwork was 
undertaken in December 2000 
- 
February 2001 in Seoul, the capital of Korea. During 
these two periods, archival data, primarily at the National Assembly Library and the 
National Library of Korea, were examined and collected. Interviews were conducted 
during both trips. 
Finally, given the fact that many theories on the development of mental health policy 
have emerged from studies of single nation cases, such as Rogers and Pilgrim (2001) on 
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mental health policy in Britain, Rochefort (1997) U. S. mental health care policy 
analysis, Samele (1993) Italian psychiatric care, to name but three, there is no reason to 
reject the single-case study as a compelling approach to lead substantive theories of 
mental health development. However, as Castles (1989) points out, we should bear in 
mind that comparison makes possible a simultaneous focus on both similarity and 
difference, so that the antinomy of national uniqueness and general trends can be 
analysed and resolved in terms of variations on a common theme (Castles 1989, p. 4). 
Comparison may be essential to highlighting the distinct features of each individual 
case. In this respect, this study will use comparisons of Korea with other countries, 
where possible, as an auxiliary research method. Comparisons in this research will be 
concerned with quantitative data on health and welfare related to mental health care 
inputs and outcomes that are readily available. This cross-national comparison will 
provide an opportunity to find out both similarities and differences with regard to the 
provision of mental health care in Korea. 
1.5. Organisation of the Thesis 
This study attempts to find structural and cultural influences in mental health policy 
making in Korea. For this purpose, first of all, the study identifies the characteristics of 
the development of Western mental health policy and practice. Also this research 
analyses the policy direction during the industrialisation period and in the aftermath of 
the economic crisis of 1997, and how the policy direction affected mental health policy 
making. 
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This study consists of nine chapters. In Chapter 1, the purpose of the study is presented, 
including the research questions, and research method. 
Chapter 2 explains the political, cultural and socio-economic foundations which have 
affected Korean social policy development, and explores the emergence of state welfare. 
Special attention will be focused on a fundamental question: `Have the special 
circumstances of the country exerted an influence on the evolution of its social policy? '. 
Chapter 3 reviews the literature and arguments that explore the factors affecting mental 
health policy making in Western European and North American countries (especially 
the U. K. and the U. S. ). Chapter three also tries to examine theoretical perspectives for 
mental health policy development and explores the relevant theoretical framework for 
Korean mental health policy making 
Chapter 4 focuses on the conceptual framework, governmentality. Chapter Four deals 
with the literature and arguments that explore cultural influences on policy making in 
order to understand Korean mental health policies. The cultural explanation is more 
likely to be important to understanding Korean social policies including mental health 
policies because the division of welfare in Korea developed out of a unique set of 
historical and cultural circumstances. 
Chapter 5 and 6 deal with the contemporary discussion about industrialisation and 
urbanisation (main structural factors) as well as Confucianism and Westernisation (the 
main cultural factors). The reflection on the need for welfare as a means or aid-to 
managing social change is then discussed. The thrust of this chapter is on the policy 
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responses to some perceived social problems and the way in which other social 
problems are individualised within families. These policies are informed and shaped by 
Korean politics and culture. In order to clarify the policy direction which was primarily 
influenced by mental health policy making, actual welfare development in Korea is 
explored. First, through the period leading up to the economic crisis in 1997 (Chapter 5), 
and second, by examining the period following that crisis (Chapter 6). 
The thrust of Chapter 7 is on policy responses to perceived social problems related to 
mental health (i. e. the increasing number of people with mental health problems) and 
the way in which the problems of mental health were individualised within families. 
The mental health policies during the industrialisation period were informed and shaped 
by a strong Korean cultural tradition and repeated affirmation of the values and practice 
of Confucianism. 
Chapter 8 examines the relationship between the economic situation and mental health 
policy making in Korea. What does mental health policy look like now and how does it 
fit with broader policies (e. g. the productive welfare approach)? The thrust of this 
chapter is on policy responses to perceived social problems related to mental health (i. e. 
the increasing number of people with mental health problems) along with the 
inauguration of a relatively progressive government in Korea in the aftermath of the 
economic crisis. The mental health policies during the economic crisis were informed 
and shaped by repeated affirmation of the values and practice of Confucianism. 
Finally, Chapter 9 reviews the findings and insights gleaned from this study's analyses, 
and discusses the relevance and utility of its topics. This chapter also considers the 
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scope and generalisability of this study's findings. In the second section, the study's 
insights and contributions to mental health policy development and policy making are 
examined. This second section also highlights the contribution the findings make to the 
body of policy development and policy making in the mental health arena. 
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Chapter 2. Background of Social Policy in Korea: Structural 
and Cultural Influences 
It could be argued that the study of social policy originated in the west, in the nineteenth 
century, in reaction to the enormous social changes brought about by the industrial 
revolution (Manning, 1985). Society and Government became aware of social 
`problems' which either posed a challenge to the social and political order or which 
offended a group of people for humanitarian reasons. In particular these problems were 
seen to be susceptible to change through collective social action. In Western Europe, the 
period of change from initial industrialisation to the formation of developed welfare 
regimes took some 200 years. By contrast, the industrialisation of Korea commenced 
only around 40 years ago. Social policy has consequently only recently come to the fore 
as a response to perceived social problems. Welfare policy has begun to emerge as a 
result. But how did this policy develop and how were the responses formulated? 
There are traditionally two main ways of accounting for policy development 
- 
politically and structurally. The political approach suggests that cultural diffusion and 
policy learning spread through personal contact and a growing shared knowledge. This 
has been dubbed the school of `politics matter' (Castles, 1982). The suggestion is that 
policies are less a rational response to problems than a site for argument, contest and 
struggle. Rhodes and Marsh (1992) have refined this in terms of policy networks, and 
on occasion, more substantial policy communities through which policies are developed 
and refined and in which bureaucracies are seen as political rather than technical. 
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Resources are struggled over and positions established and defended. Extreme versions 
of this can appear where a model is imposed for political (or religious) reasons. 
The structural approach, on the other hand, suggests that countries have shared 
structural and economic problems that dictate periods of convergent policy responses to 
convergent or parallel problems. For example, Heclo (1974) argued that social security 
systems evolved through a process of trial and error as bureaucracies learned what 
worked and what did not, more in the style of Lindblom's `muddling through' (1980) 
than rational decision-making. Nevertheless, policy development here is seen as a 
cumulative adjustment to reality. Wilensky (1975) famously argued that a nation's social 
welfare `effort' was determined by economic growth and its `democratic and 
bureaucratic consequences', in particular, by the growing proportion of older people and 
the meeting of their needs. In reality, of course, we expect to find a mixture of both 
processes, and there have been attempts to combine political and structural factors in a 
`shared framework', for example, by Hage et al (1989) and Hicks and Swank (1984), 
though none of these have really been successful. 
. 
Social policies are influenced by political, demographic and economic factors and are 
created by the interplay of these factors. To investigate the development of mental 
health policy and to explore the driving force in shaping mental health policy in Korea, 
an understanding is needed of the processes by which social policies in Korea are made 
and the political and economic contexts in which policy decisions are taken. However, 
the development of social policy in developing countries is different from that in the 
developed world (Chow, 1987; Walker and Wong, 1996; Goodman and Peng, 1995; 
White et al., 1997; Kwon, 1998). In short, in confronting social problems, the same 
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solutions may not be applicable for every country and the consequences may not be the 
same for every country. It also means that the Korean social policy needs to be situated 
in the Korean context, which has been formed by various specific cultural values 
embedded in individual lives, patterns of interactions among individuals, the family, the 
community and the state. These factors, and the resulting situations might be very 
different from those with Western experience of social policy development. Thus, to 
understand the nature of Korean social policy development, it is essential to explore the 
internal and external variables which have influenced Korean development. 
This chapter explains the political, cultural and socio-economic foundations which have 
affected Korean social policy development and explores the emergence of state welfare. 
Special attention will be focused on a fundamental question: Have the special 
circumstances of the country exerted an influence on the evolution of its social policy? 
The chapter is divided into four sections including the summary. The first section 
outlines a brief overview of the political factors in Korea since the 1960s. In section two, 
the relationship between the economic crisis and emergence of welfare provision during 
industrialisation is examined and the relationship between the changing economic 
situation and welfare reform is explored. Section three examines the cultural influences 
in social policy making. Based on this exposition, the implications of structural and 
cultural influence in Korean social policy are provided in order to understand mental 
health policy making in Korea. 
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2.1. Political Factors 
Korea's industrialisation accelerated from the early 1960s. Late industrialisation 
coincided with the emergence of a strong authoritarian developmental state' in Korea. 
The Korean developmental state fostered economic growth vigorously while preventing 
the workers from participation and consumption. The prevailing image of the state has 
been that it ought to stand above and over the private sectors. However, the recent 
experience of democratisation clearly shows that the degree of state autonomy and elite 
cohesion has seriously deteriorated. 2 Furthermore, in recent years, Korea has witnessed 
eruptions of discontent from the conglometers, not to mention labour conflicts. 
Consequently, such an accumulated discontent caused the battle for political 
liberalisation in the 1990s, leading to genuine democratic reforms. In this context, the 
policy-making process can be analysed in two different periods in Korea: periods of 
economic growth under an authoritarian regime (1962-1987) and the transition to 
democracy (1987- present). 
There have been some recent studies on social policy in Korea (Joo, 1999; Kwon, 1999; 
Lee, 1999; Shin, 2000a, 2000b). They attempt to explore the ` dynamics of social policy 
change', `social policy development', and `globalisation and the emerging welfare 
state'. Through these studies, it has been found that there are some crucial periods in the 
development of social policy in Korea. They are divided into three periods for a better 
understanding of the policy-making process in Korea. For instance, the first is the 
See Charlmers Johnson, 1987; Charliners Johnson's expression (1987), the 'Authoritarian Development 
State' (ADS) 
2 The role of social policy experts was drastically reduced in the new institutional configuration. 
Previously they had been strategically located at the side of a president who enjoyed a monopoly over 
power, but as this shrank the role of the experts shrank accordingly. They also lost the political institution 
provided by the president and became subject to scrutiny (Kwon, 1999). 
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period of the `authoritarian regime (1961-87)', the second the period of `democratic 
participation (1987-present)'. 
2.1.1. Authoritarian Regime (1961-1987) 
A student uprising in 1960 brought about the demise of the 12-year rule of the First 
Republic. This was followed by the democratic parliamentary government of Chang 
Myon, which lasted only nine months. It was toppled by a coup led by General Park 
Chung Hee on 16 May 1961 (Baker, 1982). From this day through to 1987, when 
parliamentary democracy was inaugurated once again, three authoritarian military 
regimes seized power: from 1962 to 1971 the Third Republic of Park Chung Hee; from 
1973 to 1979 the 'Yushin3, Regime of 'Park'; and from 1980 to 1987 the Fifth Republic 
of Chun Doo Hwan. They ran an authoritarian regime under `a facade of democracy and 
constitutionalism' (Lee 1999, p. 26). All three regimes shared the characteristics of, to 
use Charlmers Johnson's expression (1987), the 'Authoritarian Development State' 
(ADS), and the welfare state responses of each regime were not identical but common 
in their basic premise that welfare state policies should remain minimal and able to be 
utilised as political instruments for authoritarian developmental rule. 
As mentioned above, the Third Republic opted for outward-looking economic 
development policies, implemented a series of Five-Year Economic Development 
3 Under the Yushin regime, the president had sweeping powers to rule by decree and used them 
aggressively to control political activity. For example, criticism of the Constitution itself was made a 
punishable offense. The legislature and the political parties represented in it were narrowly circumscribed, 
and although debate within the legislative hall was supposedly protected, it often was not reported to the 
public. 
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Plans4 and achieved remarkable economic success. The First Five-Year Economic 
Development Plan, launched in 1962, resulted in an average annual real growth rate of 
7.9 per cent. It was followed by the Second Five-Year Plan which achieved an average 
growth rate of 9.6 per cent a year. The Third Five-Year Plan (1972-1976) reached 9.2 
per cent, and the Fourth (1977-1981) 5.8 per cent, despite minus growth in 1980. The 
Fifth Five-Year Plan (1982-1986) achieved a 9.8 per cent average growth rate and the 
Sixth (1987-1991) continued the high growth rate at a 9.9 per cent average. During the 
25-year period between 1962 and 1987, the Korean economy grew at an average rate of 
8.9 per cent per year. The per capita GNP for 1960 was only US$80, one of the lowest 
in the world. It rose to US$252 in 1970 and to US$3,218 in 1987. This rapid economic 
growth contributed to an overall rise in the standard of living for the general population 
and altered the composition of its industrial structure. In 1961 the primary sector 
accounted for 79 per cent of the Korean labour force, but in 1988 70% of the labour 
force was employed in the secondary and tertiary sectors. `Korea had, in a very short 
space of time, transformed itself from a predominately agrarian society into an 
industrial one' (Lee 1999, p. 26). 
Many attempts have been made to account for this remarkable sustained economic 
growth. The factor most often referred to as contributory was the role of the state, which 
was determined to pursue outward-looking intentional economic growth. Park's quest 
for prolonged rule ushered in the Fourth Republic with the'Yushin' (restoration) system, 
which allowed Park to remain in power for life. The general political ideology was 
reorganised into a basically neo-Confucian structure. The 'Yushin' system was 
legitimised by the government's drive for heavy chemical industries (HCI) predicated 
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upon `the twin purposes of developing the indigenous defence industries and 
restructuring the export composition in favour of more sophisticated and high added- 
value industrial goods' (Baker 1992, p. 173). Tushin' started with the outright repression 
of labour. Workers' collective action and the labour movement were perceived as `more 
threatening than any other social movement' as they could disrupt `the whole national 
economy directly through work stoppage' (Lee 1999, pp. 26-7). 
In summary, the state elite of the Park and Chun regimes, suffering from a lack of 
political legitimacy, largely relied on and believed in success in economic management 
through eliciting support from the general public. Although they achieved remarkable 
economic success, they eventually failed to stabilise their regimes. These contrasting 
events can be called `the paradox of economic success' because the main cause of the 
regimes' failure to secure their regimes was economic success itself (Joo 1999, p. 405). 
Kwon (1999) points out that there was little opportunity for actors such as political 
parties, trade unions, business organisations and other interest groups to challenge those 
in power and influence the decision-making process within the institutional 
arrangements set up by the authoritarian regime. He explains this factor in more detail. 
First, the National Assembly was effectively controlled by the government through 
constitutional provisions that ensured a majority for the government party in the 
National Assembly, regardless of the number of votes won in the general election. 
Second, the right to organise social groups was effectively removed and official 
interest-group organisations were controlled by the government. Third, repressive 
measures were widely used, including martial law and presidential emergency 
measures (pp. 28-9). 
4 The U. S. authorities worked with the military government to stabilize the economy and then 
help finance the first Five-Year Plan for development (1962-1966). 
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Another important point in gaining an understanding of the policy-making process 
during the authoritarian rule is the state elites' response to social problems. The state 
elites means those mostly at the top of the executive branch of the state institutions that 
determine and implement state policies and regulations concerning collective goods and 
state resources. More specifically, the term includes: ` the president, his top entourage 
such as the chief secretary; the heads of the intelligence and security services; the 
cabinet ministers; and the executive members of the governing parties during the 
authoritarian regimes of Park (1961-79) and Chun (1980-87)' (Joo 1999, p. 58). 
2.1.2. Democratic Participation (1988-present) 
While the Korean economy has been on an extraordinary rapid growth trajectory since 
the early 1960s, Korean democracy has travelled a rocky road. Its political institutions 
suffered from authoritarian rule, so Korea's economic and political development has 
been `severely disjointed and lopsided' (Cho 1994, p. 16). However, successful 
economic growth unleashed social changes that ultimately overwhelmed the 
authoritarian state and, in 1987, Korea crossed `a historic political watershed into 
parliamentary democracy' (Lee 1999, p. 29). The march of democratic transition had 
commenced, albeit not at the pace and scope the public had anticipated during the 
height of the democracy movement (Im, 1989). 
Chun's sponsorship of Korean nationalism in the form of the Asian Games of 1986 and 
the Seoul Olympics of 1988 proved to be `a great challenge, opening a window of 
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opportunity for protest action' (Johnson 1987, p. 13). After a spell of the most turbulent 
eruption of popular cries for more democratisation, more human rights, greater equity in 
income distribution and social justice, Chun was driven to make concessions, 
culminating in the Declaration for Democracy by Roh Tae Woo in June 1987 (Han 
1988). The Declaration included fair and direct presidential elections as well as the 
release of political prisoners. Thus the Sixth Republic was ushered in, and 
parliamentary democracy was reinaugurated (Lee, 1999). 
In January 1990, three political parties (headed respectively by Roh Tae Woo, Kim 
Young Sam and Kim Jong Pil) announced their merger, making the New Democratic 
Liberal Party (DLP) the largest political party in Korea. The merger was called the 
Grand Conservative Coalition and represented the interests of big business, which had 
been demanding more state support and less state control (Lee, H. Y., 1992). 
Many Koreans consider the 1992 presidential election, which was won by Kim Young 
Sam of the DLP, to be first real democratic election as all three presidential candidates 
were civilian. 
There were some changes in the policy-making process after democratic participation. 
Kwon (1999) notes that the new democratic arrangements brought about changes in 
general policy making: 
First, the decision making process moved away from the confined institutional 
terrain in which the president had dominated all decisions and become more 
open; the National Assemble continued to play a greater part in policy making; 
and the factions within the governing party gained a strong voice on political 
issues. Second, the new emergence of several effective points of decision 
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making meant that there were more access channels for interest groups. 
However they were slow to take full advantage of the new institutional 
arrangements and it would take time for them to adapt their strategic and 
organisational structure to the new environment. Third, the role of social policy 
experts was drastically reduced in the new institutional configuration. 
Previously they had been strategically located at the side of a president who 
enjoyed a monopoly over power, but, as this shrank, the role of the experts 
shrank accordingly. They also lost the political institution provided by the 
president and became subject to scrutiny (Kwon 1999, pp. 67-68) 
2.1.3. The Implication of Political Factors for Social Policy 
The political perspective has gained wide support among Korean scholars (Kwon, 1995; 
1996; 1997; Joo, 1999). The state-centred perspective can be subdivided into two forms, 
the first of which can be referred to as the actor-centred approach and the second the 
institution-centred approach. The former focused on the political interests of the state 
elite and argued that the development of social policy in Korea was primarily 
determined by the politics of `legitimacy' (Ha, 1989; Kwon, 1995). There is little doubt 
that the introduction of a social security programme was the result of government 
attempts to recapture the allegiance of disaffected blocs in society. On the other hand, 
other groups of scholars have focused on the configuration of the executive branch, 
especially between economic and social ministries, and argued that differences in this 
configuration in turn have varied consequences for social policy (Chung, M., 1993). It is 
true that the imbalance between economic and social ministries in terms of 
organisational power and capacity has brought about a limited development of social 
security in Korea. 
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In contrast the political conflict perspective derived from Marxism sees politics and 
power in class terms, the economy as a source of contradictions, exploitation and hence 
of collective conflict. Adopting a theoretical framework developed in the Neo-Marxist 
school, several scholars have argued that social policy in Korea developed as an 
instrument of social legitimation in the face of intensified contradictions in monopolistic 
capitalism (Research Group of Health and Social Affairs, 1989; Kim, R. H., 1989; Kim, 
Y. M., 1989). There is little doubt that they have contributed not only to undermining 
the modernisation thesis that had been dominating in social policy studies in Korea but 
also to understanding structural causes of social policy. Nevertheless, their explanations 
tend to be a priori reasoning, given that Korean capitalism works on the foundations of 
highly regulated labour markets and industrial structure, authoritarian employment 
practices, weak labour movements and the underdevelopment of the political party 
system, especially the absence of a left-wing party. 
From these political perspectives, the government developed welfare systems in order to 
gain political legitimacy. Kwon (1995) argues that the development of the Korean 
welfare system has been determined primarily by the politics of legitimation, 
particularly during the period prior to democratisation. Welfare systems have been 
constructed by authoritarian regimes seeking to legitimate themselves; social welfare 
has only attracted the interest of policy-makers when they need to enhance their 
political support. Through case studies of the Medical Insurance Law and Minimum 
Wage Law, Joo (1999, p. 387) also argues that the prime cause of social policy 
development in Korea was `the interest of the state elites in political survival, and their 
concern with their reputation in international society, together with the residual role of 
the changes in environments and legacies of previous policies'. 
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Debates have also focused on the role of bureaucrats and social policy experts in policy 
making. Kwon (1995; 1997, pp. 479-80) contends that `bureaucrats and policy experts 
who were strongly motivated to take the nation forward and bring it up to the 
international standard of advanced countries, played a significant role in the 
introduction of social policy, despite the constraints of their political masters, who set 
limitations on policy making and changes in economic conditions'. Joo (1999, pp. 406- 
7), however, has argued that `this analysis emphasising the policy ideas of 
administrative elites in social policy development has little relevance to the Korean 
experience'. He stresses that the role of administrative elites is only significant after the 
core state elites have initiated the policy development process. Moreover, there have 
been relatively few influential policy experts in the welfare policy field in Korea. The 
most important factor in the development of social welfare in Korea has been the role of 
the elites in power rather than the mobilisation of the working class, who exerted 
political pressure through class-based political action in Western countries. 
However, political explanations offer a partial picture with regard to the development of 
social policy in Korea. They still need a more comprehensive examination of the causes 
of social policy development. For a thorough examination of the development of social 
policy, other factors prompting policy development such as changes in both socio- 
economic structure and international markets, social coalitions, requirements of 
economic policy and policy legacies still need to be taken into account. 
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2.2. Socio-economic Factors 
Since the 1960s Korea has experienced a remarkable economic growth. Along with the 
expansion of the economy, welfare services and programmes for the poor and 
vulnerable have also have been developed. Korea's `economic miracle', however, was 
engineered by an authoritarian regime of the capitalist developmental state. The 
capitalist developmental state is characterised by a strong state that readily intervened in 
the market to influence the economy, a high degree of state autonomy vis-a-vis civil 
society, an efficient bureaucracy and an authoritarian regime and style of politics 
(Johnson, 1989). Korea was one of the world's economic miracles in the three decades 
until 1997, when the Asian crisis hit the country. Korea experienced a rapid fall in 
economic growth (and hence lowering of the quality of life), tumbling stock markets, 
rising unemployment and growing social inequalities. 
2.2.1. Industrialisation: Economic Growth and the Emergence of Welfare 
Korea experienced the most rapid and sustained economic development up to the late 
1990s. This impressive performance followed the severe dislocation resulting from the 
division of the country in 1948 and the Korean War. Korea's phase of rapid growth only 
began in 1961 with the establishment of a new government committed to economic 
development, which emphasised an export-oriented development policy based on the 
expansion of exports, macroeconomic stability and investment in physical and human 
capital (OECD, 1996). In the 30 years up to 1997, the average annual GDP growth rate 
of 8.4 per cent was one of the highest in the world. Rapid economic growth resulted in a 
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marked improvement in living standards across all segments of the population. Real per 
capita income increased eight-fold between 1961 and 1992, reaching nearly $7,000. The 
share of the population classified as living below the `poverty line' declined from 40 per 
cent in 1965 to less than 10 per cent (OECD, 1994). 
2.2.1.1. Economic Growth 
Korea's economic growth up to 1997 was one of the most rapid in the world. With the 
success of a series of Five-Year Economic Development Plans, the Korean economy 
achieved continuous growth. Annual economic growth rates stood at around 9 per cent 
in the 1970s and 1980s, while the average annual growth rate between 1990 and 1995 
was 7.2 per cent. Per capita GNP rose from US$ 82 in 1960 to US$ 10,548 in 1995 (see 
Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1. The Economic Growth Rate 
1962 1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 
GNP (bn. $) 2.3 8.1 62.8 94.3 253.6 352.0 
Annual Growth Rate (%) 2.2 2.2 
-2.7 6.5 9.5 8.9 
Per Capita GNP ($) 87 253 1,597 2,242 5,883 10.548 
Source: Bank of Korea, National Accounts, each year. 
During the 1970s and the early 1980s, Korea's development policies focused on the 
promotion of heavy and chemical industries. Hence, a significance change in the 
industrial structure occurred. In the 1960s, the agriculture and fisheries industry 
comprised 39.6 per cent of industries, the mining and manufacturing industry, 14.4 per 
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cent and the service industry, 46.0 per cent of the GDP. However, in 1995, the ratio of 
the agriculture and fisheries industry to the GDP was reduced to 6.6 per cent, while the 
mining and manufacturing industry increased to 27.2 per cent (see Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2. Changes in Industrial Structure 
(Unit: %) 
1960 1970 1980 1990 1995 1997 
Agricultural and Fishery 39.6 29.7 16.0 8.7 6.6 
Mining & Manufacturing 14.4 19.7 26.9 29.8 27.2 
Services 46.0 50.6 57.1 61.5 66.2 
Source: Bank of Korea, National Accounts, each year. 
In order to overcome the natural handicap of scarce natural resources and a relatively 
small domestic market, the Government of Korea has focused on an export-oriented 
development strategy. As a result, the percentage of exports to imports rose from 33.1 
per cent of the GDP in 1970 to 55.0 per cent in 1995 (see Table 2.3). The high 
dependency on foreign markets makes Korean industries sensitive to foreign market 
trends. In addition there was a growth in the employment rate until 1997 due to the 
government strategy on export-oriented industry. 
Table 2.3. Trends in Trade Volume 
1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 1997 
Export (bn. $, A) 0.9 7.2 28.4 63.1 123.2 
Import (bn. $, B) 1.8 21.5 26.5 66.1 127.9 
GDP (bn. $, C) 8.1 62.8 94.3 253.6 456.5 
A+B/C(%) 33.1 45.7 58.2 50.9 55.0 
source: tsanx of itorea, National Accounts, eacn year. 
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2.2.1.2. Employment Growth 
Although Korea is one of the most densely populated countries in the world, it lacks 
economically essential natural resources. Such limited conditions underline the 
significant role of the nation's abundant human resources in its economic development 
over the last three decades. The massive pool of unemployed in the early 1960s and the 
subsequent rapid growth of the working age population of 15 years old and over further 
expanded the labour force. Although the annual growth rate of the total population 
gradually decelerated from 2.4 per cent between 1963 and the 1970s to less than 1 per 
cent in the first half of the 1990s, the working age population increased at a much 
higher rate than the total population over the entire period. 
The growth rate of the working age population, which jumped from 2.6 per cent a year 
between 1963 and 1970 to 3.7 per cent in the 1970s, gradually declined to 1.7 per cent 
by the first half of the 1990s. This reflects the fact that most of the children born during 
the post-Korean war baby boom joined the working age population in the 1970s. The 
economically active population increased slightly more rapidly than the working age 
population prior to 1997, except for the first half of the 1980s when there was a gradual 
increase of women in the labour force. 
Consequent to the labour surplus, the Korean government began to focus on expanding 
its labour-intensive exports because of the comparative advantage in view of its factor 
endowments. This strategy had a striking effect on creating jobs. During the period of 
rapid industrialisation (1963-1979), the annual average growth of total employment 
climbed to 3.7 per cent, and to 7.2 per cent in non-agricultural employment. Thus, the 
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national unemployment rate declined from 4.4 per cent in 1970 to 2.0 per cent in 1995 
(see Table. 2.4). 
Two critical changes occurred in the labour market during the latter half of the 1980s. 
First, the Korean labour market experienced a serious shortage in production jobs 
during the 1980s as it underwent a transition from labour surplus to a labour scarcity in 
the latter part of the decade, as reflected in the low unemployment rate of 2 to 3 per cent. 
The other change was the introduction of labour union activities. The labour-union law 
was enacted in 1953 and, even though there were considerable changes in the labour 
market, three core labour rights surrounding the right of labour disputes were restricted. 
This restriction persisted until democratisation was proclaimed in 1987. Following the 
1987 proclamation, the activated labour union movements brought about a drastic 
increase in real wages, during some years even exceeding the increase in labour 
productivity. 
Table 2.4. Population by Labour Force Status 
(thousand persons, %) 
Population Economically active population Economically 
15 years active Unemployment 
and Total Employed Unemployed participation rate 
over* rate 
1970 17,468 10,062 9,617 445 57.6 4.4 
1975 20,918 12,193 11,692 501 58.3 4.1 
1980 24,463 14,431 13,683 748 59.0 5.2 
1985 27,553 15,592 14,970 622 56.6 4.0 
1990 30,887 18,539 18,085 454 60.0 2.4 
1995 33,664 20,853 20,432 420 61.9 2.0 
source: ivauonai mausncai vitice 
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Table 2.5. Employed Persons by Industry 
(thousand persons) 
1985 1990 1995 
Total 14,970 18,085 20,432 
Agriculture, forestry & fisheries 3,733 3,237 2,534 
Mining & manufacturing 3,659 4,990 4,824 
Manufacturing 3,504 4,911 4,797 
Social overhead capital & other services 7,578 9,858 13,074 
Construction 911 1,346 1,905 
Wholesale and retail, hotels & restaurants 3,377 3,935 5,378 
Electricity, transport, storage, finance* 701 923 1,859 
Business, personal, public service & other** 563 945 3,933 
''Yrnor to 1991, transport, storage and communications 
** Prior to 1991, finance, insurance, real estate and business services 
Source: National Statistical Office 
During the 1970s and the early 1980s, Korea's development policies focused on the 
promotion of heavy and chemical industries. Hence, a significant change in industrial 
structure occurred. In the 1960s, the agriculture and fisheries industry comprised 39.6 
per cent of industries, the mining and manufacturing industry, 14.4 per cent and the 
service industry, 46.0 per cent of the GDP. However, in 1995, the ratio of the 
agriculture and fisheries industry to the GDP was reduced to 6.6 per cent, while the 
mining and manufacturing industry increased to 27.2 per cent (see Table 2.5) 
2.2.1.3. Impact of Economic Growth on Korean Social Policy 
Although industrialisation has produced a range of social problems, economic growth 
seemed to enable the Korean government to promote and expand its social welfare 
measures, including mental health care. Remarkable social improvements have occurred 
in Korea during the past few decades, particularly in its economy. Korea's economic 
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growth until the economic crisis of 1997 was one of the most rapid in the world. With 
the success of a series of five-year economic development plans, the Korean economy 
was continuous growth. The quality of life of Korean people has been considerably 
upgraded in many areas. The rapid economic improvement is reflected in the steady rise 
of the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. This shows that Korean society is 
making economic progress, moving forward from a `developing' to a `developed' 
society, from an economic perspective. Since the mid- 1960s, rapid Korea economic 
progress made more social welfare programmes possible. There was increasing public 
demand and, due to the increase in Per Capita GNP capacity, the government could 
expand the scope of the welfare programmes, as there was the capacity within the tax- 
base. 
2.2.2. Changing Economic Situation and Welfare Reform after the Economic Crisis 
In December 1997 the Korean economy was on the brink of collapse and was bailed out 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF promised the much-needed help 
but with a string of conditions (Ministry of Finance, 1998). The economic crisis 
shocked the entire nation because Korea had experienced the most rapid and sustained 
economic development. The economic crisis had a considerable impact, not only on the 
Korean economy but also on social policy. 
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2.2.2.1. Economic Crisis of 1997 
The negative impact of the financial crisis on the real economy became apparent 
throughout 1998. As Table 2.6 illustrates, GDP dropped 5.8 per cent year-on-year, 
reflecting an 8.2 per cent fall in domestic consumption expenditure and sluggish exports 
in the wake of the financial crisis. All industries showed negative annual growth and 
gross fixed capital formation also plunged 21.1 per cent in 1998. Consequently, per 
capita gross national income (GNI), which mirrors real purchasing power, also fell from 
$10,307 in 1997 to $6,823 in 1998. 
Table 2.6. Major Economic Indicators 1995-1998 (at 1995 constant prices) year-to-year 
change (%) 
1995 1996 1997 1998 
yearly 'Y4 %i 3/4' 4/4 
Exchange rate 774.7 844.2 1,415.2 1,207.8 1,378.8 1,385.2 1,376.2 1,207.8 (won against $) 
Call Interest rates 12.4 12.4 16.3 15.0 23.7 18.7 10.2 7.1 
Gross domestic 8.9 6.3 5.0 
-5.8 -3.6 -7.2 -7.1 -5.3 Product (GDP) 
Final consumption 8.2 7.2 3.2 
-8.2 -8.4 -9.7 -8.9 -5.8 Expenditure 
Private 9.6 7.1 3.5 
-9.6 -9.9 -11.2 -10.4 -6.9 
Government 0.8 8.2 1.5 
-0.1 1.3 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4 
Gross fixed capital 11.9 7.3 
-2.2 -21.2 -20.6 -23.7 -22.2 -17.9 Formation 
Exports of goods and 24.6 11.2 21.4 13.3 25.7 13.2 8.0 8.8 Services 
Imports of goods and 22.4 14.2 3.2 
-22.0 -27.2 -25.5 -25.9 -9.0 Services 
Gross national 8.1 4.8 2.1 
-7.9 -6.8 -9.7 -8.6 -6.6 Income GNI 
*refer to at the last quarter of 1997. 
Source: National Statistics Office, 1999 
Such a deterioration of the real economy has had a great deal of negative impact on 
individual wellbeing. Nominal wages have fallen dramatically in the wake of the 
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financial crisis so that the year of 1998 witnessed a decrease in nominal wages for the 
first time since the 1960s. The sharp rise in import prices due to the depreciation of the 
won boosted consumer price inflation to 7.5 per cent during 1998. Consequently, real 
wages dropped by around 10 per cent at the end of 1998 compared to a year earlier. The 
average real annual income of the urban working class household was thus reduced by 
6.6 per cent in 1998, compared to that of the previous year (National Statistical Office, 
1999a). This decline in real wages, especially when combined with soaring 
unemployment, became a source of increasing economic hardship. 
2.2.2.2. Increase in the Unemployment Rate 
Figure 2.1 shows that unemployment rates increased dramatically after the financial 
crisis of 1997, transforming from a situation of near full employment to a level that 
threatens social stability. Before the financial crisis, unemployment rates in Korea were 
around 2.5 per cent, but they soared to 8.7 per cent in February 1999. 
Figure 2.1. Trends of Unemployment Rates after the Financial Crisis 
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The number of jobless was listed at 1.8 million at that time. In particular, the 
unemployed who lost their jobs within the previous year exceeded 90 per cent of the 
total. In a country like Korea that, since industrialisation, has never ever suffered from 
high unemployment, such a soaring unemployment rate itself might have been enough 
of a threat to bring about social and political instability. 
It is worth noting that this negative social impact has not been uniform across social 
groups. Table 2.7 shows that there have been some changes with respect to the 
composition of the unemployed in comparison to that before the financial crisis of 1997. 
First, if we look at the educational achievement of the unemployed, there has been a 
considerable increase in the proportion of the unemployed having a relatively poor 
education. Table 2.7 shows the number of the unemployed who graduated only from 
middle or primary schools increased by more than double in the wake of the crisis. 
Second, the proportion of heads of household among the unemployed rose from 34.5 
per cent in 1997 to 43.6 per cent in 1998, more than doubling in number from the year 
before. This caused hardship for dependants too. There was a number of suicides, called 
`IMF suicides' by Koreans, referring to male bread-winners who were laid off and took 
their own lives and those of their dependants, presumably out of a belief that no one 
would be left to care for them (Koreaherald, 25 April 1998). 
Third, middle-aged people had an increased risk of becoming unemployed. Table 2.7 
illustrates that there was more than a doubling in the number of the unemployed among 
all middle-aged groups. In particular, those aged from 45 to 49 expanded more than 
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threefold. These figures suggest that people in this group are the main targets of 
structural adjustment in the labour market in the name of improving labour flexibility. 
Table 2.7. The Characteristic of the Unemployed 
(%) 
97 Jan. 
-Apr. 98 Jan. -Apr. Growth rate* 
Education attainment 
Middle school 23.0 27.6 115.0 
High school 54.8 52.5 71.8 
Technical college 9.5 7.8 46.7 
University 12.6 12.1 71.9 
Relations with householder 
Householder 34.5 43.6 126.8 
Spouse 15.8 16.0 80.8 
Others 49.7 40.4 45.9 
Age structure 
15-19 old 8.1 7.1 58.8 
20-24 old 26.4 19.5 32.7 
25-29 old 21.1 19.1 62.4 
30-34 old 11.0 11.3 83.3 
35-39 old 10.8 12.5 109.2 
40-44 old 8.6 10.0 109.9 
45-49 old 4.6 7.9 214.1 
50-54 old 3.9 5.6 153.6 
55-59 old 3.0 3.9 133.2 
60 or more 2.7 3.1 107.9 
Previous Job 
Full-time employed 26.0 22.3 125.5 
Temporary workers 39.5 36.1 139.8 
Daily workers 16.3 26.8 330.2 
Employers 7.1 5.4 98.2 
Self-employed 10.1 7.9 105.1 
Family-employed workers 0.9 1.4 366.7 
Source: Korea National Statistics Office, 1998. 
Finally, there was a big increase in unemployment across all kinds of jobs. However, 
unstable wage earners, such as temporary workers or daily workers, formed the majority 
of the unemployed, accounting for 36.1 per cent and 26.8 per cent of total unemployed 
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respectively. In particular, the number of those whose previous job was that of a daily 
worker dramatically increased 4.3 times. 
All these figures suggest that the social impact of the financial crisis was different 
across social groups. Temporary or daily workers who are middle-aged with a relatively 
poor education attainment were the worst affected. Furthermore, given that they were 
neither eligible for unemployment benefit nor living allowance as a form of social 
assistance benefits, the pain of the unemployed and their families was further 
aggravated. 
As a result of the crisis, rising unemployment and the decrease of nominal wages 
destabilised households severely, and the poverty level rose both in absolute and 
relative terms while income disparities widened. While there has traditionally been a 
gap between urban and rural area wealth, new patterns of poverty emerged in the cities. 
The crisis brought a realisation that economic development cannot be socially 
sustainable without social policy measures. In this context, the government had to 
introduce a set of temporary measures as well as an important reform of the welfare 
system. 
2.2.2.3. Impact of the Economic Crisis on Korean Social Policy 
In the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis, the severity of the social impact of the 
economic crisis was worsened by the under-development of social protection. The 
government, however, gave its priority to the strengthening of systems of social 
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protection. There appears to be a clear recognition that the design and implementation 
of structural adjustment programmes should be accompanied by social protection. The 
measures of the government included not only establishing a social safety net but also 
reforming the social security system (Shin, 2000a). 
Moreover, households are likely to be more vulnerable than before in a globalising 
world with weaker traditional family support systems. A number of problems and 
concerns have emerged in the social policy arena since the economic crisis of 1997. The 
following are more likely to be considered by policy makers: deteriorating social 
integration; poverty in the outskirts of urban areas; inequality in the distribution of 
income and wealth; regional imbalance in the distribution of resources; weak rights and 
interests of the socially underprivileged; old age pension coverage for people who have 
not paid contributions; the high rate of unemployment; instability of employment; the 
protection of the needs of people (young, old, disabled) outside the labour market; the 
present system hindering self-support as a means to escape poverty; monopolistic 
tendencies in business-government collusion; globalisation and high labour costs. 
The structure of Korean society is changing rapidly in the aftermath of economic crisis. 
Korea is becoming greyer, more urban, more formal, and more open both economically 
and politically. These trends have important implications for future social policies. 
Social policy cannot be divorced from the characteristic of the population and 
demographic changes will bring issues of old age security to the forefront and require 
changes in the patterns of public spending. Economic changes, driven by shifts in 
employment, greater urbanisation and continued globalisation, will be associated with 
greater labour mobility and increased political participation and will put social issues on 
48 
the political agenda. All three trends will put pressure on `informal, family-based 
mechanisms for household protection and increase demands for more formal, 
government-mandated schemes' (Atinc 2000, p. 142). 
The social welfare system continues to be adapted to the economic market system. The 
government has attempted to pursue a strategy of moderate development in welfare 
provision in which the average level of provision, measured either by per capita social 
expenditure or its ratio to GDP, would be prevented from going to either of the two 
extremes, remaining instead on roughly the existing level. It is an important part of the 
government's social policy agenda to adjust the structure of welfare provision. To this 
end, the Korean government has attempted to seek a new social welfare system (see 
more detail in Chapter 6). 
The Korean government has realised that, in existing welfare states, unemployment and 
income disparity are severe problems and excessive welfare expenditure threatens 
government finance, driving it towards a budget deficit crisis. Also the government is 
aware that over-generous welfare allowance has been criticised for diminishing welfare 
recipients' work incentive. In order to cope with these problems comprehensively, the 
government has attempted to find a new welfare model (see more detail in Chapter 6). 
In the establishment of a new welfare state model, several essential elements are to be 
considered: `unemployment, income inequality, the financial crisis, stagnation and 
deteriorating work incentives' (Chung, K. B. 2001, p.! ). To address these negative 
elements, more comprehensive policy planning needs to occur. 
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2.2.3. The Implication of Socio-economic Factors for Social Policy 
In the case of Korea it could be argued that social policies, including mental health 
policies, have been subordinated by economic policies. Shin (2000b) argues that 
economic and social policies have not been determined in isolation from each other. He 
also points out that the form and content of social policy has been greatly constrained by 
the requirements of economic policy. 
Since the early 1960s the Korean government chose the strategy of minimising labour 
costs for competitiveness in the world trade markets, which has subsequently had an 
important effect on shaping social policy. Social policy in Korea has been embedded 
in and constrained by the requirements of economic policy. Yet, the nature of policy 
linkages between economic and social policies varies according to the area of social 
policy and the content of economic policy (Shin 2000b, p. i) 
As Kwon (1999b) points out during the period 1961-87 the governments of Korea 
pursued a strategy that can be summarised as legitimisation through economic 
performance. For instance President Park's government pursued an `economic growth 
strategy' whereas President Chun aimed at `economic stabilisation'. Consequently, 
economic policy took precedence over all other policy considerations, including social 
policy. This economic first strategy has also been witnessed in the Kim Dae Jung 
administration (1998-present) in the aftermath of economic crisis. It is called the 
economic recovery strategy. 
In this regard, it could be argued that the economic strategy constrained social policy 
decisions and the structure of mental health policy. Financial liberalisation introduces a 
serious risk of the destabilisation of the economy of Korea through a sudden outflow of 
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portfolio capital and other forms of `hot money'. Financial bailouts are aimed primarily 
at protecting the investor's and creditor's interest and the associated conditionalities 
often add to the `diswelfare' of the general population resulting from the crisis. 
Moreover, the resolution of the problem within the framework of financial openness 
increases the risk of recurrent crisis and diswelfare for the population and is likely to be 
followed by further bailouts. Thus a vicious cycle is set in motion. The consequences 
for systems of social protection are contradictory. On the one hand, the 
commodification of the economy increased insecurity, undermined existing forms of 
social protection and thus underlay the need for an adequate social safety net in an open 
globalised economy. On the other hand, the disruption of the economy, resource 
constraints and fiscal austerity, and the ideology of privatisation militate against 
building programmes of social welfare. How to manage this contradiction is an 
important problem of public policy societies (Mishra, 2001). 
Changes of this kind reflect the changing socio-economic environment and the 
government's declared aims: to adapt the social welfare system to the new global 
capitalist market economic system, to stimulate economic efficiency in a marketising 
and globalising environment, and to maintain political stability by solving social 
problems such as urban unemployment and poverty, which are mainly caused by market 
reform and international competition. 
However, the policy direction during a period of industrialisation and globalisation 
reveals that a capitalist state is able to manage the public welfare demands not only with 
little negative impact on its accumulation, but also to use social welfare as a means to 
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create more economic opportunities. The key issues are what strategies are used to meet 
societal demands and which institutions are expected to bear the costs. 
In the case of Korea's social policy during the process of industrialisation and 
globalisation, the Korean family, which stresses family obligation, has been emphasised 
as the basic caring unit responsible for the long-term needs of people with mental health 
problems while public welfare provisions provide only limited assistance to preserve the 
family's welfare function. In this way, responsibility for meeting the needs of the 
vulnerable groups has been diverted to the family system. As a consequence, individual 
and family work ethics have been preserved, while the financial sector has been 
enhanced for achieving further accumulation. 
2.3. Cultural Factors 
Recently, there has been a growing concern with the cultural dimension in comparative 
cross-national social policy studies. As MacPerson and Midgley argue, `any account of 
Third World social policy should pay attention to the institutionalised patterns of 
obligation and cultural practices that respond to the needs of dependent individuals and 
families' (MacPerson and Midgley 1987, p. 137). Asian countries' cultural heritage and 
traditional values and beliefs, which are strikingly different from those of Western 
countries in many important ways, also have a great impact on the development of 
welfare policy in these countries. Such cultural factors, expressed at `the level of 
national ideology and political power', as MacPherson and Midgley point out, `are 
important for a proper understanding of the rest of the world' (MacPherson and Midgley 
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1987, p. 138). To understand welfare policy development in Korea, it is important to 
identify Korean culture and the value placed on the nature of society and its members, 
and hence to examine the way this culture and those values are applied to social 
problems. 
Traditionally, Buddhism and Confucianism have played important historical roles in the 
early cultural heritage of Korea (Choi, E., 1994). Korean's strong commitment to their 
family is rooted in concepts from Buddhism and Confucianism, and some people even 
think that the basic unit of the self among Koreans is not the individual, but the family 
(Lee, 1983). Some cultural factors are inherited but some parts are changing, therefore 
creating a new culture. In modem society, many factors that influence cultural change 
are increasing. These factors include `complicated geographical migration and changes 
in the family life cycle' (McGoldrick 1993, p. 357). Compared with other world 
religions, the uniqueness of Confucianism lies in the fact that its teachings always begin 
with the family. In fact, the family is the main pillar of Confucianism. ` Arguably there 
is no other religion, which can surpass Confucianism in terms of its family- 
orientedness' (Choi, J. 2000, p. 6). 
In this context, the family was the most important group for traditional Koreans. It is 
largely due to the influence of Confucianism, which emphasises familial relationship or 
kinship more than any other relationships. That is, Koreans' attachment to the family is 
overwhelmingly strong when compared to that of other cultures. `Such family-centred 
worldviews and sentiments are still very powerful in contemporary Korea' (Choi, J. 
2000, p. 8). These will be described in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
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However, over the last four decades Korea has undergone remarkable socio-culture 
changes due to modernisation, industrialisation and globalisation. It is said that the 
collectivistic Korean society is now gradually becoming more westernised and 
individualistic. 
Korea's traditional culture, including its religious heritage, was seriously undermined. 
Moreover, since the 1960s, within a single generation, Korea has been transformed 
from an agrarian to an industrialised urban society. The adoption not only of Western 
science and technology, but also Western culture, has played a decisive role in 
bringing about this transformation. Swept into the country on the tides of 
Westernisation, industrialisation, and economic development, Protestantism has taken 
root and expanded its reach (Park and Cho 1995, p. 120). 
Along with growing concern over the weakening traditional values of family obligation, 
there has been an increasing awareness of the need to re-emphasise traditional moral 
values and the importance of moral education (see Section 4.3.1.3), particularly 
education in filial piety and respect for parents (Sung 1990,1992; Han, 1996). 
2.3.1. The Effect of Confucianism 
Not only material conditions but also the mental environment has a great influence on a 
person's way of thinking and acting. Korea is a country of long history and various 
thoughts 
- 
including Western thinking 
- 
which have served an important role in 
moulding the Korean culture. For nearly five hundred years, traditional Korea 
- 
the 
Chosun dynasty 
- 
was ruled by a monarchy which maintained a highly centralised, 
Confucian-oriented system. Thus, Confucianism is one of the most prominent factors 
that may act to shape Korean culture and its effect is still rooted deeply in Korea's life. 
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Traditionally Korea and Japan belong to a form of Ancient Chinese culture, but unlike 
Japan, which was geographically sufficiently isolated to prevent Chinese intervention, 
Korea is so near to China that there has long been a much closer relationship. China 
often intervened in Korea, and these circumstances restricted the independence of 
Korea's internal development. Thus, though both Korea and Japan were exposed to 
Chinese Confucianism, the effect is much greater in Korea. 
2.3.1.1. Confucian Influence in Political Culture 
It is said that the Korean political structure has been strongly influenced by Confucian 
tradition (Kihl, 1994). Confucianism is the foundation of social and political attitudes. 
Because hierarchy and authority are the main tenets of Confucian thought, they have 
penetrated the ideology of the ruling and administrative sectors of society. 
Accordingly, the Korean style of governmental bureaucracy has been notable for its 
strong and dominating leadership. It has remained a spontaneous by-product of this 
particular ideology within Korean society. Kim and Kim (1997) have defined two 
noteworthy factors by which Korean political culture has been affected: first, 
`Confucian hierarchical subordination, ' which implies a high sensitivity to authority- 
support in socio-political life; second, `a high degree of cultural homogeneity, ' which 
has tended to inhibit not only the fragmentation of power but also the diversification of 
group political interests (p. 64). These two ideological norms contributed fundamentally 
to the formation of the political structure of Korean bureaucracy. Oh (1999) describes 
Confucian influence in Korea thus: 
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The key legacies of Confucianism in Korea were authoritarian, paternalistic, and 
family-centred, legacies that are visible in that country today. Most Koreans still look 
to their leader, the president, for key decisions and Korean chief executives have 
played extraordinarily defining roles in Korean politics and government. Family ties 
in Korea still constitute the central element in the lives of Koreans and their 
organisations, particularly in the economic sector, where family-owned and 
-operated 
conglomerates predominate (pp. 13-14). 
Consequently, Confucian doctrine produced an elite, ruling class known as Yangban. In 
Korean society, Yangban comprised a literati group which constituted the dominant 
social class of the Chosun dynasty. They attained a monopoly on prestige, power and 
wealth (Oh 1999, p. 10). Their tradition embodied socio-political formalities of 
ceremony, rites, ranks and hierarchical structures. As the Yangban occupied civil and 
military sides of the government, this class tradition provided for the fundamental 
formation of a new version of ruling elitism in Korean society and bureaucracy. Thus, 
Confucian principles as the official creed of government consolidated the power base of 
the Korean ruling elites, securing a highly centralised authoritarian bureaucracy (Kim 
and Kim 1997, p. 65). 
2.3.1.2. Confucianism and Economic Development 
Confucian tradition has also strongly influenced economic development in Korea. There 
were many factors affecting the economic success that occurred in Korea from the 
1960s. As Francis Fukuyama (1995) noteds, some of these factors were situational 
S In his book, Trust: the social virtues and the creation of prosperity, Francis Fukuyama explores the 
ways in which countries that share apparently similar capitalist economic institutions are in fact quite 
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factors unique to the time but some of the factors were cultural. The legacy of 
Confucianism in Korea helped to further the goals of industrialisation. 
Confucian traditions placed an emphasis on the values of the group over the individual. 
This helped industrialism by creating a `pliant populace' who were willing to accept 
long hours and low wages and not question government policies. The traditions of 
Confucianism taught workers not to question authority. These traditions carried over 
into the post war period (1953-1961) and allowed authoritarian regimes (1962-1987) in 
Korea to go unquestioned by the public. This lack of dissent facilitated Korea to have 
stable governments, which were crucial to investment and industrialisation. This 
stability was a direct result of Confucian values being emphasised upon the population. 
Confucian placement of the group over the individual and its strong belief in filial piety 
also caused families to accept responsibility for their dependent members. This safety 
net that was provided by families allowed the government to limit its spending on social 
welfare programmes and thus channel more funds into infrastructure and industry. 
Confucianism also placed an emphasis on self-cultivation which has helped Korea to 
have a skilled and ambitious work force. A large role was played by the traditions of 
Confucianism which created a pliant and stable populace, skilled and eager workers, 
and a `meritocratic' bureaucracy that were skilled at formulating and carrying out 
economic policy. 
different from one another 
- 
different in their approaches, work, entrepreneurship, industrial organisation 
and, ultimately, economic performance. In trying to understand the origins of competitiveness, the chief 
puzzle concerns why capitalist East Asia grew as fast as it did over the past two generations. Most of the 
current literature on this subject discusses the problem in terms of either free market or state 
interventionist policies, but few take seriously the possibility that culture somehow lies at the root of 
Asian success. 
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During industrialisation the family in Confucian Korea worked as a powerful social 
agent protecting its family members. The extended family network functioned as a 
strong social network; furthermore, the state promoted the family ethos, especially the 
notion of filial piety, as a means of social control and as the basic strategy for handling 
social problems. It is said that family problems are regarded as the families' own 
problems rather than social problems in Confucian Korea. 
While several themes have dominated attempts to account for the economic success of 
Korean society 
- 
notably 
- 
their distinctive `developmental states' and their heavy 
emphasis on education- the most wide-ranging and popularly current explanation is 
based on culture. Most cultural explanations have in turn been based on some notion of 
Confucianism, which is held to be a key part of the shared heritage of East Asia as a 
whole. In an earlier era (the 1950s and the 1960s), Western observers largely perceived 
Confucianism as a heavy constraint on the economic programme because of its stress on 
the importance of preserving tradition, its reinforcement of a social structure which 
despised and restricted commercial and industrial pursuits, and was hostile to 
technological innovation and entrepreneurship. Since the 1970s, however, 
Confucianism 
- 
in a protean variety of versions 
- 
has been rediscovered as a positive 
historical force. It is now commonly cited as having provided the fundamental cultural 
underpinnings for East Asian economic success, particularly through its perceived 
emphasis on education, strong family relations, benevolent paternalism, social harmony 
and discipline, respect for tradition and a strong work ethic (White and Goodman, 1998). 
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2.3.2. The Implication of Cultural Factors for Social Policy 
The theoretical orientation of Western literature, where applied to the Korean context, 
downplays certain explanations of Korean social policy, and modifies or extends others. 
First of all, cultural explanations may be utilised to analyse the policy responses to 
perceived social problems and the way in which other social problems are 
individualised within families even though cultural explanations tend to ignore the 
independent effects of social and political conditions other than cultural values and 
norms (Woo 2003, p. 10). Cultural theorists attribute the unique pattern of the East Asian 
welfare state to the region's cultural values (Jones, 1990; Park, 1990). From a cultural 
perspective, Confucianism plays a key role in shaping political actions of East Asian 
political elites. Because Confucianism has influenced these elites to believe that mutual 
support among family members and relatives is their primary duty, they may not have 
developed a strong sense of public responsibility for the well-being of the general 
population. 
Most studies tend to focus on the issue of whether or not there is an East Asian welfare 
model distinct from its Western counterpart although there have been few studies on the 
subject produced by Western scholars. However, there are different viewpoints on the 
characteristics of the East Asian welfare system. Some academics argue that East Asian 
countries have their own distinctive welfare system, `the East Asian Welfare Model' 
(Jones, 1990,1993; Goodman and Peng, 1995). Jones (1990,1993) argues that East 
Asian countries have a Confucian tradition of filial piety and loyalty which has been the 
overpowering force behind welfare policy in order to contrive `Oikonomic welfare 
state'. Goodman and Peng (1995) also argue that these countries have incorporated 
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many aspects of the Western welfare system, but in practice there is a fundamental 
deviation from the western experience. On the other hand, others argue that there is little 
to indicate a distinct `East Asian Welfare Model' that cannot be grasped with the 
standard conceptual tools of welfare state theory (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Goodman 
and White, 1999). 
2.4. Summary 
This chapter has explored the background of social policy in Korea. This chapter has 
also examined the interplay of political and economic factors before demonstrating what 
shaped the development of social policy and what the driving force in shaping social 
policy in Korea is. As noted over the last four decades Korea has undergone remarkable 
socio-economic changes due to modernisation, industrialisation and globalisation. 
Political and Socio-economic factors in social policy making are important in 
understanding how Korea's mental health policies have been developed and changed. 
However, the importance of cultural factors should not be underestimated. To make 
sense of the development and impact of mental health policies in Korea an 
understanding is needed of the processes by which social policies are made and the 
cultural contexts in which policy decisions are taken. 
It could be argued that mental health policy is one of the most complex in the policy- 
making arena among the many social policy programmes due to the mixture of variables 
from social, political and economic factors. That is to say that the mental health policy 
of any nation contains the distinctive characteristics of its national components. 
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Thus, each nation shows the distinctiveness of its social policy development although 
many developing countries have adopted the welfare developmental pattern of the 
developed countries. Hence, it is necessary to examine the history of the socio-political 
and socio-economic development of that nation when we observe the evolutionary 
process of a nation's social policy programme. In the same sense, this study intends to 
explore the ways in which Korean mental health policy has developed over time. 
By adopting Western systems as models in the social, political and economic arenas in 
the country throughout the modernisation process, Korea has become very Western in 
its thinking with regard to national values. With respect to this assumption, the question 
can be raised as to whether the development of the Korean mental health policy can be 
adequately explained within the context of a purely Western theoretical framework. In 
the next chapter, some Western theories will be introduced before examining their 
applicability to Korean mental health policy. Western theories can explain the 
development of Korean mental health policy. 
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Chapter 3. Theoretical Perspectives for Mental Health Policy 
Developments 
There has been a wide range of theoretical approaches amongst Western scholars, which 
have tried to explore accounts for the development of mental health policy (Busfield, 
1986,1996,1999; Goodwin, 1997; Jones, 1960,1988; Ramon, 1996; Rogers and 
Pilgrim, 1996,2001; Scull, 1977). These diverse perspectives have brought about a 
great deal of debate over the causes and effects of changing mental health care 
provision. 
As noted earlier, wider discussions about how and why welfare systems have developed 
and changed is likely to be crucial to understanding mental health policy making. In so 
doing, before examining the nature of social policies for people with mental health 
problems, it is necessary to explore theories which provide a theoretical explanation 
based upon the following particular factors 
- 
social and economic changes and the rise 
of the asylum, and reasons for the policy shift from institutional to community care. 
From this discussion, some theoretical explanations will be derived for Korea by 
elaborating how mental health policies have been formulated in the Korean context 
compared to Western mental health policy development. Although there are numerous 
studies of mental health policy developments, this study concentrates on three dominant 
approaches: the logic of industrialism, a Marxist approach and a cultural perspective. 
Tracing the creation of large institutions can help us understand their demise. (This is 
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the assumption behind the work of critical social historians such as Michel Foucault and 
Andrew Scull). There are two competing accounts giving different interpretations of 
events and the policy behind the establishment of the asylum system (Pilgrim and 
Rogers, 1999). 
This chapter is divided into four sections including the summary, the first section 
reviews the literature and arguments that explore the factors affecting mental health 
policy making in Western European and North American countries (especially the U. K. 
and the U. S. ). Section two tries to examines theoretical perspectives for mental health 
policy developments Section three explores the relevant theoretical framework for 
Korean mental health policy making 
3.1. Mental Health Policy Developments in Western Countries 
During the twentieth century there were significant developments in mental health 
policies and services in West European and North American countries (Goodwin, 1997; 
Busfield, 1999). These have been analysed in several different ways. In this study, 
however, mental health policy developments in Western countries will be discussed 
through two different phases. These are `the rise of the asylum' and the introduction of 
the ` care in the community' policy. 
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3.1.1. The Rise of the Asylum 
Over a number of centuries West European and North American countries have 
developed their mental health services. They opened their asylums for the mentally ill. 
The asylum was viewed as the `creation of secure provision for lunatics. ' (Goodwin 
1997, p. 6). In Western Europe, the Bethlem hospital was opened in 1403 in London, 
England, and the Casa de Orates opened in 1408 in Valencia, Spain (World Health 
Organization 1955). 
From the mid-seventeenth century, a `great confinement' took place across Europe 
(Foucault, 1961). Michel Foucault's (1960) pioneering work `Historie de la folie a 1'age 
classique' (Madness and Civilisation, 1967) laid the foundations for a critical review of 
psychiatric history. Often referred to as a `pre-history' of psychiatry, Foucault's thesis 
affords a central position to what he calls `the Great Confinement' in which the 
mentally ill were rounded up and put into the chief centres of confinement such as 
asylums, hospital, prisons or jails throughout European countries during the Classical 
Age (1660-c1800) (Foucault 1965, pp. 44-5). In France, the `great confinement' in the 
seventeenth century began with the incarceration of the poor, the sick and the mentally 
disabled in general hospitals, the first of which opened in Paris in 1657 (Foucault, 
1973). 
The logic of enlightenment values with its emphasis on rationality meant that those that 
represented `unreason' were stigmatised and separated from mainstream society. 
Deviancy of all types embodied in a variety of groups 
- 
the criminal, the poor, the lazy, 
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and the destitute 
- 
and which threatened bourgeois values, resulted in their segregation. 
In addition, Foucault argued, tolerance for the deviant within the community was 
diminishing throughout the nineteenth century. 
In Canada, an asylum was established by the `religious order' of New France (Quebec) 
in 1639 `for the care of indigent patients, the crippled and idiots', the 1833 Act was 
passed to allow relief for `destitute lunatics' in Ontario and, in 1841, its first asylum was 
opened (Dear et al., 1979). In the United States an asylum for lunatics was opened in 
Virginia in 1773 (World Health Organization, 1955). Western European and North 
American countries established a policy of building asylums for the incarceration of 
lunatics during the early to mid-nineteenth century. As a result of this, the pace of 
development increased. In addition, there were parliamentary inquiries and plans for 
asylum service development in the 1820s in France, England and Denmark. Some 
European countries, France, the Netherlands, England and Belgium introduced 
legislation to allow for the building of asylums by the middle of the nineteenth century. 
(Mangen, 1985; Goodwin 1997). 
The 1890 Lunacy Act placed the emphasis on protecting the rights of the public outside 
the asylum. As a result of this, legal procedures were tightened so that `the power of the 
legal profession superseded the power of the medical profession and social policies of 
the time' (Manning and Shaw 1999, p. 6). As Jones points out, this Act had implications 
which hampered the progress of the mental health movement for around four decades: 
The movement for further reform of the law became an (unequal) affair of pressure 
groups. The legal professional had been fully established for centuries. Medicine was 
involved in throwing off the shackles of a long association with barbering and 
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charlatanism, and did not achieve full status until the passing of the Medical 
Registration Act of 1858.... social work and social therapy were to remain occupations 
for the compassionate amateur until well into the twentieth century. It is therefore not 
surprising that the legal approach took precedence, to be followed after 1890 by the 
medical approach. It is only now, where the social sciences have developed a 
comparable professional status that the social approach is coming into its own again 
(Jones, 1960, p. 23). 
As Goodwin points out, however, `incarceration of lunatics proved to be an effective 
nineteenth-century solution to the problem of madness': 
The numbers afflicted were relatively small, and their condition was generally 
recognised to be severe. With an emphasis upon protecting society from the lunatic, 
the regulation of admission and discharge was left largely in judicial hands, and for 
the most part involved compulsion. Reflecting these concerns, the vast majority of the 
newly created asylums resembled prisons. Their main purpose was to remove the 
insane from society, and hold them. Inmates were often chained, and conditions were 
harsh (Goodwin 1997, pp. 6-7). 
In the late eighteenth century, there were efforts to reform the conditions in which 
lunatics were held. Goodwin (1997) portrays the situation as follows: 
In 1792 at the Bicetre hospital in Paris, Philippe Pinel has chains, which had been 
worn by some for 30 years, removed from 50 of the inmates and a regime based on 
moral treatment was introduced. A number of further reforms, such as the creation of a 
farm, were subsequently introduced by Ferrus at Bicetre, while others, such as 
Esquirol, sought to introduce a more humanitarian approach to lunatics more widely in 
France. In England similar ideas were introduced in a Quaker-led initiative by William 
Tuke and Lindley Murray, who founded the York Retreat in 1796. The use of chains 
was prohibited, and therapy based on work and exercise and the encouragement of 
moral behaviour was introduced. These ideas were also of influence in America, with 
Friends' Asylum being opened in 1817 in Pennsylvania. Subsequently, Dorothea Dix 
attempted to take forward the cause of reform in America by campaigning extensively 
for an improvement in asylum conditions (Goodwin 1997, p. 7). 
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As Grob (1991) points out, however, these efforts to improve the quality of care and 
treatment within the asylums had a limited effect. He also argues that conditions in 
asylums tended to worsen and the character of asylums became more custodial during 
the second half of the nineteenth century due to fiscal constraints and overcrowding 
(Grob, 1991). Nevertheless, the asylum system grew rapidly over the next few decades 
and the almost inevitable consequence of being found insane was incarceration by the 
end of the nineteenth century (Goodwin, 1997). 
There have been two major objectives of policy reformers over the last century: initially 
to reform the asylums, and subsequently to replace them. The first was to reform the 
custodial asylums into `proper' hospitals. This was initiated in Britain by the Mental 
Treatment Act of 1930 which moved the focus away from detention and towards 
prevention and treatment (Busfield, 1986). It also stimulated the introduction of insulin 
coma therapy, electronic-convulsive therapy and brain surgery (Manning and Shaw, 
1999). Goodwin also points out this: 
In the first half of the twentieth century there was some innovation taking place within 
the old mental hospitals. In the 1930s and 1940s many psychiatrists began to 
experiment with open-door policies, whereby patients gained some freedom of 
movement outside of the hospital ward. Efforts were made to increase the therapeutic 
value of the mental hospital, this including the development of industrial therapy as 
well as the introduction of a range of new physical treatments including electro- 
convulsive therapy, insulin coma therapy and psycho-sugary. Concurrent with these 
developments, admission rates tended to increase, while average lengths of stay 
tended to decrease. Overall, through the first half of the twentieth century asylums 
underwent a transition in function, from being primarily custodial institutions towards 
becoming treatment institutions (Goodwin 1997, pp. 7-8). 
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Before the drug revolution and the decarceration movement of the 1960s, mental 
hospitals were as much concerned with containing aberrant behaviour as with treating 
the sufferer. Asylums, Erving Goffinan's important book about inmate life in a 
psychiatric hospital, detailed this control process. His book presented an empathic view 
of the role of the patient and his passage through the treatment system. He focused on a 
participant observer's viewpoint of the daily interaction between patients, patient and 
staff and patient and relatives. In addition, he dealt with the process of social exclusion, 
social control and alienation experienced by inmates of highly bureaucratised 
psychiatric institutions (Baron, 1987). 
As a result of the introduction of the major tranquillisers, the more acute symptoms of 
mental illness were effectively controlled and long-term incarceration in a mental 
hospital became unnecessary for most people. Indeed, in the 1960s, there were 
extensive alternative treatments, for example, day-centres and other non-residential 
organisations providing care for mental illness. Much of this alternative treatment 
adopted `anti-institutional views'. Consequently, more and more people involved in 
psychiatry, either as carers or on the receiving end of treatment, were beginning to 
reject the notion of control that is inherent in much of modern psychiatry (Baron, 1987). 
68 
3.1.2. Explanations for the Rise of Asylum 
3.1.2.1. The Social and Economic Changes and the Rise of the Asylum 
The social and economic changes associated with industrialisation and urbanisation are 
structural factors contributing to the rise of the asylum in nineteenth century Britain 
(Carrier and Kendall, 1997). There have been some arguments that industrialisation is 
one of the crucial contributing factors affecting the rise of asylum. For instance, Rogers 
and Pilgrim (1996) noted that most accounts view aspects of industrialisation as a causal 
factor in the rise of the asylum. The main features of industrialisation have been 
summarised as follows: 
(a) A rapid growth in population and geographical mobility; 
(b) Population and production mobility from rural to urban areas; 
(c) A shift away from agricultural to factory-based production; 
(d) A transformation of the social and political ordering of dominant ideals. 
(Rogers and Pilgrim 1996, p. 46) 
According to Mechanic, segregative forms of social control arose as a response to the 
inability of family-and community-based systems of support to contain illness in the 
community. Mechanic (1969) writes: 
Industrial and technological change... coupled with increasing urbanisation 
brought decreasing tolerance for bizarre and disruptive behaviour and less 
ability to contain deviant behaviour within the existing social structure (p. 54). 
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Mechanic emphasises the decreasing tolerance of society for deviant behaviour as 
inevitably arising from the replacement of old paternal relationships with chaos caused 
by mass geographical mobility and urban anonymity. 
3.1.2.2. Conventional Accounts (Humanitarianism) 
This conventional account is sometimes referred to as a `Whig', or from a feminist 
perspective a `great man', version of history. This type of history is usually written by 
and for the confidant and successful and it emphasises the valiant deeds, altruism, and 
humanitarianism of key agencies and individuals. From such a perspective the asylum is 
viewed as part and parcel of medical progress and an increasingly humane way of 
dealing with `mentally ill' people (Pilgrim and Rogers, 1999). 
For instance, Jones (1960) stresses the humanitarianism behind the reform movement 
leading to the Lunatics Act 1845. This Act compelled county authorities to establish 
asylums and enforced their regulation via a centralised Lunacy Commission and a 
system of medical records. Much of Jones's account centres around the official reports 
of Metropolitan Commissioners between 1828 and 1845 and the role of government- 
appointed bodies (such as Parliamentary Select Committees), which drew public 
attention to the poor state of workhouses and private madhouses. The establishment of 
early institutions modelled on the moral treatment regime of the York Retreat is 
described as arising from `the consciousness felt by a small group of citizens of an 
overwhelming social evil in their midst' (Jones 1960, p. 40). In fact, moral treatment 
failed to transfer from the early charity hospitals like the Retreat to the State-run 
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asylums, although its image dominated the rhetoric of asylum reformers (Donnelly 
1983). Jones (1960) sees the implementation of the 1845 Act in a humanitarian light: 
`Ashley and his colleagues had roused the conscience of mid-Victorian society, and had 
set a new standard of public morality by which the care of the helpless and degraded 
classes of the community was to be seen as a social responsibility. ' (Pilgrim and Rogers 
1999, p. 145) 
3.1.3. The Emergence of Care in the Community 
As mentioned before there have been two major objectives of policy reformers during 
the latter part of the nineteenth century: initially to reform the asylums, and 
subsequently to replace them. As the conditions within asylums worsened further, the 
efforts to develop alternative systems of care and treatment emerged. 
Perhaps most famous of these schemes was that begun at Gheel in Belgium, where its 
shrines were reputed to offer a cure for lunacy. If no cure resulted within nine days, 
the lunatic would then be boarded out with a local family in order that they might 
continue to attend church. The practice of boarding-out lunatics with families 
subsequently developed in many European countries, including Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and the Scandinavian countries (World Health Organization, 
1955, p. 7). 
The new emphasis upon mental health care outside of the asylum continued to grow in 
the early twentieth century (Goodwin, 1997). 
By the 1920s the mental hygiene movement had established associations in a number 
of European countries and in the United States. By the 1930s there were small-scale 
developments in a range of extramural services. This included domiciliary support, the 
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development of child guidance, marital counselling services and outpatient services. 
While not common, these types of service began to emerge in various towns and cities 
across Europe and North America (Goodwin 1997, p. 9). 
Many European countries had considerable experience in mental health services 
provision in the aftermath of World War II. In addition, there were also a number of 
initiatives for people with mental health problems in the community as a means of 
ensuring their survival (Demay, 1987). Since the early 1950s, there have been moves 
towards community care in many western countries. This resulted in reductions in 
hospital places in Britain, the US, and other European countries (Busfield 1999). 
There has been the shift from asylum care to community care resulting from a distinct 
change of policy: from a model of services for those disturbed in mind centred on the 
asylum, to a model of services located in an centred on the community (Busfeld 1999, 
P. 58). 
It has been estimated that over half a million long-stay patients have been discharged 
from mental hospitals in the United States and the United Kingdom since the 1950s 
(Lamb, 1993). This extensive change in mental health care has been advocated by 
successive British governments since 1961, and Enoch Powell, then health minister, 
gave this statement on the closure of 75,000 beds in asylums by 1976: 
There they stand, majestic, imperious, brooded over by the gigantic water-tower and 
chimney combined, rising unmistakably and daunting out of the countryside, the 
asylums which our forefathers built with such solidity. Do not for a moment 
underestimate their power of resistance to our assault (Enoch Powell, 1961). 
In case of the United States, a crucial improvement was given to de-institutionalisation 
when President John F. Kennedy (1963) sent a message to Congress that announced 
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America's first, and only, federally operated community mental health initiative. In that 
year Kennedy spoke of pursuing a `bold new approach' in mental health service 
delivery, three words that eventually became the by-words of the de-institutionalisation 
movement (Lamb, 1993). 
Over the twentieth century, mental health services outside of the hospital, such as 
outpatient services and day care services, were developed. There was also a range of 
new community centred care services for discharged patients including community 
mental health centres, and the establishment of multi-disciplinary community-based 
psychiatric teams involving general practitioners, community psychiatric nurses, 
psychiatrists, psychologists and some other staff groups (Goodwin, 1997). With a 
variety of insurance schemes, Western European and North American countries have a 
number of common patterns and trends in mental health services. In few countries, 
including England, Denmark, Italy and Canada, services funded by general taxation 
have emerged (Goodwin, 1997). There has been a general trend towards more varied 
and more community centred mental health care for those with mental health problems. 
Many of the older hospitals have been run down or closed. At the same time, new 
psychiatric units have been established in general hospitals. 
There has been a `global trend' in that many other industrialised countries have tended 
to develop community mental health care for those with mental health problems 
(Goodwin, 1997). Malaysia, for example, has made substantial progress in transferring 
mental health service users from institutional to community settings in recent years 
(Salleh, 1993). In Israel, mental health legislation was implemented in 1991 which 
seeks to increase patient rights and to avoid unnecessary hospitalisation (Levy, 1992). In 
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1992 the health ministers of all-Australian states and territories, together with the 
federal government, endorsed a National Mental Health Policy. This laid out plans to 
promote the development of community-based services, together with their better 
integration with remaining institutional services (Whiteford, 1993). 
There have been significant changes in the way in which people with mental health 
problems are treated and cared for in Western Europe and North American countries in 
the aftermath of World War II, even among many other industrialised countries around 
the world in recent years. In this respect, the question that arises is why this has 
occurred and what forces, in what combination, have brought about such a rapid, 
widespread and dramatic policy shift? 
In the early 1960s there were some plans to reduce the number of long-term mentally ill 
patients in hospital in North American and Western European countries (Goodwin, 
1997). Many long-stay hospitals were closed through the pursuit of a `care in the 
community' policy (Hadley and Clough, 1996). This policy appeared to be successful in 
providing an opportunity for long-term mentally ill people to live in their own home and 
community and be supported by health and social care services. People with mental 
health problems were given individual rights to protect them from poor inhumanitarian 
services and to provide `needs-led' services which provided for `highly differentiated 
treatment needs' (Tomlinson 1991, p. 162). 
There were some policies and projects aimed at seeking good practice and to continue a 
care in the community policy for those with mental health problems in the 1970s and 
1980s. These policies and projects were designed to support and help families of the 
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mentally ill, provision of suitable accommodation and housing and social support. They 
also emphasised the development of community care (Renshaw et. al, 1995). Hadley 
and Clough argued that there were five general themes that affect the development of 
community care; `the growing resource', `base of public services', `rising demands', 
`professionalisation', `changing patterns of treatment' and `de-institutionalisation' 
(Hadley and Clough 1996, p. 10). Many industrialised countries around the world are 
now tending towards developing community-based policies for people with mental 
health problems. 
As Dear and Wolch (1987) argue, a combination of factors is responsible for the policy 
shift: `The idea of the care in the community approach was a response to new treatment 
philosophies, major advances in chemotherapy, a concern with patient's rights and 
fiscal pressure' (Dear and Wolch 1987, p. 250). 
In addition Hafner and his colleagues argue that there are three main reasons for the 
shift in policy in European countries: `the neglect of mental hospitals and the resulting 
criticism of their condition; the shift within psychiatry towards a more therapeutic 
orientation; and the increasing emphasis upon civil rights, liberty and quality of life for 
chronically sick and disabled people' (Hanfner et. al. 1989, p. 12). 
The demand for community-based mental health care was subsequently intensified by 
economic problems. Within this range of factors explaining why community-oriented 
mental health care services have tended to replace institutional care, a pattern emerges 
in terms of type of explanation developed in different accounts. Some, particularly 
Jones tend to stress the importance of new drug treatments for people with mental 
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health problems, and humanitarian concerns such as those contained in the anti- 
institutional critiques. Others, particularly Scull, tend to stress the importance of 
structural factors, particularly those deriving from the nature of capitalist societies. This 
concerns factors such as the cost of service provision, and problems associated with the 
maintenance of social control (Scull, 1977). 
As Goodwin (1997) points out, there have been a number of problems affecting 
community care policies in Western countries. 
(a) Hospital and community support services: transinstitutionalisation; a two-tier 
service; the revolving door; the lack of community care facilities; the poor quality 
of some community care facilities; the inadequate range of community care 
facilities 
(b) The outcomes of community care: the discharge process; the destination of 
discharged patients; family care; homelessness. 
(c) Use of treatments: side effects of drug treatment; compulsory treatment in the 
community; the physical and mental health of service users. 
Goodwin has also noted that `a lack of resources devoted to the development of 
adequate alternatives to institutional care, together with a lack of concern for the quality 
of life of informal carers or of service users, has tended to characterise the development 
of community care policy' (Goodwin 1997, p. 27). Despite this, in recent years the 
Korean government has introduced a care in the community policy for people with 
mental health problems. Korea has made substantial progress in transferring mental 
health services users from institution to community settings in recent years. This trend 
of community-oriented mental health care appeared in Korea as a policy shift toward 
community oriented services provision by the mid-1990s. In 1995 Korea passed a 
mental health law for the first time in order to protect some individual human rights, 
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and it allowed for the creation of some community-based programme models. It has 
generally come to be accepted that people experiencing mental health problems are 
better provided for in the community than in hospital care. Accordingly there has been a 
massive shift in emphasis from the provision of inpatient care in mental hospitals, 
towards the provision of a more varied and community-based set of services. 
3.1.4. Explanations for Policy Shift towards Community Care 
There have been various origins of the policy of care in the community. Ramon (1992) 
described three factors influencing the policy of long-stay psychiatric hospital closure. 
The first is evidence of the effectiveness of alternative community-based interventions 
and medical treatments. The second is political support deriving both from the 
perceived financial savings to be made by hospital closure, and from the fact that 
community-based services are considered to provide a more `respectful' way of treating 
fellow citizens. The latter is a sociological critique of the segregating and stigmatising 
effect of total institutions. 
However, Busfield (1986) attempted to summarise explanations for the trend of large 
hospitals being run-down and closure. She presents three main models: 
(a) The pharmacological revolution 
- 
introduction of psychotropic drugs and 
acceptance of institutional critique; 
(b) Economic determinism 
- 
increased costs of segregative control plus the fiscal 
crisis of the state; 
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(c) A shift to acute problems 
- 
undermining of belief in the therapeutic value of 
institutions; development of non-institutional forms of welfare; medical 
advantages of integration; therapeutic optimism. 
Additionally, in his study of the Comparative Mental Health Policy: from institutional 
to community care, Goodwin (1997) presents a comparative analysis of mental health 
policy in Western Europe and North America. He considers how, and why, differences 
have developed in the implementation of these policies. As a focus for his study he used 
a range of types of explanation (see Table 3.1. ) about the policy shift towards 
community-based services for people with mental health problems. 
What we find, therefore, is a range of types of explanation, from orthodox, which tend 
to stress the positive and beneficial aspect of the policy shift, to the radical, which tend 
to stress the negative and detrimental consequences of the shift to community-based 
systems of care and treatment (Goodwin 1997, p. 28). 
Table 3.1. Reasons for the Policy Shift 
Orthodox Accounts Radical Accounts 
(a) The development of new drug treatment. (a) 
(b) The development of social psychiatry. (b) 
(c) The emergence of radical analyses, together (c) 
with the civil rights movement. 
(d) The poor conditions within the old mental (d) 
hospitals. 
(e) 
(e) Increased community tolerance. 
(0 
(g) 
(Ii) 
High public welfare expenditure is a cause of 
economic problems. 
High public expenditure growth is associated 
with a tendency towards deinstitutionalisation. 
High fiscal deficits result in pressure for 
deinstitutionalisation. 
The retention of institutional care results in 
increasingly large opportunity costs. 
An inverse relationship can be found between 
levels of unemployment and mental hospital bed 
space. 
Community care is cheaper than institutional 
care. 
Government policy is determined by economic 
issues. 
Source: Adapted form Goodwin (1997) 
The wishes of people with mental health 
problems to live, whenever possible, within 
community settings. 
A federal constitutional structure has tended 
to facilitate a more rapid shift in policy. 
Insurance-based funding systems have 
tended to hinder the policy shift. 
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Goodwin (1997) explains `orthodox accounts' of policy shift: 
By the term `orthodox accounts', we are referring to those explanations and 
descriptions of policy development that offer a conventional understanding of policy 
change. Such accounts tend to be pluralistic, offering a range of factors to accounts for 
post-war change in mental health policy (p. 29). 
In contrast, he explains `radical accounts' of policy shift: 
Rather than focus upon particular ideological currents, administrative arrangements or 
other intricacies of public policy-making, Marxist and other radical writers tend to 
focus upon broad analytical themes associated with the more general nature of social 
and economic arrangements. A central contention is that the post-war mental health 
policies of Western European and North American countries have largely been shaped 
by financial pressures (Goodwin 1997, p. 51). 
Within this range of factors concerning why community-based services have tended to 
replace institutional care, a pattern emerges in terms of the type of explanation 
developed in different accounts. Some, especially Katherine Jones, tend to stress the 
importance of new drug treatments, and humanitarian concerns such as those contained 
in anti-institutional critiques. Others, especially Andrew Scull, tend to stress the 
importance of structural factors, particularly those deriving from the nature of capitalist 
societies. This concerns factors such as the cost of service provision, and problems 
associated with the maintenance of social control (Goodwin, 1997). 
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3.1.4.1. `Orthodox' Accounts for the Policy Shift 
The post-war policy shift towards community care has been explained in a number of 
different ways. A standard account, often favoured by psychiatrists, links it to the 
therapeutic developments of the post-war 1950s, and, to a lesser extent, to the impact of 
the sustained and vocal critiques of institutional care that come from both within and 
outside psychiatry during the same decade. The chemically synthesised drugs of the 
1950s permitted, it is contended, a greater number of patients to be treated outside the 
hospital and facilitated the earlier discharge of those who did have to be admitted. This, 
together with an increasing recognition of the anti-therapeutic nature of institutional 
care led, it is argued, to general support for policies of shifting care away from the 
mental hospital towards the community. Busfield (1986) attempted to characterise the 
policy change and the explanation that is offered of it in terms of the simple model set 
out in Figure 3.1. 
According to Shaw (2000), in the UK `moving the locus of treatment away from the 
asylums by developing broad systems of community care was one of the objectives of 
the 1930 Mental Health Treatment Act. This Act had given the local authorities 
permissive responsibilities for the aftercare of those discharged from hospitals, though it 
was not until the "three revolutions" of the 1950s that a significant move towards 
community care occurred' (Shaw 2000, p. 106). 
(a) The first `revolution' was the introduction of new drugs. Chlorpromazine 
(largactil), although sedative in effect, enables patients to continue daily activities 
while being relieved of the more disturbing symptoms of their illness; 
(b) The second `revolution' was an administrative one which involved the 
modernisation of hospitals to utilise a wide range of services, such as in-patients, 
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outpatient units, day care, and hostels, which facilitated the development of 
community care; 
(c) The third `revolution' involved legal reforms brought about by the 1959 Mental 
Health Act. This abolished compulsory admission as the regular means of 
admission and aimed to reorient the mental health service away from institutional 
care towards community care 
(Shaw 2000, p. 106). 
In addition Goodwin (1997) attempted to explain reasons for the policy shift. He called 
it `orthodox accounts': 
By the term `orthodox accounts', we are referring to those explanations and 
descriptions of policy development that offer a conventional understanding of policy 
change. Such accounts tend to be pluralistic, offering a range of factors to accounts for 
post-war change in mental health policy (p. 29). 
Figure 3.1. Policy Change and its `Orthodox' Explanation 
Policy Change: Development of Community Care 
Community care: 
Institutional care: 
ý1ý " Outpatient clinics 
" AsylumV) 
" Day hospitals 
" Mental hospital 
" Hostels 
" Primary care 
Explanation: 
" Introduction of psychotropic drugs. 
" Acceptance of institutional critiques. 
Source: Busfield, 1986. 
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He also attempted to add some reasons for the policy shift into the existing explanation. 
These are: 
(a) The development of new drug treatment; 
(b) The development of social psychiatry; 
(c) The emergence of radical analyses, together with the civil rights movement; 
(d) The poor conditions within the old mental hospitals; 
(e) Increased community tolerance; 
(f) The wishes of people with mental health problems to live, whenever possible, 
within community settings; 
(g) A federal constitutional structure that tended to facilitate a more rapid shift in 
policy; 
(h) Insurance-based funding systems that tended to hinder the policy shift. 
(Goodwin, 1997) 
There are series of problems with many of the propositions in the orthodox analysis. 
Goodwin (1997) argued that the only proposition that could be accepted is `the tendency 
of insurance-based funding systems to hinder policy change'. In addition, other factors, 
such as the introduction of new drugs, and the role of social psychiatry, were all highly 
problematic. 
Furthermore, critical historians reject this more conventional account of events. The 
incarceration of mad people in asylums is seen as inextricably linked to the wider-scale 
containment of social deviancy: the poor in workhouses and criminals in prisons. The 
accounts of alternative histories vary (Pilgrim and Rogers, 1999). 
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3.1.4.2. Radical Accounts for the Policy Shift 
While some commentators accepted the orthodox account for the policy change, there 
has been the radical explanation of the policy shift from institutional care to community 
care for those with mental health problems. Goodwin (1997) explains `radical accounts' 
of policy shift: 
Rather than focus upon particular ideological currents, administrative arrangements or 
other intricacies of public policy-making, Marxist and other radical writers tend to 
focus upon broad analytical themes associated with the more general nature of social 
and economic arrangements. A central contention is that the post-war mental health 
policies of Western European and North American countries have largely been shaped 
by financial pressures (p. 51). 
There are a number of problems with this explanation of the shift to community care, 
grounded as it is in the liberal-scientific view of medical work, as Scull in his book 
Decarceration, and others, have indicated. First, it is defective on grounds of timing. 
The decline in the size of the resident population of psychiatric beds was apparent in 
national statistics for the UK and in the US in the mid-1950s and in the statistics for 
particular hospitals from at least the beginning of the 1950s, yet the chemically 
synthesised drugs were only just beginning to be introduced in the mid 1950s (Scull 
1977, p. 82). 
Scull presents a second objection to the thesis: that there is little evidence that 
psychotropic drugs have been very effective in curing mental disorders. In his words 
there is `a growing volume of evidence which suggest that claims about the therapeutic 
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effectiveness of so-called "anti-psychotic" medication have been greatly exaggerated' 
(Scull 1977, p. 82) 
Scull has presented us with an alternative description of the policy transition and an 
alternative explanation that questions the benevolent assumptions of the liberal 
explanation. For Scull, the key policy change is a negative one: the rejection of the 
asylum; he uses the term decarceration as a `shorthand for a state-sponsored policy of 
closing down asylums, prisons and reformatories', a policy more commonly described 
as deinstitutionalisation (Scull 1977, p. 1). According to Scull this represents a 
movement away from what he calls `an institutionally based system of segregative 
control' (Scull 1997, p. 64). He measures the adoption of this policy by the decline in the 
number of resident patients in state mental hospitals in the US and the UK since the 
mid-1950s, a decline more substantial in the US than in the UK and one that he 
recognises is far from complete in either country. 
Scull's description of the transition is not, therefore, of a move from mental hospital 
care to community care but from segregation in the asylum to neglect and misery within 
the community. This description of the nature of the transition generates its own 
explanation: that the main reasons for the adoption of the new policy were economic. 
Decarceration was introduced because `segregative modes of social control became, in 
relative terms, far more costly and difficult to justify' (p. 135). For him the anti- 
institutional ideology of the 1950s may have facilitated decarceration but was not in 
itself sufficient to account for its adoption. As evidence, he points to the critique of 
institutional care in the nineteenth century, which he asserts had little real impact. 
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Bustfield (1986) presents Scull's interpretation of decarceration and its explanation in 
Figure 2.2. 
Furthermore Goodwin (1997) attempted to add some reasons for the policy shift into the 
existing radical explanation in terms of `radical accounts'. These are: 
(a) High public expenditure growth is associated with a tendency towards de- 
institutionalisation; 
(b) High fiscal deficits result in pressure for de-institutionalisation; 
(c) The retention of institutional care results in increasingly large opportunity costs; 
(d) An inverse relationship can be found between levels of unemployment and 
mental hospital bed space; 
(e) Community care is cheaper than institutional care; 
(f) Government policy is determined by economic issues. 
Figure 2.2. Policy Change and its Radical Explanation 
Policy Change : Closing Down the Asylums 
Asylums 
(Segregative Social 
Control) I> 
Run down of services (Neglect and 
Gettoisation) 
Explanation: 
" 
Increased costs of segregative control plus the fiscal crisis of 
the state 
Source: Busfield, 1986. 
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As Goodwin (1997) mentioned, the radical analysis of the development of mental health 
policy includes ` a number of assumptions about the nature of the relationship between 
capitalist economies and welfare provision' (p. 65). He argued that the concerns of 
governments with the economic cost of welfare provision and the possibility of 
achieving cost savings through the shift towards community-based mental health care 
are evident. These radical accounts have been mainly advocated by Scull (1977) who 
argues that after the Second World War governments increasingly struggled to contain 
the fiscal pressures of the welfare state. Given that institutional care or segregate control 
was expensive, the large hospitals could be eliminated to save money. 
3.2. Economistic Explanations for Mental Health Policy Developments 
It could be argued that social policies are always changing according to domestic socio- 
economic structures, internal influences, as well as changes in international markets, 
external influences (Powell and Hewitt, 1997). In this respect, Korean mental health 
policy has been largely influenced by structural factors due to the process of 
industrialisation (internal influences) and globalisation (external influences). 
3.2.1. Logic of Industrialism 
In Western Europe and North America the early development of mental health services 
is generally recognised to be a product of the emerging industrial societies. In the 
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eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the shift of populations from rural to urban areas 
created a problem of maintaining social order and of meeting the needs of a newly 
formed urban mass (Goodwin, 1997). Within the emerging market economies, lunatics, 
more obviously than the physically sick, elderly and children, were less able to conform 
to labour market discipline and more able to create disturbance and disorder (Scull, 
1979). 
Not everybody could support himself or herself in the market, nor would they 
necessarily find support from the church, charity or family. Or, where such support was 
made available by a family member, their own ability to participate in the labour market 
was constrained. People with mental health problems, therefore, were one of the first 
potential welfare clients to be recognised by governments as a distinct group who had 
the right to social benefits without the need for labour market participation (Goodwin, 
1997). 
The creation of asylums in Europe and North America has been argued to represent one 
part of the response made to these issues: `Throughout Europe, confinement constituted 
one of the answers the seventeenth century gave to an economic crisis that affected the 
entire Western world' (Foucault 1973, p. 49). In his analysis of the origins and 
development of the asylums in the United States, Rothman (1971) develops a similar 
analysis: 
In this period, psychiatrists were more American than they were scientific, and the 
nature of their response to insanity cannot be comprehended unless one recognises that 
they defined mental illness as a social problem, not just a medical one.... Prisons, 
poorhouses and orphan asylums grew up at the same time, and this coincidence 
suggest that the society was reacting to more than psychiatric doctrines (p. xv) 
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Furthermore, Scull, a Marxist, suggests that mass confinement (of which the asylum 
system constituted an integral part) was a product of urbanisation, industrialisation, and 
professional forces during the first half of the nineteenth century. The development of 
capitalism, with its demand for wage labour, meant that the existing means of poor 
relief was ill-equipped to deal with social deviance produced by the new market 
economy. Thus, the old outdoor system of relief in operation since the Elizabethan Poor 
Law was replaced by mass incarceration in institutions (Pilgrim and Rogers, 1999). 
From the beginning of the nineteenth century a gradual process of segregation took 
place. Poor, able-bodied people (that is those fit to work) were sent to workhouses, 
which were orientated towards instilling `proper work habits'. These people were 
separated from those that could not work, which included those deemed insane and in 
need of incarceration in asylums. At the same time, ideas about madness were changing. 
It became recognised as a loss of self-control and not, as previously, a loss of humanity. 
These changing values were influenced by the exposure of the brutal treatment of those 
in madhouses. This encouraged the abandonment of mechanical restraints and it 
endorsed regimes such as the York Retreat (Pilgrim and Rogers, 1999). 
These new social values permitted a greater willingness to accept a medical view of 
madness, the ascendance of which Scull attributes to the entrepreneurial leanings of 
medical practitioners, who were at the same time making efforts to professionalize and 
expand. Lucrative pickings were to be had by the profession trying to capture the 
madhouses previously run by laymen. Rather than having to attract patients to them, 
the asylum provided them with a ready-made and captive clientele (Pilgrim and 
Rogers 1999, p. 145). 
88 
The logic of the industrialism approach shares many similar points to functionalist 
perspectives in how it accounts for the development of social policy. This approach 
explains that social policy programmes are necessarily born to deal with the impact of 
social transformation into an urban-industrial society. Because urban-industrialisation 
and technical evolution cause massive changes in the structure of the family, 
community, labour and demography, government ultimately responds to these rapid 
social changes by bringing a means of social policy. 
This theoretical perspective offers a possible approach for the interpretation of the 
Korean case. Since the Korean War, the country has succeeded in making rapid 
economic development during the last four decades. This huge economic achievement 
has resulted in tremendous social transformations in the areas of the family, 
demography, social structures and so on. While enjoying economic growth, the country 
has also adopted welfare programmes. During the socio-economic evolution, the 
question could be raised as to whether economic development contributed to the 
development of welfare programmes in Korea. As the mental health policy was 
initiated and implemented alongside economic growth in Korea, economic growth may 
be a critical variable to explain Korean welfare development in general and mental 
health development in particular. 
With regard to the logic of industrialisation, thus, two controversial issues became 
apparent with respect to the Korean experience: first, even though the industrialisation 
approach provides an explanation for mental health policy development, the efforts of 
political actors in the policy-making arena should be considered; second, although 
industrialisation has brought progress, it has also contributed to the collapse of 
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traditional social welfare mechanisms in Korean society. For example, neighbours have 
traditionally depended on each other for assistance during times of crisis. 
Unfortunately, industrialisation has led to the breakdown of these informal networks 
and created a need for the development of formalised welfare programmes. 
3.2.2. Marxist Perspectives 
Scull (1977) provides an alternative explanation for `decarceration', the term he uses to 
describe the `... State sponsored policy of closing down asylums', which he relates to 
changes in social control mechanisms. Scull contends that, with the emergence of the 
welfare state, segregative control mechanisms became too costly and difficult to justify. 
The cost inflation of mental hospitals prior to, and after, the Second World War was 
brought about by the elimination of unpaid patient labour and the increased cost of 
employees, as a result of the unionisation of labour. The latter had the effect of 
contributing to the doubling of unit costs (because of the cost of a shorter working day 
and holiday entitlement) (Pilgrim and Rogers, 1999). 
The maintenance of ex-patients on welfare payments and the ` neglecting' of community 
care has become a more viable State policy. The reality of community habitation for ex- 
inmates, according to Scull, has been an unmitigated disaster for the majority. The 
inhumanity of the asylum has simply been replaced by the negligence of the 
community: `the alternative to the institution has been to be herded into newly emerging 
"deviant ghettoes", sewers of human misery, which are conventionally defined as a 
social pathology within which (largely hidden from outside inspection or even notice) 
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society's refuse may be repressively tolerated' (Scull 1977, quoted in Pilgrim and 
Rogers 1999, p. 153). 
Some academics argue that a capitalist state has to achieve the goals of legitimation and 
accumulation. In the 1970s and 1980s neo-Marxists such as O'Connor (1973), Gough 
(1979) and Offe (1984), believed that the capitalist state would face an inbuilt and 
inescapable crisis. According to O'Connor (1973), a capitalist state will have to fulfil 
two basic functions 
- 
accumulation and legitimation 
- 
and public expenditure is 
required to meet these functions. As he predicted, the `fiscal crisis' has been triggered 
by a gap between state revenues and expenditure in fulfilling these two contradictory 
tasks. This is because the state's welfare burden becomes heavier as more of the 
population become dependent on state help. For O'Connor, there is no alternative 
means for handling such an inbuilt conflict. 
As Busfield (1986) argues, in the case of the United Kingdom the fiscal pressure 
hypothesis fits poorly with the period of the 1950s and 1960s when the policy of de- 
institutionalisation was introduced (on paper if not in practice) and fits better for the 
1970s and after. The latter has been a period which we have already noted was 
associated with rigid efforts on the part of both the Labour and then Conservative 
administrations to contain welfare spending. 
During the 1970s a Labour administration had struggled with debt problems amplified 
by the OPEC oil crisis in 1973 and had to approach the International Monetary Fund 
for a loan. A condition of this arrangement was that public spending had to be brought 
under control. And so a Labour government began a period of welfare cuts even 
before Thatcher came to power in 1979. The crisis of the British welfare state can be 
viewed as endemic to any capitalist country which attempts to solve its social 
problems by the use of public finance. This financial consideration put pressure on 
expensive institutions like the Victorian asylum system, but the latter had in any case 
been losing their credibility since the mid-1960s. Thus the run-down of the old 
asylums gained momentum for both economic and ideological reasons. Indeed, whilst 
economic factors were influential, it is worth noting that asylum run-down, and the 
absence of new large institutions being commissioned, had become a global trend, 
independent of particular nation-state economic conditions. Sometimes a reaction 
against the large hospital and for new community developments was stronger in some 
capitalist countries during the 1960s and 1970s (e. g. the US and Italy) that in others 
(e. g. Spain and Japan) (Roger & Pilgrim 1996, p. 77). 
Hospital closure was not utilised in the US case as an opportunity to change the system, 
the attitudes or the skills of providers and purchasers, nor to increase the involvement of 
the lay community. Ramon (1996, p. 30) argues that `this was the case because the aim 
of the government, and a number of professionals, was not to reach beyond de- 
hospitalisation. The latter was a finite objective for a cost-cutting exercise, as 
demonstrated by cuts in the budgets of community mental health centres a few years 
later'. 
In addition, the costs of mental health problems to a nation are substantial. This fact, 
together with the relatively difficult fiscal conditions faced by many governments over 
the last three decades, leads most writers to accept the importance of economic factors 
in the determination of mental health policy (Goodwin, 1997). Even, Jones, who 
supports orthodox accounts of policy shift, mentioned the important role of economics. 
... 
the discovery by governments that welfare policies had limits, and that citizens 
were liable to demand far more in the way of services than they were prepared to pay 
for through taxes; and a new economic situation after the crisis of 1973, in which 
monetarism was dominants, public sector expenditure was reduced, unemployment 
was widespread, and welfare services were cut to the bone. These factors, common to 
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all countries in the Western world and involving some curious and contradictory 
reasoning, brought about similar results in quite different national contexts (Jones 
1988, p. 82). 
A leading advocate of this position is Andrew Scull. He maintains that over the post- 
war period governments in the advanced capitalist countries had become increasingly 
prone to `fiscal crisis': a condition when tax revenues tend to decline while demands for 
social expenditure tend to increase, resulting in a growing fiscal deficit. The process of 
de-institutionalisation has primarily been the result of a need to reduce costs, and the 
ideology of community care has provided the legitimating cover under which that 
programme commenced (Goodwin 1997, p. 52). 
Scholars of social policy have paid considerable attention to the part that economics 
plays in the policy-making process. Richardson (1969, p. 96) notes that `economics 
imposed certain constraints upon political action. Purely economic factors were an 
incentive to government action because of the need to increase the efficiency of the 
nation's economy'. 
Marxist and other radical writers tend to focus upon broad analytical themes associated 
with the more general nature of social and economic arrangements rather than focus 
upon particular ideological currents, administrative arrangements or other intricacies of 
public policy-making (Goodwin 1997, p. 51). Moreover, there is an important point 
about the cost of health problems to a nation. Goodwin (1997) explains this: 
The cost of mental health problems to nation is substantial. This fact, together with the 
relatively difficult fiscal conditions faced by many governments over the last 20 years 
or so, leads most writers to accept the importance of economic factors is the 
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determination of mental health policy (p. 51) 
There are various propositions to account for the policy shift from institutional to 
community care for people with mental health problems. One of them is `government 
policy is determined by economic issues', which means that governments are largely 
driven by economic imperatives (Goodwin 1997, p. 62). Economic problems have 
resulted in a reduction in the commitment to welfare provision and a shift towards 
community-based care because of its assumed relative cheapness (Carrol, 1993). 
Goodwin (1997) gives us some evidences to justify this: 
It is argued that the tendency to shift from institutional to community care since the 
1970s has been driven by cost considerations: `As the crisis of the welfare state has 
deepened, official preoccupations with community care have progressively narrowed 
down to the paramount question of cost'. Indeed the desire to save money has been 
key to the process of de-institutionalisation. In many European countries `these 
policies are driven largely by ideas of reducing expenditure-namely that it is cheaper 
and more cost-effective to care for people in the community (p. 62). 
Scull's replacement of a technological determinist argument with an economic 
determinist one also gives rise to empirical and conceptual difficulties. In particular, his 
account has been deemed defective on the grounds of timing (Pilgrim and Rogers, 
1999). Busfield points out that the State's fiscal crisis (which is the main reference point 
for Scull's thesis) characterises the post-1970s era. During the 1950s, when American 
deinstitutionalisation policies developed rapidly, the economic growth which 
accompanied increases in public expenditure meant there was relatively little concern 
about the latter. Scull's explanation also fails to acknowledge the rise in expenditure and 
development of mental health services outside the hospital sector. There have, for 
example, been large increases in psychiatric services in the area of primary care. Rather 
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than the non-provision of services, Busfield has argued that community care has 
brought with it a shift in orientation from the chronic long-term patients towards those 
with acute or less serious problems (Pilgrim and Rogers 1999, p. 154). 
The Marxist perspective provides a tool for examining the relationship between the 
development of welfare programmes and the conflicts among different socio-economic 
classes. This is inevitably produced by the profit-driven mechanism of capitalist 
countries. In Korea, export-driven economic development has allowed for the excessive 
accumulation of capital by a relatively small number of large corporations, the so-called 
Chaebol (Conglomerate). This tactic facilitated rapid economic development and 
resulted in the strong control of labour to maintain a stable economic growth in the 
country. This kind of economic system caused unfair competition and an over-use of 
power by a limited number of capitalists. In Korean society, the redistribution of wealth 
has been uneven among classes, and the gap between rich and poor has widened. 
As Marx predicted, these social outcomes produced by economic development under 
capitalist formation were sufficient to bring about conflicts between capitalists and 
labour. In Korea, however, this theoretical perspective does not explain appropriately 
the initiative of the first social welfare law and its implementation which occurred 
during the 1960s and 1970s. Since labour was heavily controlled by an authoritarian 
government, it was almost impossible to take any collective action against the 
government or employers. Thus, there was no sign of conflict between labour and 
capitalists in the policy-making process of mental health care. This conflict became 
evident, however, during the democratic movement in the 1980s. Government officials 
and entrepreneurs found that the increasing number of labour disputes and the 
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escalating demands of the labour force became a tremendous challenge. It is interesting 
to see how the labour movement impacted on Korean social welfare development with 
respect to government intervention in these issues. In respect to this matter, we can 
raise two questions: `How has the Korean government reacted to the class conflict? ' and 
`Was the welfare provision a measure of the government to undermine the conflict? ' 
Secondly, according to Marxists' views, labour is considered as a means of production 
in the capitalist mode. Thus, welfare is a provision from the bourgeois to preserve the 
health of labour that guarantees an increase in productivity. In Korea, however, 
demands for welfare provisions from the entrepreneur side were not found. Therefore, 
it cannot be said that the welfare development of Korea was attributed to the efforts of 
the bourgeois to preserve a high quality-labour capacity. 
Finally, this Marxist theory is further limited by its narrow definition of capitalism. It 
implies that every country will have an identical experience under the capitalist 
approach. We know that this is not the case when we compare the result of capitalism 
in different national settings. For example, two capitalist styles, Scandinavia and the 
U. S., show us a prominent differential in interpreting welfare development (especially 
regarding health care policy). Each country has used a distinct method for dealing with 
social matters based upon its interpretation of the functions of capitalism. In 
Scandinavia, the social democratic method was used, whereas a liberal-market approach 
was adopted by the U. S. 
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3.3. Towards a Relevant Theoretical Framework for Korean Mental 
Health Policy Making 
It is generally acknowledged that historical and socio-cultural conditions are important 
in determining the particular shape of social welfare systems. It is also said that the 
development of new policies can be explained in terms of the effects of specific social 
pressures on a government. In this respect, the emergence of mental health policy 
reflected the Korean government's intention to cope with economic, social and political 
pressures through its strategic choices. The development of the Korean mental health 
policy seems to be the unique and complex result of economic, social and political 
conflict in the country. 
3.3.1. Relative Advantage of Cultural Perspective over Existing Theoretical 
Perspectives 
It is said that the importance of cultural influence on social policy should not be 
underestimated. Because welfare state policies and culture are mutually interrelated in a 
very complex way and sometimes also contradictory ways. In this regard, the literature 
and arguments that explore cultural influences on social policy will give us another 
appropriate analytical framework to understand how Korean mental health policies have 
been developed and changed along with a structural approach. 
In this regard, the literature and arguments that explore structural influences have 
limitations to understanding how Korean mental health policies have been developed 
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and changed. The importance of cultural factors therefore should not be underestimated. 
To make sense of the development and impact of mental health policies in Korea an 
understanding is needed of the processes by which social policies are made and the 
cultural contexts in which policy decisions are taken. 
In recent years, more cultural theorists attributed the unique pattern of the East Asian 
welfare state to the region's cultural values (Jones, 1990; Park, 1990). From a cultural 
perspective, Confucianism plays a key role in shaping political actions of East Asian 
political elites. Because Confucianism has influenced these elites to believe that mutual 
support among family members and relatives is their primary duty, they may not have 
developed a strong sense of public responsibility for the well-being of the general 
population. 
White and Goodman (1999) argue that cultural explanations were utilised by political 
elites to rationalise their policy-making, which usually included inaction on welfare 
policy development. Chang (1997) shows that Korean conservative politicians and 
bureaucrats have been using critical Confucian views on the nuclear family 
- 
largely in 
order to avoid public responsibilities. It could be argued that `Confucian' forms of 
government have influenced mental health policy making in Korea while there has been 
a recent shift away from `social' forms of government towards neo-liberal political 
rationalities, strategies and technologies of rule in many Western countries. 
The relationship between the individual and society is the foundation of Western 
community-based mental health policy. However, many have noted that Korean society 
is more collectivist, and while individuals are recognised, their needs are for social 
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groups. In this way, Korea could be argued to have done itself a disservice by looking to 
the West for a mental health services model to import and adapt rather than looking for 
an indigenous model that may be more appropriate to Korean culture. 
The practice of looking outside of Korea for models to import and adapt may have 
worked well in economic development, but this appears bankrupt in social development, 
particularly in mental health, an area so intimately tied to social values, customs, and 
prejudices. In addition to the human suffering imposed by Korea's mental health 
policies, a real tragedy is that Korea has all but ignored existing native models, or the 
germination of new models that are at once progressive and in consonance with Korean 
social values. 
For example, Americans have an interpersonal moral code that stresses personal 
freedom of choice and individual responsibility, whereas Koreans have a duty-based 
interpersonal moral code that emphasises mandatory responsibilities towards others. 
These mandates are based on one's position vis-ä-vis the other person in the social and 
familial matrix. These core values have direct relevance to the societal position and self- 
evaluation of dependent disabled adults who rely on family members and others for 
economic sustenance and caregiving. 
In collectivist culture, a shared view of reciprocal obligations may make it easier for 
individuals to concede impairment and to accept help from those whose roles mandate 
the provision of support. Tsuang and Faraore (1997) state that: 
Researchers for the WHO reported that the most important cultural factor implicated 
in the improved outcome for patients in developing countries were: close family ties, 
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extended families, active participation of the family in the care of patients, and other 
factors which made it easier for patient, to return to their previous lives. 
Lin and Kleinman (1988) also suggest that is easier for families to be caregivers, than in 
traditional cultures as there is less social isolation and fewer extended human resources 
to buffer the family burden when compared with the burdened nuclear family in western 
cultures. Since Confucian values are favourable to the limited intervention principle, the 
government takes an active role in promoting them through the provision of social 
welfare. In fact, social welfare is provided to reinforce rather than replace the family in 
looking after its members. Instead of offering welfare benefits to relieve pressure on the 
family, the main direction of family services and family life education is to promote 
family obligation and duties. 
Through my literature review I have found that relatively few resources are currently 
available which enable me to examine mental health programmes and policies from a 
comparative standpoint. Given the diversity of cultural values, political and economic 
structures, and social welfare and health policies around the world, it is not surprising 
that major differences exist between nations in the treatment they provide to the 
mentally ill (Benson, 1996). However, literature on comparative mental health policy 
mainly focuses on North American and Western European countries, which may be less 
relevant to East Asian countries such as Korea. Another often missed point in this 
literature is the importance of cultural factors on societies and social policy provision. 
Welfare state policies and culture are mutually interrelated in a very complex way and 
sometimes also contradictory ways. It could also lead to a way of analysing the impact 
of Confucianism on the East Asian Welfare regime. Furthermore, the fabric of the 
Korean welfare system is determined by a number of ideological influences. The 
100 
Confucian welfare legacy is, of course, dominated by Confucian ideology. Korean 
society has always emphasised dependence on family rather than the state. The values 
underlying the Korean welfare system are an amalgam of traditional and contemporary 
ideologies. The Confucian welfare legacy of family dependence rather than government 
dependence has been promoted by the Korean government as a means of lessening the 
welfare burden on the state. 
3.3.2. Towards Mental Health Policy Making under the Confucian Governance 
As highlighted in Chapter 2, the Confucian cultural orientation is the most influential 
factor affecting social policy making in Korea, although its influences has been 
weakened or transformed gradually along with modernisation and industrialisation in 
Korea. Nevertheless, Confucianism as a philosophy and vision has quite complex 
guiding principles and ideals of social relations and behaviour in almost every realm in 
Korea. 
In this context, this study is expected to utilise a more insightful and comprehensive 
analytical framework to examine how the various cultural factors interact with 
economic structures and impact upon issues dealing with mental health. In doing so, this 
study employs the conceptual framework of `governmentality', associated with the 
French social theorist Michel Foucault. It is said that governmentality analysis situates 
social and economic changes as reflecting shifts in the `mentality' of government (Joyce, 
2001). In this respect, it is useful to utilise the governmental analysis to comprehend 
Korean mental health policy making since the 1960s. By contrast with Marxist 
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narratives, the governmentality approach highlights not capitalism, viewed as an 
economic system, but the certainty of transformations in human governance in broadly 
liberal democratic societies. This perspective has a political focus and the capitalist 
market and the state are not accorded any particular explanatory, causal privilege 
(Stenson, 1998b). 
Foucault's ideas have played an important part in shifting contemporary understanding 
of the state. Within social policy, `dominant understandings of the state have in the past 
derived from Marxist or liberal traditions' (Watson 2000, p. 71). Within Marxism the 
state is posited as having an independent and objective existence as a set of institutions 
or structures: it is seen to play a key role in organising relations of power and assumed 
in the last instance to act in the interest of capital, even if its role is sometimes 
contradictory (Gough, 1979). In liberal traditions the state is posited as the neutral 
arbiter of competing interests, and the welfare state is posited in similar terms. 
Foucault's concern with `how to get rid of Marxism' echoes loudly in this analysis 
(Curtis, 2002). The formation of the modern state can not simply be understood as the 
rising hegemony of an executive committee of the bourgeoisie preoccupied with the 
reproduction of relations of production. The modem state is a governmental state; its 
agencies are multiple; the technologies and tactics at its command diverse. The object of 
government is not first and foremost the maintenance of capitalist exploitation as 
classical Marxists propose (Smart, 1983) and its essential subjects are not contesting 
social classes. On the contrary, `population' has come to be `the ultimate end of 
government: because fundamentally, what else could its end be? '. At the same time, 
`population comes to be a subject, as well as an object of government' (Curtis 2002, 
102 
pp. 29-30). 
3.4. Summary 
This chapter has explored the explanations of mental health policy developments in 
Western European and North American countries, which may be less relevant to East 
Asian countries, such as Korea. As noted, most of comparative social policy, even 
comparative mental health policy, has appeared to remain substantially within Esping- 
Anderson's framework of welfare state regimes. Some ascertain it by applying his 
model to specific countries, while others try to vindicate his neglect of gender or of 
religion, status and ethnicity in shaping the welfare mix (Castles and Mitchell, 1993; 
Lewis and Ostner, 1994). Another criticism is associated with raising doubts about the 
applicability of his model to specific countries. For instance, East Asian countries, 
including Korea, though they may be a hybrid, are said to be a deviant case that can not 
be explained by one of his existing models (Esping-Andersen, 1999). Furthermore, 
another often missed point in this literature is the importance of cultural factors on 
societies and social policy provision (this will be discussed in Chapter 4 in more detail). 
Welfare state policies and culture are mutually interrelated in a very complex way and 
sometimes also contradictory ways. 
In so doing this study employs the conceptual framework of `governmentality', 
associated with the French social theorist Michel Foucault. It is said that 
governmentality analysis situates social and economic changes as reflecting shifts in the 
`mentality' of government (Joyce, 2001). In this respect, this study will utilise 
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governmental analysis to comprehend Korean mental health policy making since the 
1960s. This is the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4. Governmentality and Confucian Governance 
The previous chapter examined the extent to which existing perspectives that explore 
mental health policy development are relevant as a theoretical rationale for Korean 
mental health policy making, paying attention to developing a relevant explanatory 
framework. In order to develop a theoretical framework for Korean mental health policy 
making, this study adopts `governmentality', which has been applied by Foucaudians. 
This chapter is divided into four sections including the summary, the first section 
outlines the concept of governmentality and different forms of government. Section two 
tries to explore governmentality and mental health policy in the Korean context. Section 
three identifies the Political Rationalities of Confucianism and its Technologies of 
Governance. 
4.1. Governmentality and Different Forms of Government 
The govemmentality approach that many writers (Barry, et al., 1996; Dean, 1999; 
Gordon, 1991; Joyce, 2001; Light, 2001; O'Malley et al., 1997; Osborne, 1997; Rose 
and Miller, 1992; and Stenson, 1999) adopt is useful in understanding how power is 
now deployed in changing circumstances and has its origins in the later writings of 
Michel Foucault (1991, p. 87). 
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Foucault only ever sketched an outline of his thoughts on governmentality 
- 
most 
directly in a published lecture from a programme given in 1978 (Foucault, 1991). In it, 
he focuses on `the problematics of government'. Specifically, he directs his attention to 
`the art of government', a realm which, Foucault suggests, came to be of particular 
interest from the middle of the sixteenth century to the end of the eighteenth. A string of 
texts from this era, for Foucault, struck an implicitly `anti-Machiavellian' stance in that 
they dwelt on the `art of government' rather than dealing with strategic concerns, 
questions of power, or relations of force, per se. They looked, instead, to the underlying 
rationality of government. By examining some of this literature, and through a free- 
ranging process of argumentation and exposition, Foucault develops his thoughts. In 
essence, he marks out a domain, an area of enquiry, which looks to the manner and 
rationales of government, i. e., the conduct, mentalities, practices, techniques, modes, 
and forms of government activity (Marlow, 2002). 
Foucault defined govemmentality as an `ensemble formed by the institutions, 
procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics, that allow the exercise 
of this specific, albeit complex form of power which has as its target population as its 
principal form of knowledge, political economy, and as its essential technical means, 
the apparatus of security' (Foucault 1991, p. 102). In addition, he explains this in more 
detail as follow: 
This word must be allowed the very broad meaning which it had in the sixteenth 
century. Government did not refer only to political structures or to the management of 
states; rather it designated the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups 
might be directed: the government of children, of souls, of communities, of families, 
of the sick. I did not only cover the legitimately constituted forms of political or 
economic subjection, but also modes of action, more or less considered and calculated 
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which were destined to act upon the possibilities of action of other people. To govern, 
in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of others (Foucault 1982, 
p. 221). 
The main focus of the governmentality theorists has been on uncovering the logic of 
government incorporated in complex interconnections between political rationalities, 
governmental strategies and technologies, and the assemblages of persons and locations 
within which they operate (Barry et. al., 1996). 
In this approach, contemporary society is conceptualised as being pervaded by a system 
of regulation concerned with `the conduct of conduct'. Government, for Foucault, is not 
merely the state apparatus, but `political rationalities' defining issues for action and 
prescribing goals and values, as well as `technologies' comprising `the complex of 
mundane programmes, calculations, techniques. Documents and procedures through 
which authorities seek to embody and give effect to governmental ambitions' (Rose and 
Miller 1992, p175). Governmentality is about the disciplining and regulation of the 
population without direct or oppressive intervention. It is about achieving `action at a 
distance', so that actors come to perceive problems in similar ways and accept 
responsibility for seeking ways of transforming their position themselves (Flynn, 2002). 
Furthermore, Dean (1999) stresses that governmentality is not merely the exercise of 
authority over others but is also how we govern ourselves. The Foucauldian ` analytics 
of govemmentality' approach is thus concerned with how we govern and how we are 
governed within different regimes (Dean, 1999). 
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Given Foucault's views about power, it is not surprising to find that he is wary about 
locating power in the apparatuses of the state, and indeed there are very few direct 
references to the state in his work. In its place he is more concerned with the 
construction of the ` social' and in govemmentality. Foucault distinguishes between two 
notions. `First, there is a notion of sovereignty, the aim of which is to maintain a 
territory where sovereign rule is preserved through the rule of law and the people's 
submission to it. Government, in contrast, is the exercise of power which concerns the 
realm of the social, the object of which is to manage or facilitate the best resolution of a 
population's needs, resources and wealth. The catalyst for the development of the art of 
government was the emergence of the problem of population which was constituted by 
the deployment of bio-power" (Watson 2000, p. 71). 
Government understood in this governmentality approach may refer to many different 
forms of `the conduct of conduct', the particular objects, methods and scale of which 
will vary. Burchell (1996) discusses this as follows: 
There may also be interconnections and continuities between these different forms of 
government and, in particular, between local and diverse forms of government 
existing at the level of interpersonal relations or institutions dispersed throughout 
society on the one hand, and political government as the exercise of a central, unified 
from of State sovereignty on the other, or between forms of government existing 
within micro-setting like the family or the school and the macro-political activities of 
government directed towards individuals as members of a population, society or 
nation (p. 19) 
I Bio-power is a conceptual tool that makes it possible to analyse historically how power has come to 
work in relation to the human body. The concept refers to the mechanism that takes the body and life as 
objects of intervention. Power operates on the individual body to optimise its capabilities, efficiency, 
usefulness, and docility. On a macroscale it also manages the biological processes of a population 
- 
births, 
morality, and probabilities of life. Bio-power relies on associated forms of knowledge, such as surveys, 
demographic studies, and public health campaigns (Chambon, et al. 1999, p270). 
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4.1.1. Liberal Forms of Government 
The liberal forms of government emerged in the early nineteenth century. According to 
Foucault, it was of critical historical significance and only with the emergence of 
liberalism was it possible for a domain of `society' to emerge (Foucault, 1989a). He 
also noted the connection between liberalism and the historical emergence of society as 
the political rationality: 
It seems to me that at that very moment it became apparent that if one governed too 
much, one did not govern at all 
- 
that one provoked results contrary to those one 
desired. What was discovered at that time 
- 
and this was one of the great discoveries 
of political thought at the end of the eighteenth century 
- 
was the idea of society. That 
is to say, that government not only has to deal with a territory, with a domain, and 
with its subjects, but that it also has to deal with a complex and independent reality 
that has its own laws and mechanisms of disturbance. This new reality is society. 
From the moment that one is to manipulate a society, one cannot consider it 
completely penetrable by police. One must take into account what it is. It becomes 
necessary to reflect upon it, upon its specific characteristics, its constants and variables 
(Foucault 1989b, p. 261) 
For Burchell (1996), the forms of liberalism set out a `schema' of the relationship 
between government and the governed in which individuals are identified as, on the one 
hand, the object and target of governmental action and, on the other hand, as in some 
sense the necessary (voluntary) partner or accomplice of government. He points out 
that: 
For (early) liberalism, to govern properly involves pegging the principle for 
rationalizing government activity to the rationality of the free conduct of governed 
individual themselves. That is to say, the rational conduct of government must be 
intrinsically linked to the natural, private-interest-motivated conduct of free, market 
exchanging individuals because the rationality of these individuals' conduct is, 
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precisely, what enables the market to function optimally in accordance with its nature. 
Government cannot override the rational free conduct of governed individuals without 
destroying the basis of the effects it is seeking to produce (Burchell 1996, p. 23) 
They are seen as political constructions: differentiated spheres of social relations 
produced by liberal modes of government. In addition, this analysis has an explicitly 
normative basis, favouring the production of knowledge that will help to safeguard and 
extend liberal values and provide checks and balances on tyranny, which can develop 
from the political left as well as from the right (Stenson, 1998b). 
The power of governmentality is that it allows the investigation of different aspects of 
liberal forms of government as essentially different aspects of the problematisation of 
power (Rose and Miller, 1992; Rose, 1993). The difference between this and traditional 
policy studies is the notion that conceptions of government and population are not fixed 
but are the product of the changing power/knowledge discourse in which they are 
embedded. For Foucault, the Western ` art' of liberal government is a dynamic, self- 
critical process. At its centre is the inherent tension between minimum intervention by 
the state and a `will to knowledge' about populations that expands the number of the 
categorisations that individuals are subjected to and subjectified by, in the pursuit of the 
most efficient form of government. 
However, the reflexive nature of liberalism as a mentality of government, continuously 
leads to the questioning of appropriate boundaries between the political/public domain 
of government activity and the non-political/private domain, the preserve of the 
autonomous individual. The problem for all types of liberalism is that most of the 
regulation of the population takes place in the non-political/private domain, particularly 
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within the structure of the family. It is in this context that the concept of expertise has 
evolved as a technology of control and surveillance so that liberal governments can 
regulate this private domain, ` without destroying its existence and its autonomy' (Rose 
and Miller 1992, p. 180; Joyce 2001, p. 596). 
In conditions of liberalism, Foucault's prime concern was to understand how personal 
liberty, autonomy and choice could be reconciled with the state's need to govern. 
Foucault sought solutions to this, not by exposing the apparent contradictions and 
conflicts inherent in liberal thought, but on the contrary, by understanding liberalism as 
a particularly productive discourse. For Foucault, then, liberalism is concerned with 
trying to determine how government is possible, what it can do and what it must 
renounce to achieve its potential. It is thus a perpetually reflexive activity, constantly 
seeking to understand why it is necessary to govern and how. Foucault locates traces of 
this thinking in precise historical texts that contribute to a conception of liberalism, with 
all its compromises, hesitations and paradoxes, as a shifting and polymorphous set of 
possibilities (Schofield 2002, p. 666). 
4.1.2. The Social Logic of Government 
The `social logic' of government is a form of `govemmentality' (Stenson and Watt, 
1999). This refers to the range of ways 
- 
with the censuses, studies of urban poverty and 
the social sciences playing a central role 
- 
in which the population is made thinkable 
and measurable for the purpose of government (Foucault, 1991; Barry et al., 1996). 
Governing in the name of the social, which is not reducible to governing the economy, 
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is holistic. It attempts to foster social solidarity, often at the level of the nation-state, but 
also at more local spatial scales, hence providing an effective underpinning for the 
operation of markets (Stenson, 1998a; Stenson and Watt 1999). Government is seen as 
operating in a range of sites beyond the confines of national and local state agencies and 
is rooted in political rationalities whose provenance goes back to late 19th century 
Europe (Gordon, 1991). Smart describes the shift noted by Foucault in the realm of the 
social as follow: 
The emergence of the `social' and the associated mechanisms directed towards such 
dimensions of population as fertility, age, health, economic activity, welfare and 
education, not only represent a major development or shift in the form of the exercise 
of power, but in addition it has produced significant changes in the nature of social 
relationships, and has since the mid-nineteenth century effected a particular form of 
cohesion or solidarity within society..... it is at the political level that the various 
measures and technologies of power associated with the rise of the social have had 
their most critical impact (Smart 1983, p. 121). 
The governmentality theorists' narrative about the shift away from welfarist policies 
and practices challenges the view that these shifts can be understood principally in 
terms of changes in the economy and the state (Rose and Miller, 1992). 
Governing in the name of the social 
- 
which underpinned the policies of welfare states 
in the high period between 1945 and 1980 
- 
attempts to foster social solidarity, hence 
providing an effective underpinning for the operation of markets (Rose, 1996b; Stenson, 
1998b, 1999). The aims of social government include the goals and technologies of 
redistributive social justice, `tutelage' of the poor into the perceived norms of 
acceptable citizenship (Donzelot, 1979) and the use of actuarial technologies of risk- 
sharing. The pool of risk-sharers ultimately encapsulates the citizens of the state and 
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protects against crime, unemployment, sickness, old age and the other risks associated 
with the minimally regulated play of market (Donzelot, 1991). 
`Social' policies, operating with universalist criteria for service provision, were 
associated with the development of a differentiated institutional apparatus for the 
delivery and co-ordination of the major social services (Stenson and Watt, 1999). The 
social logic of government fosters the differentiation of `social' policies and a `social' 
sphere from the `economic' sphere of economic/contractual relations. However, this 
should not be conceived of simply as the operation of official agencies, since the 
`social' creates a field of possibilities for recipients of social services to try to set their 
own agendas. Moreover, differentiation of a field of `social policy' was assisted, in part, 
by the academic disciplines of social policy and other social sciences that conceptualise 
the ` social' as a separate domain of investigation. (Crowther, 1999; Hill, 1996; Stenson, 
2000). 
However, writers from within the Foucauldian governmentality theorists have 
characterised recent governmental trends, associated with neo-liberal political 
rationalities, as manifestations of the death of the collectivist and universalist character 
of the `social' (Stenson and Watt, 1999). Joyce has noted this recent governmental 
trend: 
Using the conceptual framework of `govemmentality', it will be argued that one of the 
most important aspects of this shift is that neo-liberal forms of social policy 
governance re-code and re-problematise the function of the health and social care 
system, predominantly in terms of an economics discourse (Joyce 2001, p. 595). 
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4.1.3. The Rise of Neo-Liberal Modes of Government 
Over the past 50 years, welfare liberalism has itself come under sustained criticism by 
those who denounce it as undermining the very freedom that liberalism is there to 
guarantee. In response to this critique, liberalism is undergoing a further mutation into a 
distinctive form in the advanced economies of the West. 
Not surprisingly, there has been considerable debate surrounding the sustainability of 
present levels of state provision. European governments have tended to argue for 
retrenchment and for the substitution of state provision by other means. (Shaw 1999a, 
p. 362) 
Within the governmentality framework, it is argued that with the rise of neo-liberal 
modes of government since the late 1970s, the social is now on the wane or even dying. 
Increasingly, social policies must be justified according to a utilitarian logic, as 
contributions to the more efficient operation of markets. And the tasks of government 
are redistributed across, and blur the boundaries between, statutory, voluntary and 
commercial sectors and agencies (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). Broad inclusive, 
national notions of a risk-sharing collectivity give way to smaller risk-sharing 
collectivities (O'Malley, 1992; Stenson, 1993). Local communities are encouraged to be 
more self-reliant or enrolled in the tasks of government. State and local state agencies 
are encouraged to target their interventions more precisely towards particular 
`communities', social groups and neighbourhoods. These are seen as representing high 
levels of criminal and other modes of social risk for themselves and for the well-being 
of other groups and interests (O'Malley and Palmer, 1996; Stenson, 1996,1998a). 
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In its new `advanced' or `neo-liberal' form, liberalism no longer seeks to govern 
through `society' (Schofield 2002, p. 667). According to Rose, in this form it typically 
seeks: 
To de-governmentalise the state and to de-statise practices of government, to detach 
the substantive authority of expertise from the apparatuses of political rule, relocating 
experts within a market governed by the rationalities of competition, accountability 
and consumer demand. It does not seek to govern through `society' but through the 
regulated choices of individuals now construed as subjects of choices and aspirations 
to self-actualisation and self-fulfilment (Rose 1996a, p. 41) 
Governmentality theorists argue that policy discourse is a means through which neo- 
liberal rule is exercised in relation to particular `risk' population groups (Dean, 1999; 
Rose, 1998). As Petersen (1997, p. 194) argues, `neo-liberalism is a form of rule which 
involves creating a sphere of freedom for subjects so that they are able to exercise a 
regulated autonomy'. Governmentality theorists argue that modern individuals are 
increasingly urged to consider their everyday lives and well-being in terms of a lifelong 
project of self improvement and lifestyle optimisation (Rose, 1999). 
Furthermore, Focault's concept of governmentality has two advantages in theoretical 
terms for an analysis of neo-liberalism. Lemke (2001) explains this: 
Given that political leadership is only one form of government among others, first, the 
dividing line the liberals draw between the public and private spheres, that is the 
distinction between the domain of the state and that of society, itself becomes an 
object of study. In other words, with reference to the issues of government these 
differentiations are no longer treated as the basis and the limit of governmental 
practice, but as its instrument and effect. Second, the liberal polarity of subjectivity 
and power ceases to be plausible (p. 201). 
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From the perspective of governmentality, government refers to a continuum which 
extends from political government right through to forms of self-regulation, namely 
`technologies of the self', as Foucault calls them (Foucault, 1988). 
By means of the notion of governmentality, the neo-liberal agenda for the `withdrawal 
of the state' can be deciphered as a technique for government. The crisis of 
Keynesianism and the reduction in forms of welfare-state intervention therefore lead 
less to the state losing powers of regulation and control (in the sense of a zero-sum 
game) and can instead be construed as a reorganisation or restructuring of government 
techniques, shifting the regulatory competence of the state onto `responsible' and 
`rational' individuals. Neo-liberalism encourages individuals to give their lives a 
specific entrepreneurial form. It responds to a stronger `demand' for individual scope 
for self-determination and desired autonomy by `supplying' individuals and collectives 
with the responsibility of actively participating in the solution of specific matters and 
problems which had hitherto been the domain of state agencies specifically empowered 
to undertake such tasks. This participation has a `price-tag': the individuals themselves 
have to assume responsibility for these activities and possible failure (Donzelot 1984, 
1996; Burchell, 1991,1996). 
The theoretical strength of the concept of governmentality consists of the fact that it 
construes neo-liberalism not just as ideological rhetoric or as a political-economic 
reality, but primarily as a political project that endeavours to create a social reality that 
it suggests already exists. Neo-liberalism is a political rationality that tries to render the 
social domain economic and to link a reduction in (welfare) state services and security 
systems to the increasing call for `personal responsibility' and `self-care'. In this way, 
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we can decipher the neo-liberal harmony in which not only the individual body, but also 
collective bodies and institutions (public administrations, universities, etc. ), 
corporations and states have to be `lean', `fit', `flexible' and `autonomous': it is a 
technique of power. 
The analysis of governmentality not only focuses on the integral link between micro and 
macro-political levels (e. g. globalisation or competition for `attractive' sites for 
companies and personal imperatives as regards beauty or a regimented diet), it also 
highlights the intimate relationship between `ideological' and `political-economic' 
agencies (e. g. the semantics of flexibility and the introduction of new structures of 
production). This provides an opportunity to shed sharper light on the effects neo-liberal 
governmentality has in terms of (self-) regulation and domination. These effects entail 
`not just the simple reproduction of existing social asymmetries or their ideological 
obfuscation, but are the product of a re-coding of social mechanisms of exploitation and 
domination on the basis of a new topography of the social domain' (Lemek 2001, 
p. 203). 
4.2. Governmentality and Mental Health Policy in Korean Context 
In order to analyse mental health policy making in Korea, this study will draw heavily 
on recent Foucauldian work on `governmentality'. This concept will be useful in such a 
context because of the innovative ways in which it helps us to describe the 
amalgamation of an array of governmental technologies (ways or methods of 
intervening in the non-discursive world constructed by political rationalities) that work 
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across private and public boundaries to realise, or at least attempt to realise, 
governmental programmes (Rose, 1993). By this means, it is possible to understand the 
emergence in Korea of a specific governmental interest in mental health policy as 
characterised by certain reproductive regularities and capacities which are amenable and 
open to intervention. A brief genealogical approach will enable us to trace the threads of 
a concern with mental health policy making, its amalgamation with other governmental 
technologies and forms of reasoning, and eventual deployment within the context of 
mental health policy making. 
In this connection, it could be argued that we need to understand governmentality in a 
number of distinct ways. I propose here to examine the application of governmentality 
in problematising mental health policy making in the Korean context from three fronts. 
First, the concept of governmentality will be used as a particular method or way of 
understanding the `conduct of conduct' 
- 
`a form of activity aiming to shape, guide or 
affect the conduct of some person or persons' (Burchell, et. al., 1991, p. 2). Second, 
using the conceptual framework of `governmentality', it could be argued that one of the 
most important aspects of this shift is that neo-liberal forms of social policy governance 
re-code and re-problematise the function of the mental health care system, 
predominantly in terms of an economic discourse. Finally, the government's rationale 
for fostering ` Confucianism' will be examined in order to look at the moral discourse on 
the family as it appears to have been useful in legitimating their suppression of demands 
for welfare programmes. 
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4.2.1. Forms of the Government in Korea 
4.2.1.1. Developmental Authoritarian Government 
The economy in Korea has largely been managed under the leadership of state 
entrepreneurs who have used what is popularly called `developmental authoritarianism' 
to propel rapid economic growth under the slogan of `growth first, distribution later'. 
By the 1980s, this `growth first' initiative had lost most of its popular appeal in national 
politics, and political leaders proclaimed the goal of building a `welfare state' by the 
beginning of the 21st century. At least in public policy announcements, social welfare 
has become a prime goal of administrative activities, supposedly linked to `social 
integration and the sustenance of political order' (Chang 1997, pp. 23-4). 
In Korea the deterioration of social conditions following the 1997 economic crisis led to 
a rise in the demand for welfare services, while family ties and mutual co-operation in 
communities were declining. A new type of poverty has emerged among women, 
children, the disabled and the elderly without relatives, and within the urban areas 
because of the sharp decline in incomes and the fact that most of the unemployment 
occurred among low paid temporary workers, resulting in poverty rising substantially. 
At the same time, income inequalities are widening, threatening a breakdown in social 
cohesion. In this circumstance, the Korean government was expected to extend welfare 
provision for people in need. However, the government also faced some obstacles to 
expanding welfare programmes. The obstacles were lack of funding and resource 
allocation. The government pursued economic recovery and stable strategies. The 
government policies therefore were highly driven by economic concerns. In this respect, 
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it is particularly important to identify how the economic strategy constrained mental 
health policy decisions and the structure of mental health policy institutions. 
There has been a controversy on the subject of the political influence and achievement 
of the New Right in shaping the pro-family moral discourses and movements in 
Western countries like the United Kingdom and the United States (Durham, 1993; 
Somerville, 1992,1993). The political implication of the seemingly moral judgements 
concerning family change is not confined to those Western countries under neo-liberal 
rule. In Korea, moral criticisms of recent family change serve not to reverse a so-far 
progressive social policy regime as in Western welfare states but to dissipate the 
political pressure for a policy transition from economic growth-oriented state 
intervention to social welfare-oriented state intervention. Such political use of the moral 
discourse on family change is facilitated in the still strong Confucian socio-cultural 
environment (Chang 1997, pp. 22-3). 
4.2.1.2. Neo-liberal Trend in Korea 
The neo-liberal `world trend' has influenced Korea since the 1980s when the movement 
towards privatisation launched political debates throughout the country. Because 
General Chun seized power through a military coup, many people questioned the 
legitimacy of his government. During his authoritarian regime (1980-1987) the neo- 
liberal orientation seemed not to be supported by the citizenry due to the corrupt and 
oppressive bureaucracy of Chun's regime. Kim Young-Sam's democratically elected 
regime (1993-1998) pushed even more forcefully in the neo-liberal direction in an effort 
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to increase efficiency and economic competition. His regime stood for `small- 
government' and `productive welfare'. Neo-liberal policies were introduced in an effort 
to transform basic relationships between the state and the market. Deregulation sought 
to invigorate competition and promote market flexibility. The educational system was 
reformed and new management skills were advanced to lessen conflict in 'labour- 
capitalist' relations, promoting prudent compromise rather than hostile dispute. Public 
spending on social welfare programmes was reduced as government came to rely on the 
innovation and collective efforts of religious, civic, and volunteer groups and social 
purpose enterprises2. The percentage of the population receiving public assistance and 
medical aid decreased and has continued to do so even after the economic crisis of 1997 
(Kim, Y. H. 2003, pp. 64-5). 
Currently, there is considerable debate in Korea about how to reform social insurance, 
whether by increasing private investment or state responsibility. Labour and social 
action groups oppose neo-liberal ideas, but a high-tech economy plus the vagaries of 
globalisation continue to challenge social welfare reform in Korea. Since the 1990s the 
neo-liberal tendencies (see Table 4.1. ) which have been detected in Korean policies 
more or less parallel the neo-liberal developments in the industrialised countries of the 
West (Kim, Y. H. 2003, p. 65). 
2 Social purpose enterprises are specifically created with the thought of employing the most difficult to 
employ. A social purpose enterprise is a revenue generating commercial venture founded by a non-profit 
organisation to provide jobs and / or training opportunities to low income individuals. Sometimes these 
enterprises are completely sustained by market revenue and sometimes they are partly subsidised because 
the overall social benefits produced are sufficiently valued by the stakeholders. 
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Table 4.1. The Neo-liberal Tendencies in Korea 
Policies Details New Liberal Transformation 
Economic State involvement Deregulation 
Policies Involvement for market competition 
Reducing public spending 
Privatisation 
Labour-market policies I Enlargement of market flexibility 
Relationship between labour and I Changing attitude from hostile to 
capital compromising 
Social Basic orientation Stress on `productive welfare' policies 
policies Extension of private sectors 
Emphasis on the obligation of individuals 
and family (Citizenship) 
Social insurance system Attempt at the privatisation of the 
`Industrial Accident Insurance' 
Integration of medical and social insurance 
system for efficient management 
Source: Kim, Y. H., 2003. 
4.2.2. Consideration of Confucianism as a political rationality 
Although Confucianism is close to neo-liberalism in terms of assisting economic 
performance, it is clearly not the whole story. It is important to explore the differences 
between Confucianism and Neo-liberalism and show how it assisted the development of 
Korean economics and how now it may actually be hindering further welfare 
development. In this respect, recently Kim, Y. H. (2003) has explored the future 
directions for the Korean welfare system as it adjusts to economic globalisation. She 
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points out some similarities and differences of social rights and the obligations of 
citizenship between the West and Korea as follows: 
One may detect some resemblance between the neo-liberal emphasis on the obligation 
of citizenship and the Confucianist emphasis on the obligation to care for family 
members. But they are two different concepts. The Korean government has not 
guaranteed social rights for the people due to economic striving for development. 
Without satisfaction of the social rights of citizenship, how can the obligation of 
citizenship in a competitive world be accepted and internalised by the people? 
Koreans have little experience with volunteerism and participation in a civil 
democratic society in which the citizen has both obligations and rights. Clearly more 
time is needed for Korea to develop an approach to social policy that mitigates the 
tensions between Confucian `familism' and `liberal' rights and obligations of 
citizenship (Kim, Y. 2003, p. 66). 
As mentioned earlier in Western society the economy is now geared towards 
individualisation (Beck, 2001). People are encourage to take individual responsibility 
for themselves and the tendency is to engage in relationships only so long as they are 
personally satisfying to them (though governance is trying to emphasise citizenship as a 
way of forwarding the importance of obligations). The individual becomes the central 
focus of consumption. However, this has not (at least yet) happened in Korea. This, in 
part, is due to the strength of Confucianism - which emphasises duties, regardless of 
whether they are satisfying to the individual or not - and the economy is geared towards 
3 the `social wage'. 
3 That part of workers' means of subsistence which is provided as a free public service rather than 
purchased. In March 1969, the British Daily Telegraph said: `The social wage in plain English means 
government hand-outs, the exact opposite of a wage. ' Social democrats often say that the most effective 
way of defending and improving workers' living standards is not to award pay rises, but to increase the 
benefits that workers receive via state services. This, it is said, will moderate industrial conflict entailed in 
wage bargaining, reduce inequalities among workers and provide a "safety net" for the poor, provide 
services more efficiently and foster an ethos of collectivism rather than individualism. Promotion of the 
concept of social wage invariably means arguing against fighting for pay rises, and is based on the 
assumption that class struggle is a bad thing; better to use the democratic process to elect social 
democrats to government and legislate improvements in the social wage. "Social wage" fell out of use in 
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In addition, Western notions of citizenship around rights and obligations are being 
emphasised because the nature of society in the West is more individualised. Korea is 
not individualised (largely because of the influence of Confucianism) and consequently 
neo-liberal concepts around citizenship do not yet apply. It could be argued that neo- 
liberalism and its market rationality is preferable to Confucianism because the feminist 
voice is weak and women in Korea have been largely apolitical. However, women are 
still expected to play a central role in providing care for dependent family members. In 
this respect, it is more likely to be convinced by neo-liberal minded economists and 
politicians that the government's rationale for fostering Confucian views on family 
responsibility contribute to reducing state intervention into welfare provisions for 
dependant people. Furthermore, `Confucian governmentality' could be utilised by 
policy makers as a rationale for their policy making and to cope with new challenges: 
`rapid transition to post-industrialism, increasing globalisation, sweeping changes in 
demography and social relations' (Ferrer and Rhodes 2000, p. 1). 
4.3. Confucian Governance: the Political Rationalities of Confucianism 
and its Technologies of Governance 
The government's rationale for fostering `Confucianism' and family responsibility 
appears to be disingenuous. At times, Korea's political leaders are likely to be 
convinced by their own rhetoric that supportive income and social services would 
the latter part of the 20th century, as social democratic parties around the world were engaged in running 
down health services and pensions while unions were bargaining for employer contributions to health 
insurance and superannuation funds (http: //www. marxists. org/glossary/terms/s/o. htm) 
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undermine the Confucian tradition of the family caring for dependant people. The 
political-economic drive for low income taxes and low taxes on equity transactions, 
combined with subsidies and incentives to encourage exports plus a substantial 
commitment to the military budget, leaves few resources available for social services. 
The government is thus using the Confucian ethic as `a rationale for its laissez-faire 
approach to the problems posed by dependant people' (Palley 1992, p. 801). Weiming 
(2000) points out that ` East Asian modernity under the influence of Confucian traditions 
presents a coherent social vision with at least six salient features' (pp. 205-206): 
(a) Government leadership in a market economy. 
(b) Organic solidarity resulting from humane rites of interaction. 
(c) The Family as the basic unit of society. 
(d) A civil society, which draws its inner strength from the dynamic interplay 
between the family and the state. 
(e) Education. 
(f) Self-cultivation as the common root of the regulation of the family, of 
governance through the state and from the stability provided by peace. 
Furthermore, the doctrines of Confucianism advocate `a centralised benevolent form of 
monarchy as the only legitimate form of government and stress the absolute 
subordination of the people to their government' (Tang 2000, p. 51). 
4.3.1. The Government's Rationale for Fostering `Confucianism': the Political 
Rationalities of Confucianism 
In Korean history, Confucianist ideology exerted a hegemonic influence around the 
mid-seventeenth century. This was an era when Korean (the Chosun) scholars even 
excelled Chinese scholars in revitalising and refining old Confucian philosophy into a 
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comprehensive set of norms, laws and customs for prescribing political rule and social 
relationships. Under Confucianism, the patriarchal family played a central role in social 
control, political integration and welfare provision (Cho, 1991). When Korean society 
entered the modem industrial era after successive colonial encroachments, indigenous 
elites made no serious attempt to eradicate the Confucian tradition of family-centred life. 
In fact, Confucian values and attitudes were incorporated into public education and 
political discourse as a legitimate cultural heritage. In Korean society today, people are 
under strong moral and, sometimes, political pressure to sacrifice their individual 
interests for unconditional family unity, to confine familial problems within the family, 
and to abstain from resorting to social or governmental measures in solving familial 
needs (Kim, 1990; Chung, 1991). 
Since the 1960s, Korea has shifted from being a mainly agrarian, rural society to an 
urbanised and industrial, newly modernising one. Of the Asian modernised or 
modernising societies that have Confucian ethical heritages, it appears that Korea is one 
of the most closely bound to the relational aspects of this heritage (Kihl, 1994). 
Modernisation, accompanied by demographic changes, urbanisation, and 
industrialisation, have contributed to changes in Korea's family structure. Traditionally, 
the Confucian ethical and relational system holds the eldest son to be responsible for the 
care of his elderly parents, although in modem Korea it is possible for another son to 
assume this care-giving role. The second cardinal virtue of Confucianism requires the 
obedience of the son to the father and the third requires the obedience of the wife to the 
husband. Moreover, the political structure's emphasis on economic development makes 
it difficult to moderate any social stress factors through the development of a social 
welfare infrastructure. The previous Korean governments have followed a political- 
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economic model that emphasises stimulation of economic growth and industrial 
development (Kwon, 1995,1999; Joo, 1999a, 1999b; Shin, 2000b). 
It has been Korea's deliberate governmental strategy not to develop a supporting social 
infrastructure or a modern welfare state package of social services and income policies 
and programmes that would assist the elderly and their informal caregivers. It has been 
the reason for the lack of government action in the face of the increasing imperatives of 
demography, as well as segmentation and nuclearisation of families accompanying 
modernisation and urbanisation (Chang, 1997). That is to say, Confucianism could be 
regarded as `governmentality' in terms of political rationalities, strategies and 
technologies of rule in order to foster the family responsibility for their dependent 
members and avoid state responsibility for providing welfare services. 
4.3.1.1. Korean Pattern of Confucian Ideals, Authority and Personality 
Confucianism as an established state ideology existed until the early twentieth century. 
Even today, family relationships, political attitudes, ways of problem solving and many 
other aspects of Korean life reveal the imprint of the Confucian tradition (McCune, 
1959; Reeve, 1963; Osgood, 1951; Hahm, 1967; Henderson, 1968; Yang and 
Henderson, 1958,1959). As the unchallenged, uninterrupted socio-political ideology of 
historic Korea, Confucianism was the single greatest influence on the Korean political 
culture and provided the view of the universe in which Korean society and politics 
operated (Kihl, 1994). 
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Confucian precepts represented by the Confucian Classics were major objects of study 
by traditional Korean scholars and valued for both their practical governmental wisdom 
and their philosophy of life in general. The `formalities' of early Korean bureaucracy 
were based on Chinese Confucian models (Kim and Kim, 1997). 
In particular, Chu Hsi Confucianism strongly appealed to Koryo scholar-officials as it 
was not abstract or speculative metaphysics but rather practical, moral, and educational 
in its institutional applications and in its emphasis on the formalities of ceremony, 
etiquette, rank and hierarchical social structure (Kim and Kim, 1997). 
Chu Hsi Confucianism offered an ideological/cultural rationale for a centralised 
bureaucracy and an elitist intellectual political conservatism. In short, Confucianism 
became the official creed of the government. This development was a remarkable event 
in Korean history. As a state ideology Confucianism was the chief intellectual frame of 
thought throughout the entire Chosun dynasty (Kim and Kim, 1997). 
With extreme literalism, the doctrines of Chu Hsi Confucianism advocated a centralised 
benevolent form of monarchy as the only legitimate form of moral government and thus 
contributed greatly to the foundation of a highly centralised autocracy. At various times 
during this dynasty, various school of Chosun Confucianism had controversies over 
divergent views of the nature of rules governing ethics and the practice and strategy of 
administration (Yang and Henderson, 1958)). 
The school of Li (also known as the Songni Hakpa, the `natural-law' school) provided 
the Confucian political system with moral authority, and ethical legitimacy. 
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Government was the final authority that could represent the Supreme Ultimate (Li) truth 
in the real world. And naturally, government had Benevolence (In), the highest virtue 
and the supreme quality of Li. The `final cause' of politics belonged to the authoritative 
monarch (Kim and Kim, 1997). 
The school of Rites (Ye Hakpa) emphasised an unusual degree of strictness in formal 
ritualism which became the most striking characteristic of the Chosun social system, 
i. e., highly complex court ceremonies, official and personal behaviour. The observance 
of Ye, rites or etiquette and ceremony had a significant impact both on the social 
conduct of the Korean people and on the development of Korean politics and 
administration (Kim and Kim, 1997). 
These Confucian Schools were, however, closely associated with Chosun political 
factionalism. Scholars and officials quarrelled over controversial questions of 
legitimacy, dynastic succession and court procedures. 
Rival group competition for the power of government followed the division into 
philosophical schools of thought and the so-called `four factions' of `four colours' 
(Sasack) persisted as the principle factions in Chosun politics until 1910. These rivals 
fought the philosophical validity of each other in a long, bloody, factional struggle. 
The effect of Confucianism on the popular psychology of the Korean people can be 
characterised as follows: (a) hierarchical view of life; (b) authoritarianism on the part of 
the ruling class; (c) a corresponding `submissiveness' on the part of the ruled; (d) a 
`face/or status-oriented' consciousness; and (e) the well-ordered family (Yun, 1970). 
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Hierarchy and authority are at the heart of Confucian ethics and represent a vertical 
order, not horizontal. The implicit values in Confucianist politics are those of harmony, 
stability, and hierarchy based on the absolute authority of a well-ordered hierarchy 
(Wright, 1962), the Ultimate Li 
- 
in the codified rules of social behavior, Confucian 
authority finds its perfect embodiment in the well-ordered patriarchal family, that is, the 
microcosm of the socio-political order that ideally prevails in both the state and society 
(Kim and Kim, 1997). 
In the Confucian family, adults learn how to manage private affairs and to direct others 
for the common good while the young learn to obey their parents and to play their 
proper roles in the kinship hierarchy. The former is a model for the wise ruler while the 
latter is the model for properly submissive subjects. Li reflects the very structural 
characteristics of Confucian authority. Wright states that `the Li, spread by fathers, 
village elders, and government officials, and supplemented by the discipline of ordered 
family life, would in turn foster social virtues: filial submission, brotherliness, right- 
consciousness, good faith, and loyalty' (Wright 1962, p. 7). Both structurally and 
ideologically, Confucian authority creates controlling forces of governing power by 
denying the sentiment of aggression (Pye, 1970). Lucian Pye (1970) points out that 
Confucian hierarchy was uniquely designed to repress all manifestations of the basic 
human aggression drive. 
The following Figure 4.1 illustrates Confucian authority and its nature of repressing 
human aggression. Attitudes (or sentiments) toward authority are determined by the 
cosmic-ethical order. The vertical relationships of hierarchy and authority are reducible 
130 
to the dichotomised relation between ` superior' and `inferior'. The King, the man, the 
father, the elder, the learned, the public officials constitute superior poles, in contrast to 
the corresponding inferiors, the subjects, the women, the children, the young, the 
unlearned, and the private citizen. The morally `qualified' or `perfected' ones (on the 
top line in Figure 4.1) are entitled to manage the community affairs of the family, 
society, and state. 
Figure 4.1. Confucian Moral Authority 
Yang 
Mandate of Heaven 
Sage 
--- 
King 
Superior Authority 
Monolithic 
Order 
Li 
Form 
Duty Rite Passivity 
Nonconfrontation 
Self, the Young, Women, Citizens. The Unlearned 
Inferior Submission 
Subject 
Ying 
Source: Kim and Kim (1998) 
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Submission is stressed and, in practice if not in theory, it takes the form of 
unquestioning obedience and conformity on the part of the inferior (on the bottom line 
in Figure 4.1) towards the superior. The nature of non-confrontation between the two 
poles does not allow for the legitimacy of aggressive sentiments against superior 
authority. 
Confucian hierarchy is governed by inherited ascribed status, not by achievement. The 
biological fact of individual status cannot excuse him from confronting the appropriate 
behaviour patterns. Passivity is a virtue in the Confucian worldview and since the 
system is monolithic, the individual's only possible response to his superior is to submit 
to his authority. In short, submission to authority is the cardinal virtue in the Confucian 
system. 
4.3.1.2. A Philosophy of Maintaining Social Order 
The class of `yangban' were well acquainted with the Confucian scriptures and were 
supposed to master the doctrines of Confucius, Mencius, and other Confucian scholars. 
They especially appreciated Chu Hsi's doctrines, which emphasise ritual courtesy. They 
also respected the idea of benevolence, the supreme virtue of Confucianism, and 
cherished highly its three cardinal principles and five moral rules, all of which foster 
authoritarian human relationships. 
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Confucianism, of course, is useful for maintaining social order, but not for bringing 
about material progress. Under the ethics of Confucianism, it is very difficult to 
introduce or create new ideas in opposition to traditional ones. Confucianism was the 
philosophy of the literal-officials who ruled the people, therefore, they disvalued 
manual labour, technical matters, and practical things. They had little interest in labour 
and production, and were concerned only with the proper way of behaviour in social life. 
Confucianism regulated every relationship in society, and it taught that there was order 
between father and son, husband and wife, older and younger, and king and servant. 
According to Confucian teachings, the former is always superior to the latter. No 
question to this rule was permitted and obedience was required. This rule is called `ye' 
and to be `a man without ye' was the worst criticism in traditional Korea. This is why 
conformity of behaviour and obedience was highly valued in the Chosun dynasty. 
Anyone showing incongruent behaviour with others began to feel insecure and in order 
not to be a social outcast, paying close attention to others' conduct was essential. 
Others' opinions were always given precedence over one's desires and needs. Thus, for 
mere decency's sake, the people of the yangban class pretended they had just eaten 
when they were starving, and to show it, they often picked their teeth with a toothpick. 
In a word, traditional Koreans were extremely sensitive to other people's criticism, and 
relied heavily on external sanctions for `good' behaviour. For this reason, according to 
Ruth Benedict's definition in `the chrysanthemum and the sword (1946)', Korea also 
belongs to the shame culture like Japan. 
This trait is still prevalent in Korean society, and it is reflected in words like `chemyen' 
and `nunchi' (Kim, 1987). Chemyen is similar to face, honour or decency, and nunchi 
means an eye for social situations. Korean people frequently use words like `to save 
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one's chemyen' or `in spite of chemyen', and they also praise a man who is good at 
reading others' minds as `a man with nunchi'. These terms show the extent to which 
Koreans are conscious of other people's perceptions of them. 
All in all the basis of Confucianism was to achieve the goal of social harmony by 
allocating a place to everyone in society at all levels, with applicable rules of behaviour. 
So even if Confucianism as a philosophy was mostly a matter of concern for the male 
elite, everybody was supposed to learn the tenets of social behabiour with the main 
purpose of maintaining the social order. 
4.3.1.3. Moral Education as a Tool of Fostering Confucianism 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, there has been an increasing awareness of the need to re- 
emphasise traditional moral values and the importance of moral education owing to the 
growing concern over the weakening traditional values of family obligation. Moral 
education can be perceived of as a pure ideological weapon used by a government to 
discipline the population. In this respect, it could be argued that Confucianism was 
developed as a tool, a moral precept and ethical ideology for the government to use. In 
Confucian education the principle of government is to refine the hierarchical, 
paternalistic systems already found in the family - and clan - oriented traditional 
society (Helgesen, 1998). Confucianism emphasised that `rulers should take the ideal 
father as their model, and subjects should similarly think of themselves as dutiful 
children' (Pye 1985, p. 73). Compared to the European industrialisation period, the 
process of Korea has been extremely rapid. Accordingly, traditional society was given 
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very little time to adjust, so, in the midst of a fundamental change of the population's 
environment, the establishment of a firm cultural platform became imperative. 
Successive governments lack of political and moral legitimation has been another 
important but implicit reason for promoting moral education. Yet another reason for 
emphasising Korean values and norms has been the growing problem of how to relate to 
the impact of Western culture (Helgesen, 1998). 
4.3.2. Welfare Familism as a Technology of Confucian Governance 
As widely realised, analysing state policies, including mental health policy, in East 
Asian countries cannot be grasped properly without taking the Confucian cultural 
orientation into consideration, although its influence has been weakened or transformed 
gradually along with modernisation and industrialisation in Korea. 
The Confucian Family Ideology: `Familism' is clearly depicted in Confucius teaching 
(Lee, M. Y. 2000, p. 60), `The ideal whole and nothing more than a family': the family 
and kinship systems are the basic unit and foundation of the society. Therefore, an 
individual is merely a member of the family unit, with a paramount duty to follow the 
values and roles socially prescribed in Confucian countries such as China, Korea and 
Taiwan. According to Yang (1988, p. 97; quoted in Chen, 2000, p. 41; see also Roman, 
1991; Gelb and Palley, 1995), familism is `a set of values and their associated attitudes, 
beliefs and behaviour norms that are family dominated in the sense that people holding 
these values adopt the family as the basic social unit, not the individual. The major goal 
underlying these values is to maintain the well-being and the continuation of the 
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family'. Here the Confucian family has the following characteristics (Chang, 1976, 
p. 44; quoted in Chen, 2000, pp. 41-42). 
(a) The family is under paternal domination. The family follows the father's name, 
and the father has superior power inside and outside the family. 
(b) There is a preference for the extended family where more than two generations 
live together. 
(c) The family is an economic unit. Family members work together or independently 
to maintain the family economy. 
(d) Obedience is emphasised within the family. The younger members should respect 
their elders; children should take care of their parents. 
(e) Women's status is inferior to men's. 
Furthermore, Confucianism in Korea to a large extent regulates human behaviour, 
regardless of people's knowledge about this particular philosophy and its moral 
guidelines (Helgesen, 1998). 
4.3.2.1. The Family Orientation and the Concept of `Hyo' 
Confucian teachings contain the idea of a patriarchal family system in which the father 
has great authority. They teach the importance of the family and clan as an in-group, the 
continuation of the family through the male line, sex role segregation, and ancestor 
worship. Thus, in Confucianism filial piety - namely, `hyo '- is regarded as supreme in 
human morality and as the prototype of all possible interpersonal relationships. Respect 
for the ancestors is practised through ancestor worship. Descendants are required to 
adore the virtue of their ancestors and to cherish the traditions of the family. Ancestors 
within four generations are worshipped and strong kinship unity has to be maintained. 
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Hy-o, therefore, is constantly emphasised in that the offspring is not an independent 
being, and an ancestor's benediction is necessary for the well-being of descendants. 
Consequently, the type of relationship which is embodied in hyo is obedience and 
dependence upon the parents and the family. 
Confucian teachings on filial piety have deep roots in the lives and thoughts of the 
Korean people. Just as the fundamental ideas of Christianity imbue all aspects of life in 
the West, even in this post-Christian age, so the principle of filial piety reaches into the 
very corners of Korean daily life, even amongst those who do not give it conscious 
thought or attention. Koreans have traditionally taught that children must revere and 
obey their parents and that children should be responsible for their parents in their 
parents' old age. This process goes on today, though it may be to a lesser degree than in 
the past. 
The Filial Piety Prize System may be a representative example of the Korean 
government's attempts to encourage a sense of family responsibility for the care of 
older people in modem Korean society. This system was established in 1973 and is 
maintained by the Ministry of Health and Welfare. The prize is awarded as one of the 
major events of the Week of Respect for the Elderly, held in May each year. 
4.3.2.2. Family Obligation and Families as a Social Policy Resources 
The extent to which Confucianism has affected the welfare system in East Asian 
Countries, including Korea, needs further study and is not the focus of this thesis. 
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However, it can be argued that Confucian traditions have had a major influence on 
people's thoughts and actions in Korea. That is to say, it can be assumed that 
Confucianism has affected Korean society in general, which may include welfare policy 
making. Through the emphasis on strong familism and Confucian virtue (e. g. filial 
piety), families and individuals in Korea (women in particular 
- 
considering the fact 
that most caregivers are women), carry huge responsibility for the care of children and 
the elderly (parents-in-law in particular). In Korean welfare provision, women are 
considered as the main carers, for example, nursing/caring leave systems for family 
members (children, parents) show that these are considered as a woman's job, and are 
available for women workers. 
Traditionally as the agents of welfare, families are ranked first as the providers of an 
individual's welfare. However, families' capacities to act as welfare providers vary. 
When this capacity decreases significantly, it creates demands for statutory welfare 
policy making; and vice versa, if the families have the capacity to guarantee the family 
members' welfare well, the functional demand for the state's policy making would only 
be weak. 
4A major principle of Confucianism is filial piety. This notion defines specific rules of conduct in 
social relationships and places great importance on the family. Several key concepts follow from the 
principle of filial piety: 1) Family roles are highly structured, hierarchical, male-dominated, and 
parentally oriented; 2) The welfare and integrity of the family are of great importance. The individual 
is expected to submerge or repress emotions, desires, behaviours, and individual goals to further the 
family welfare and to maintain its reputation. The individual is obligated to save face so as to not bring 
shame onto the family. The incentive, therefore, is to keep problems within the family; 3) 
Interdependency is valued and stems from the strong sense of obligations to the family. This concept 
influences relationships among family members. The family provides support and assistance for each 
individual member; in turn, individual members provide support and assistance for the entire family. 
These relationship, interactions, and obligations are lifelong; and the goal of individual members is not 
necessarily autonomy and independence. This concept is critical to understanding Asian families, and 
service providers should avoid applying Western labels such as "co-dependency" and "enmeshment" 
when observing normal family functioning dictated by cultural values and beliefs. 
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In the United Kingdom, one `other means' which has been adopted is to shift 
responsibility for care on to families as a primary provider of welfare. An example of 
this is the development of community care policies (cf. NHS and Community Care Act 
1990). The development of these in recent years has firmly located the family at their 
hub. Indeed, although the idea of `community' 
- 
encompassing family, friends and 
neighbours, backed up by statutory support 
- 
has achieved political consensus across 
most political parties in Europe, there is little agreement upon what this actually means 
in practice for the statutory services (Shaw 1999a). This inevitably puts the emphasis 
upon families: 
Whatever level of public expenditure proves practicable and however it is distributed, 
the primarily sources of support and care are informal and voluntary. These springs 
from personal ties of kinship, friendship, and neighbourhood. They are irreplaceable. 
It is the role of public authorities to sustain and where necessary develop - but never 
replace 
- 
such support and care. Care in the community must increasingly mean care 
by the community. (Wicks 1991, p. 173). 
The family has long had a welfare role. Families can provide a means of redistributing 
income from those who earn to those who do not by ensuring that each family member 
is housed, fed and clothed. Children are reared within families and both minor illness 
and long-term disability are also usually cared for at home. Of course, whilst 
economists have used the family as a basic unit of analysis, it is individuals within 
families who actually produce welfare. In terms of the production of welfare, it is 
chiefly women who carry out the tasks and services associated with catering for the 
human needs within the family. One of the important consequences of the development 
of a welfare state is the move of many welfare tasks out of the home and into the public 
arena (Shaw, 1999a). 
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Changing family patterns in the United Kingdom also affect the dependent population 
in that whereas in previous generations there would have been three or four children to 
share the care of elderly parents, in future there will only be one or two. The increasing 
trends in divorce (1 in 4 marriages currently end in divorce) and marriage may result in 
the blurring of family ties: thus the responsibility for elderly relations may not be as 
clear cut or easy to meet. The nature of work has changed and family members may 
have to move away from the ` extended family' locality to find employment. As families 
become more dispersed `crisis support' and the welfare role they can play may diminish. 
The increase in single-parent families may reduce the amount of time spent caring for 
elderly relatives, especially as income is likely to be low for these families (Shaw, 
1999a). 
The family provides a very important welfare resource, but the nature of `the family' is 
changing and the amount of welfare it can be expected to provide certainly has its limits, 
which are likely to contract rather than expand in the future. Cultural theorists argue that, 
because of increasing individualisation, intimate relationships are changing away from 
the institution of marriage, with its structures of age and gender and towards the 
individually chosen relationship which can be broken when it ceases to satisfy (Giddens, 
1992). 
In Korea there are also signs of the undermining of the traditional basis of family life. 
The increasing divorce rate is one indicator. The crude divorce rate in Korea increased 
from 0.5% in 1975 to 2.5% in 2000 (National Statistical Office, 2002). As the nuclear 
family is dominant, the extended family makes up only a small share of the total in 
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Korea. In 2000, only 8.2% of all private households in Korea consisted of three 
generations (National Statistical Office, 2002). However, the idea of `family' and its 
associated norms has not significantly changed. The values of marriage are well 
anchored socially, and in a Korean survey only 0.2% of the unmarried interviewees 
expressed a decision to remain single (Korean Women's Development Institute, 2001). 
Cohabitation in Confucian Korea is not popular and is still socially and morally 
stigmatised. 
The Confucian Korean family still regards children as private assets, or as the future 
protectors of family interests. Parents make efforts to get their children closely attached 
to them, and the parental relationship is `cultivated' with little regard to democratic 
values. The family's affairs are largely presumed to be a private family matter, which 
again discourages the production of a public and statutory family (welfare) policy. The 
ethos of family reliance is nourished also by the Confucian Korean state. The 
conservative governments in Confucian Korea tend to load more of the welfare burden 
onto the shoulders of families. Aiming at `empowering' the family agent, various policy 
measures are adopted in Confucian Korea. It is clear that in Confucian Korea, the 
strategy of ensuring the best interest of women and children is mainly carried out 
through social control and the maintenance of family stability, and not so much through 
public benefits or the mechanism of income distribution. 
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4.3.2.3. Women's Role in Confucian Korean Family 
There have been changes in Korean society in terms of increasing women's 
participation in the labour market 
- 
married women in particular. Progress has been 
made in introducing equal rights for women, increasing the number of feminist 
movement groups, and international organisations have had an impact on improving 
women's rights. It is certainly the case that Korean society has changed since 
industrialisation and globalisation, which have affected the increasing number of 
working women in the labour market. Increasing women's participation in the labour 
market and feminist activities have influenced women's rights, and the introduction of 
social policy for working women is a good example of this (e. g. child care provision 
etc. ). However, Confucian ideas on women, such as women's nature of inferiority (Yin), 
women's submission to all men in the family, femininity, modesty and passivity still 
remain strong in Korean society. These ideas are also deeply entrenched in the `psychi' 
of Korean women, as well as men. Although industrialisation has affected women's 
status in Korea, through increasing the numbers of working women, under the 
government policy of `growth first, distribution later', both male and female workers 
have had to endure comparably low wages (Sung, 2002). 
However, female workers are significantly more disadvantaged than male workers, 
when the data are broken down according to sex (Bello and Rosenfeld, 1992). In 1998, 
after the economic crisis, unemployment rates of both men and women in Korea 
increased. Although the increasing number of unemployed in Korea is not only a 
problem for female workers, there is a tendency for employers to make female workers 
resign first, rather than male workers (Park, T. W., 1999). This can be related to the 
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Confucian traditional ideology in Korean society that women belong to home and 
family work, and men belong to outside (paid) work, although there are Western 
similarities here. 
According to Lee (1997), although rapid industrialisation from the 1960s has provided 
educational and job opportunities for women, Korean women are strongly bound by 
Confucian doctrines. Therefore, women tend to turn to marriage for their lifetime career 
because marriage is the main way for women to secure material resources and to obtain 
adult status. Confucian doctrines have emphasised women's simplicity and domesticity. 
Thus, women with little experience of the competitive and aggressive aspects of the 
industrial world will be highly valued in marriage markets (Lee, 1997). Kim, D. (1991) 
mentioned that women's virtue in Confucianism has prevented women from having jobs 
and social activities. Such Confucian ideas have had an impact on the system of Korean 
society as well as on people's minds. 
Therefore, women are seen as second earners and their role in the labour market is 
considered as supplementary, although women's economic activity has increased 
rapidly since the 1960s (Kim, D., 1991). Although the numbers of working women 
(including married women) are increasing, since industrialisation in Korea, the 
Confucian ideas on women as inferior to men which lead to the women's subordination 
to men still remain both in the workplace and in the family. In terms of the family, it 
seems that Confucian traditions are more prevalent than in the workplace. The woman's 
role as daughter-in-law in a Confucian Korean family is still emphasised. Thus, 
women's responsibility for families-in-law in general (parents-in-law in particular) is 
considered more important than for their own family (Sung 2002, pp. 58-9). 
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Furthermore, women in Confucian Korea are less active in public life. There are few 
female politicians and their political attitude is generally conservative. Women in 
Confucian Korea have been largely apolitical; the feminist voice is weak as is gender 
politics. Domestic work and childcare are regarded mainly as the duty of women, and 
most women subordinate their own interests to the interests of the family and spouse. 
Women's legal and economic conditions have improved significantly compared with 
the past, but changes in everyday life appear to be less dramatic (Lin and Rantalaiho, 
2003). Many women agree with such life ideology where they take care of the 
reproductive work and let their husbands concentrate on career advancement. Thus, 
despite the mass media's frequent portrayal of women's liberation in Confucian Korea, 
following the rhetoric of `development', this image does not give a picture of social 
reality. Thus, as welfare providers, women who act more as family agents (as mothers, 
household administrators, family budget managers, helpers for the sick and elderly, as 
well as income earners) than as social citizens can produce only rare and weak 
initiatives for developing social welfare policies for women, and accordingly the social 
pressure imposed on the state's welfare policy making for women remains weak (Lin 
and Rantalaiho 2003, p. 10). 
4.4. Summary 
This chapter has highlighted the way in which there is an increasing interest among 
academics in the conceptual framework of `governmentality' associated with Michel 
Foucault. Also the meaning of 'governmentality' has been explored to examine its 
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usefulness in understanding mental health policy making in Korea. And the 
government's rationale for fostering `Confucianism' has been examined. Through this 
chapter, this study provides a new comparative dimension to this stream of discourse 
with its particular reference to the Confucian Korean example. Paternalistic, patriarchal, 
familistic, masculine, and authoritarian society 
- 
all of these determine the orientation 
of social policy making in the Confucian Korean state. 
The future course of social policy must take account Korea's unique cultural 
characteristics as the traditional Confucian values of `familism' are somewhat in 
conflict with the welfare state's basic mission of social care and protection. As in most 
East Asian countries, Korea has a strong network of family members. It is taken for 
granted that family members will care for their kin. There is little expectation that the 
government or third parties are obliged to address family needs and, hence, limited 
public pressure for the development of social policy. In Confucianism every detail of 
family life is private. The solution to any kind of problem within a family rests with the 
patriarchal figure, the father, who has total responsibility. Indeed, this family value 
inhibits government intervention, even in drastically needy cases. Koreans have little 
expectation of receiving publicly sponsored social care or financial aid as a `social 
right'. Although Korea is in many ways a post-modern society with professional skills 
and high technologies, the Korean family value orientation remains tied to the roots of 
an agricultural society. Korean `familism' therefore has become an obstacle in some 
ways to developing a welfare state. It could be argued that the government's rationale 
for fostering Confucian views on family responsibility contribute to reducing state 
intervention into welfare provisions for dependant people. Furthermore, `Confucian 
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governmentality' could be utilised by policy makers as a rationale for their policy 
making. 
In the following four chapters, the development of the mental health policy in Korea is 
discussed in terms of both cultural and structural factors, in relation to the emergence of 
mental health problems and the subsequent policy response. In particular, Chapter 5 and 
6 elaborate on these themes in relation to the history of Confucianism as a rationality of 
governance. How has the Korean welfare regime responded to the social problem since 
the 1960s? Also Chapter 5 and 6 answers the question in relation to the basic 
assumption of social provision on which the Korean welfare regime is based: minimum 
state responsibility and maximum family responsibility. What draws our attention here 
is the contradictory relationship between the basic logic for social provision 
- 
minimum 
state responsibility 
- 
and the policy promises 
- 
active state intervention. Under the 
circumstances, in Chapter 5 and 6, the underlying assumptions of social welfare 
provision in the Korean welfare regime are explored, paying particular attention to the 
unique features which distinguish the Korean welfare regime from Western welfare 
regimes. 
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Chapter 5. Social Policy Responses under the Confucian 
Governance I: Industrialisation and its Impact 1962-1997 
As seen in the history of the Western welfare state, the growth of capitalism and mass 
democracy are important historical forces behind the emergence of the welfare state in 
Western societies. Also, as the degree and the method of responsibility for meeting 
social needs varies from country to country, the historical and socio-cultural conditions 
are important in determining the particular shape of their social welfare systems (Sherer 
1987). As noted, unlike other advanced countries across Western Europe and North 
America, Korea has experienced considerable social and economic changes 
(industrialisation and urbanisation) over a very short period of time. 
However, why then has there been very slow progress in welfare-state-building 
compared to western societies where capitalist development had been intertwined with 
huge public spending on welfare state programmes and a comprehensive protection of 
citizens from fluctuations of the market economy in the twentieth century? 
The thrust of this chapter is on the policy responses to perceived social problems and 
the way in which other social problems are individualised within families. These 
policies are informed and shaped by Korean politics and culture. In order to clarify the 
policy direction which has primarily influenced mental health policy making, actual 
welfare development in Korea is perhaps best explored, first, by examining the period 
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leading up to the economic crisis in 1997, in this chapter, second, by examining the 
period following that crisis in the following chapter. 
This chapter is divided into four sections including the summary. The first section 
examines industrialisation and social changes, which greatly affected Korean society. 
Section two tries to explore the policy response of the government during the 
industrialisation period in order to clarify the policy direction which was the primary 
influence on mental health policy-making. Section three identifies the characteristics of 
the Korean welfare system informed and shaped by Korean politics and culture prior to 
the economic crisis of 1997. 
5.1. Industrialisation and Social Changes 
One of the key elements structuring policy development in Korea was the country's 
rapid economic growth. The scale of growth in the thirty years up to the late 1990s was 
quite remarkable 
- 
the miracle of the Korean economy 
- 
based especially on exports. 
This rapid economic growth also went hand in hand with massive changes in industrial 
structure within the country. The agricultural and fishery sector, which in 1963 
employed 63.1 per cent of the total workforce, employed only 12.5 per cent in 1995, 
23.5 per cent were working in the manufacturing industry, and 25 per cent in the service 
industry (MoHW, 1996). 
As a result of these changes, many people moved from rural to urban areas, where a lot 
of large-scale firms were founded. This has also resulted in major changes to family 
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structure, with urban dwellers experiencing different family types to those of their 
parents, in rural districts. There has been a decline in the prevalence of traditional, three 
generations, Korean families, which in tandem with the decline in fertility has resulted 
in an overall fall in family sizes. The three-generation family type used to be 26.9 per 
cent of all types in 1960, but has declined to 8.2 per cent in 1997. On the other hand, the 
nuclear family type and single-unit family is on the rise. The average number in a 
family was about 5 until the 1980s, but had been reduced to 3.12 by 1997. 
These changes altered the need for social security, which must now accommodate 
modem urban life rather than an agricultural rural life. People living in cities no longer 
expect to rely on the traditional family care and support when in need; for example child 
welfare provision by the state has begun to grow. The economic growth which Korea 
experienced during the period of urbanisation made it possible to afford to fund these 
welfare costs, and this has resulted in massive changes in social policy over the last 
forty years. But the journey to a welfare state was not a painless one. It took a long time 
for Korea to create a modem welfare system, and the country is still facing some 
difficulties as a result of both internal and external pressures. This was especially the 
case after the late 1990s when the growth rate declined and government budgetary 
restraint reached crisis levels. 
5.1.1. Urbanisation 
In the 1960s, Korea had a largely agrarian economy with less than one third of the 
population living in urban areas. This changed very quickly during the 1970s and 1980s 
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during a period of rapid industrialisation. As can be seen from Figure 5.1, the urban 
population rose from 28 percent in 1960 to 79.6 per cent in 1997 and this trend is still 
increasing (National Statistical Office, 1998). 
Figure 5.1. The Trend towards Urbanisation 
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Source: NSO, Annual Report on the Vital Statistics, 
Seoul, Korea, NSO, Various Years. 
This move of the population away from the land and towards urban and industrial 
centres has meant changes in family structure. In the 1960s the majority of the 
population lived in an extended family network. In line with Confucian philosophy the 
eldest son in the family was responsible for its dependants, and the family as a whole 
supported the welfare of its members. However, urbanisation also marked a shift away 
from the extended and towards a nuclear family system. The pressure on housing in 
industrial centres meant that often those of non-economic age and dependant had to 
remain in the rural environment. It has been noted before that industrialisation changes 
family structure in this way (Goode, 1970) and the nuclear family will be the `normal' 
family pattern in Korea in the foreseeable future. However, living close to relatives is, 
as will be discussed later, an often necessary arrangement. This has been equated to the 
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European idea of `intimacy at a distance' (Rosenmayer and Kockeis, 1963). Certainly 
the forces of modernity are strong. 
5.1.2. Changing Family Structures 
Although the importance of the family and marriage is traditionally strong in Korean 
society, there are indications that the family system is under stress, and not only because 
of the move towards a `nuclear' formation. Marital relations are vulnerable, and this is 
reflected in the gradual increase in divorce rates. The divorce rate, although still low by 
Western standards, increased from 0.5 per cent in 1975 to 2.5 per cent in 1997 (National 
Statistical Office, 1998). There are signs too that individual satisfaction is becoming 
more important (Beck, 2001). This is particularly true among those who were married 
by arrangement while they were young and have since been forced to maintain their 
marriages for the sake of their children, even though their husband-wife relationship 
may not have been satisfactory. The norm for young couples is now to marry for love. 
There is also an increasing trend for women to work outside of the house and in the 
public sphere. This increases their opportunities for encountering men other than their 
husbands. Associated with the improvement in the quality of life, there are increased 
expectations of an emotional life. If the marriage fails to bring satisfaction, divorce is 
starting to become a socially acceptable alternative (Giddens, 1992). 
Growing affluence amongst the young has resulted in a rising rate of single person 
households as can be seen in Figure 5.2 on the following page. This has resulted in 
greater geographical mobility and has also contributed to a notable trend for people to 
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get married later in life, rather than in their twenties. In addition, demographic change, 
rising divorce levels, increased geographical mobility and increased female labour 
market participation are all tending to reduce the capacity of informal carers to provide 
care. 
Figure 5.2. Rising Numbers of Single Person Households 
Source: NSO, Annual Report on the Vital Statistics, Seoul, Korea, NSO, Various Years. 
Changes in family structure (see Table 5.1. ) can be explained in part by changes in such 
demographic variable as age at marriage, fertility, morality and migration. Social and 
economic conditions, such as income and housing, also affect family structure by 
influencing demographic trends (Park and Cho, 1995). 
Table 5.1. Percentage of Nuclear Family and Directly Extended Family : 1970-1997 
(Unit : 
Nuclear Directly Extended 
Year Married 
Married 
Couple with 
Single 
Parent with Couple with 
Couple with Other lineal 
Couple Unmarried Unmarried Parent(s) parent(s) & family 
Children Child ren 
Child(ren) 
1970 5.4 55.5 10.6 1.4 17.4 9.7 
1975 5.0 55.6 10.1 0.5 10.9 17.9 
1980 6.5 57.4 10.1 0.6 10.6 14.8 
1985 7.8 57.8 9.7 0.8 9.9 14.0 
1990 9.3 58.0 8.7 0.9 9.3 13.8 
1997 12.6 58.6 8.6 1.1 8.0 11.2 
Source: National Statistical Uitice, 1991c. 
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There has been some research into the changing nature of the Korean family due to 
urban-industrialisation influences (Choi, 1975). A number of problems were created by 
the growing migration from rural to urban areas, especially with regard to adequate 
housing facilities (Choi, 1975). In the labour market, a condition of industrialisation 
required geographical and social mobility. In response, family patterns have moved 
more towards the nuclear family type in the cities. The `neolocality' of the nuclear 
system correspondingly freed individuals from the ties and burdens of extended families. 
In the meantime, patriarchal authority has declined, and the basic family good was 
increasingly individual happiness and freedom rather than family prosperity (Choi, 
1975). Choi (1975) attempted to review the trend of the Korean family in relation to 
social change. She argued that the Korean family changed towards the pattern of the 
nuclear family system (see Table 5.2) as an outcome of urban industrialisation (Choi 
1975). She also presented some evidence of the Korean family changing its form 
towards that of the nuclear family: 
First of all, the nuclear family pattern increased whereas that of the extended family 
decreased. Secondly, the Korean family changed not only in its form but its content. 
There were some features of `modern Korean families'. (i) youngsters preferred a 
modified approach to selecting marriage partners between the respective parents and 
the concerned parties; (ii) the young couples preferred residential separation from their 
parents sooner or later after their marriage (Choi 1975, p. 12). 
Cho (1975) notes theoretical generalisations that concern social changes affected by the 
industrialisation process. It is that `industrialisation and urbanisation must necessarily 
disrupt large extended kinship organisations and give rise to the nuclear family isolated 
from the extended kin' (Cho, 1975, p. 22). 
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Table 5.2. Composition of Households by Generation 
(thousands. %) 
Total One Generation 
Two 
Generation 
Three 
Generation 
Four more 
generation 
Single 
person 
Non- 
relative 
1960 4,371 7.5 64.0 26.9 1.6 
- - 
1966 4,901 5.7 67.7 21.1 2.6 
- - 
1970 5,576 6.8 70.0 24.1 1.1 
- - 
1975 6,648 6.7 68.9 19.2 0.9 4.2 
- 
1980 7,969 8.3 68.5 16.5 0.5 4.8 1.5 
1985 9,571 9.6 67.0 14.4 0.4 6.9 1.7 
. 
1990 11,355 10.7 66.3 12.2 0.3 9.0 1.5 
1995 12,958 12.7 63.3 9.8 0.2 12.7 1.4 
'Results of Population and Housing Census 
Source: National Statistical Office, 1998. 
Cho (1975) attempted to present the essence of the theoretical grounds for the argument: 
`(a) Industrialisation demands that occupation role be determined more by individual 
skill and knowledge than by ascriptive factors such as family status and sex; thus family 
or kinship ties no longer play an important role in job placement of family members. 
The consequence of the fact that the elders can no longer control the selection of jobs of 
the young is that the young become freer to choose their jobs, spouses, and residence 
independent of the authority of the elders; (b) the opportunities for geographical and 
social mobility on an individual level have increased, and this separates individuals 
from their extended kin and further weakens the ties between extended kin; (c) 
individualisation also eventually creates a system of rational, universalistic, and 
functionally specific social relations, subversive of the opposite system of non-rational 
particularistic and functionally diffuse relationships which constitute the basic element 
of the kinship system' (Cho 1975, p. 22). On these grounds Linton and Parsons assert 
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that `the extended family system is fundamentally in conflict with a modem industrial 
economy and value system and so it declines, and that only the nuclear family survives 
and remains as a functional system in industrial society' (Linton, 1949; and Parsons, 
1943). 
5.1.3. Changing the Cultural Value of the Korean Family 
The traditional values associated with the family and family obligation have undergone 
change as individualism and the associated value of independence have spread through 
modem Korean society. As mentioned in Chapter 4, familism was an important theme 
in traditional Korean culture. Family was depicted as the core of the social structure and 
the honour of the family was crucial. Individual members were expected to sacrifice 
their interests to those of the family, and avoid brining shame on the family name (Han, 
1996). Such values, however, are withering away and, instead, individualism and a 
nuclear-family orientation is developing and growing. Thus the individual is being 
thought of as more important than the family, or both the individual and the family are 
being thought of as equally important. Such value changes tend to weaken the 
consciousness of family care for dependent people (Cho, 1996). 
In a Confucianist patriarchal family, the family as an entity takes precedence over its 
individual members and the family group is inseparably identified with the clan. The 
most important function of family members is to maintain and preserve the household 
within the traditional Confucian system. Accordingly, the central familial relationship is 
not that between husband and wife, but rather that between parent and child, especially 
between father and son. Moreover, the relationships between family members are not 
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horizontal 
- 
that is, based on mutual love and equality 
- 
but vertical, filial piety 
characterised by benevolence, authority, and obedience. Authority rests with the (male) 
head of the household, and differences in status exist among the other family members 
(Park and Cho, 1995). 
Rapid industrialisation and urbanisation have led to improvements in women's 
education and labour force participation rate, but they have not fundamentally altered 
the economic status of Korean women or their economic role in the family (Park and 
Cho 1995, p. 127). 
In contrast to the rapid change taking place outside the home in the Korean economy 
and society, within the family, traditional Confucian values and roles persisted. 
Nevertheless, as the family structure gradually evolved into the nuclear form centering 
on the husband and wife, and as more women took jobs outside the home and women's 
rights became a prominent issue, the family's structure began to change from the 
husband-dominated type to a husband-wife type. The fundamental structure of the 
family began to change as well, from the traditional Confucian type to a more or less 
cooperative type. As for the decision-making pattern within the family, there is some 
evidence that it is becoming more democratic and less role-differentiated as Korean 
society becomes more urbanised and nuclearlised (Park and Cho, 1995). 
The Confucian tradition of ancestral worship continues today, especially in rural areas, 
but the emphasis on honouring only the father's kin has weakened among the younger 
generation, especially in the cities. It is becoming increasingly common to honour the 
kin of both parents (Park and Cho, 1995). During the century, Korean exposure to 
Western influence, including science technology, and rationalism, has played a decisive 
role in the transformation of the country from an agriculture to a modem industrialised 
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society. Despite these changes, the Confucian influence on the Korean family is still 
strong, as evidenced by the persistent deference by wives to their husband's status and 
role, son preference, and strong kinship bonds. Whether parents and their eldest son 
maintain separate households or not, the relationship between parents and their children 
remains strong, being based on mutual reliance, and many grown children plan to live 
with their parents when the parents grow old and require help. The ethics and values 
espoused by the traditional Confucian influence of the past are changing slowly (Park 
and Cho, 1995). 
In contemporary Korean society, as a result of the rapid transformation of the economy 
and society in recent decades, there appears to be a conflict between traditional values 
and the Confucian heritage on the one hand and Western influence through economic 
and social changes on the other. That conflict is being played out between parents and 
children, men and women, and superiors and subordinates as they attempt to apply, 
depending on their viewpoint, traditional Confucian values or modem egalitarian 
principles 
- 
in the family, in the workplace, and in their actions as individuals. This 
diversity is generating a great deal of tension and threatens social harmony and 
consensus in Korean society (Park and Cho, 1995). 
In contemporary Korean society, traditional familial values and customs have 
significantly weakened. To demonstrate, the belief that the family has to take the main 
responsibility in supporting and caring for the dependent has declined. For example, 
successive surveys have found that in 1979 30.6 per cent of Koreans aged 14 years and 
over believed that the first son should take the prime responsibility, but only 19.6 per 
cent did so in 1996 (Ministry of Finance, 1992,1996). The reasons for the decline 
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include the spread of primary, secondary and higher education, its impacts on material 
and occupational aspirations, and increased women's participation in employment and 
non-family social activities. Participation in employment among married women may 
be a crucial factor (Choi, 2001). 
5.2. The Policy Response of the Government during the 
Industrialisation Period: 1962-1997 
As Manning has noted (1985) social problems 
- 
which pose a potential challenge to 
social order 
- 
invariably accompany economic and social upheaval. This has certainly 
been the case in Korea. For example, industrialisation draws in workers, which leads to 
a sharp demand for housing in urban areas. In addition, there has been an increased 
incidence of mental illness (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 1997); an increase in 
divorce rates (National Statistical Office, 1997); an increase in alcohol and substance 
abuse (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 1997); an increase in crime and suicide rates 
(National Police Agency, 1997); an increase in the adoption of changed notions of 
family responsibility; resulting in there being growing numbers of elderly people 
without income. Social policy has a potentially important role in alleviating the impact 
of such problems and has in the past been part responsible for the growth of welfare 
states (Manning, 1985). 
Although industrialisation produced a range of social problems, economic growth has 
enabled the Korean government to respond by promoting and expanding its social 
welfare measures. Korea's economic growth during the past 35 years has been one of 
the most rapid in the world. In line with this growth the quality of life of Korean people 
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has been considerably upgraded in many areas. Annual economic growth rates stood at 
around 9 per cent in the 1970s and 1980s, while the average annual growth rate between 
1990 and 1995 was 7.2 percent. Per capita GNP rose from US$ 82 dollars in 1960 to 
US$ 10,548 dollars in 1995. The State aimed at creating a strong industrial structure 
based upon large Korean companies called `chaebol' and created strong protectionist 
measures to preserve its domestic markets. The state facilitated the merger of chaebol 
by using its control of the banking system and of export-import licences. The core of 
Korean industry is consequently made up of around 50 conglomerate business groups 
each owned and run by a single family. In 1983 the combined net sales of the top 30 
chaebol was responsible for 75% of Korea's output of goods and services (Koo, 1987). 
Indubitably, the formation of the chaebol facilitated economic development. 
As Midgley amongst others has observed, social policy development cannot take place 
without economic development, and `economic development is meaningless unless it is 
accompanied by improvements in social welfare for the population as whole' (Midgley 
1995, p. 23). Cutright also argued that `a scale of national social service programs is 
developed and related to economic development' (Cutright 1965, p. 537). There was 
certainly increasing demand for better public services in Korea, and the government was 
in a position to fund public welfare programmes if it so wished, since there was the 
capacity within the tax-base 
- 
at least until 1997 (Shin, 2000b). 
5.2.1. Social Policies during the Export-led Industrialisation in the 1960s 
In the early 1960s there was a series of legislation concerning social welfare, including 
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those pertaining to health insurance, disaster relief, veteran's welfare and child welfare 
services. Many of them, however, were the statutory consolidation of administrative 
orders and ordinances and many still remained inactive. Only those of instrumental 
value were put into effect. These included Public Assistance Programmes (1961), 
Pension Schemes for Military Personnel (1963) and Government Employees (1962), as 
well as Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance (1963). Government Employees 
and Military Personnel were the first two occupational groups to receive public 
pensions in Korea. The pension was not only a means to protect the lives of retirees, but 
also a means to upgrade their status vis-A-vis other occupational groups, thereby 
securing their continuous loyalty to the new regime which had a great shortage of 
legitimacy (Yoo and Kwon, 1987). 
In 1963 Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance (IACI) was put into effect. It 
started as a state administered insurance for those employers deemed responsible for 
providing compensation for workers' industrial accidents. The initial coverage was 
limited to workplaces with 500 or more regular employees, and was gradually expanded 
to workplaces with 200 employees in 1970 and 16 in 1974. The Living Protection Law 
of 1961 was mainly a rewrite of the Chosun Poor Relief Order of 1944, which provided 
subsistence assistance only to those categorically poor and unable to work. It was the 
first statutory provision of public assistance in Korea, though a specific budget for 
public assistance was not allocated until 1969 (Lee, H. K., 1999). 
Although a wide range of welfare-related laws were established during this period, 
some of them were simply underdeveloped or premature. There were a few programmes 
including the IACI and the occupational pension schemes for government employees 
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and military personnel together with pilot medical insurance programmes, which could 
not be referred to as social security as expenditure was inevitably very low, remaining at 
around one per cent of GDP. This means that the slow development of social welfare 
programmes in Korea since the early 1960s is attributable to the relatively low level of 
public expenditure on social welfare programmes. Thus, Korea witnessed the 
establishment of a preferential welfare system to provide special treatments only for 
very limited groups whose support might be crucial for the survival of the regime (Shin, 
2000b). 
With the restructuring of economic bureaucracy and a state-dominated alliance between 
the state and business, the government strongly intervened in the economy to facilitate 
economic development. In order to achieve EOI, the state strengthened its control over 
finance by the restructuring of financial institutions and actively intervening in the 
process of domestic as well as foreign capital. In addition, the state introduced various 
policy measures to support export-led growth. Korean economic development for the 
1960s was a clear example of the developmental state (Shin, 2000b). Thus, during the 
1960s, economic development carried on with a small degree of social welfare. 
5.2.2. Social Policies during the Heavy and Chemical Industrialisation in the 1970s 
The developmental experience of Korea in the 1970s, in particular since 1973 when the 
Heavy Chemical Industrialisation (HCI) plan was being launched, should be a model of 
the developmental state. The government had strongly intervened in the market to 
facilitate industrialisation, while making little commitment to increasing social welfare. 
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Preoccupied with economic development, and having close working relations with 
business but not labour, it deliberately paid little attention to social welfare (Shin, 
2000b). 
During this period two important pieces of social security legislation were introduced 
one was the National Pension Act (1973) and the other was the revised Medical 
Insurance Act (Yoo and Kwon, 1987). The former had to wait 15 years to be 
implemented. Its enactment typifies the authoritarian developmental state's 
instrumentalist approach to welfare policy. It completely bypassed interest politics (Lee, 
H. K., 1999). 
Three years after the enactment of the 1973 National Welfare Pension Act, the Medical 
Insurance Act (first enacted in 1963) was revised and finally put into effect in 1977. The 
Medical Assistance Act was prepared to provide medical assistance to the poor who 
were excluded from medical insurance coverage. President Park was enthusiastic not so 
much about medical insurance as about national welfare pension insurance. He agreed 
to implement it when he was assured that medical insurance in Korea would be financed 
differently from the British National Health Service (Yoo and Kwon, 1987). Its 
compulsory coverage started with firms with 500 workers or more as a social security 
programme. 
However, compared to the achievement of the role of the state in the economy, the 
developmental state in Korea played only a very small role in social welfare. The 
welfare system under heavy and chemical industrialisation was a residual system. For 
example, the national pension programme was put off for an indefinite period in spite of 
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the legislation of 1973. The medical insurance programme was partially introduced only 
for workers working in large firms. Moreover, there was a relatively low level of public 
expenditure on social welfare programmes. The state hardly committed to increasing its 
burden for social welfare (Shin 2000b). Accordingly, during the 1970s, economic 
development in Korea proceeded with little provision for social welfare by the 
government. 
5.2.3. Stabilisation, Liberalisation and Social Policies: 1980-1992 
The Chun Doo Hwan regime's pledge for a welfare society placed emphasis on an 
improvement of the medical insurance system and the revision and enforcement of 
social welfare service laws (Suh, 1982). And in response to the growing awareness of 
the ageing problem, the National Welfare Pension Act was revised to become the 
National Pension Act, though its implementation was handed over to the next regime, 
the Sixth Republic of Ro Tae Woo. Medical Insurance coverage was expanded to 
include persons employed in workplaces with more than 16 regular employees (1983). 
In addition, the definition of dependants was broadened to include members of the 
extended family such as parents-in-law and siblings (1984). Thereby, by 1985,42 per 
cent of the population came to be covered by public medical insurance, either as general 
employees and their dependants or as special occupational group insurees such as 
government employees and private school teachers (Lee, H. Y., 1992). The self- 
employed, urban and rural, were still outside compulsory coverage, but they were 
planned to be covered by 1988. The medical insurance society-based, decentralised 
insurance management system was maintained despite enthusiastic reform initiatives. In 
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1986 the National Welfare Pension Act of 1973 was finally revised and renamed the 
National Pension Act and was planned to be put into effect on I January 1988 (Lee, H. 
K., 1999). 
In the field of social welfare services, thousands of senior citizens' community clubs 
were organised with the support of the government and thousands of community day 
care centres were established all over the country to help low-income working mothers. 
For these activities, the Welfare Act for the Elderly was legislated in 1981 and revised 
in 1984, and the Law for the Education of Pre-school Children was enacted in 1982. 
The Welfare Act for the Handicapped was legislated in 1981 and revised in 1984. The 
Welfare Act for Children was revised in 1984 to incorporate the universal perspective of 
child welfare services. The Social Welfare Service Act, the basic law regarding the 
delivery structure, organisation, professional personnel requirements and financing of 
social welfare services was revised in 1983 as an adjustment to the social situation 
which had changed drastically over a few decades of rapid economic growth. Still, the 
social welfare services were understood as services for public assistance beneficiaries 
(Lee, C. J., 1984; Lee, C. J., 1985). 
The underlying spirit of the Chun Doo Hwan regime's welfare policies was not to 
consolidate the state's responsibility for the people's right to welfare, but to emphasise 
the superiority of informal, familial, community-based mutual support groups and their 
co-operation with the state, particularly in the field of social welfare services. The 
Korean government was already aware of the new conservative trend of welfare state 
retrenchment in advanced Westernnations. By and large, they conceded that the 
expansion of welfare services was unavoidable but they tried to prevent the assumed 
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negative effect of the welfare state which was being notified in the West (Kwon, 1998b). 
During the first two years of President Roh's term, the nation was to encounter ceaseless 
turmoil, social unrest and the erosion of social discipline. President Roh Tae Woo, 
former military general, was hampered by the image that he was close to the military 
and not a true civilian (Morris, 1997). The Roh government's early responses to the 
social unrest were compensatory and welfare oriented. At the end of 1987, the Trade 
Union Law and Labour Dispute Adjustment Law were amended to reduce or abolish 
major regulations on union establishment, government control over the management of 
trade unions and restrictions on collective actions. When, however, further revisions 
were attempted by the National Assembly in early 1989 to allow the government 
officials labour rights, political activity on the part of trade unions and third-party 
intervention (as was demanded by the trade unions), the presidential veto was exercised 
(Morris, 1997). 
In addition, the Medical Insurance System expanded its coverage to rural (1988) and the 
urban self-employed (1989), and the National Pension Insurance Scheme was put into 
effect in 1988 as planned by the previous regime. Furthermore, it was promised that the 
Employment Insurance System would be prepared and implemented during the period 
of the Seventh Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1992-1997). In addition to these 
major social insurance plans, the public welfare service delivery system came to be 
provided with professionally trained social welfare workers (1988). Many other pieces 
of social legislation were introduced and revised as well, such as the Equal Employment 
Act (1987), the Maternity Health Care Act (revised 1987), the Maternity Welfare Act 
(1989) and the Law for the Promotion of the Employment of the Disabled (1990) (Kihl, 
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1990; Park, B., 1990). 
There is little doubt that the democratic transition associated with the development of 
civil society, in particular a growth of working-class power, greatly affected the 
governmental ability to develop the social security programme in Korea. However, this 
view fails to provide an explanation of why the Chun government did not develop social 
policy during the 1980s and then began to raise social policy issues in 1986. It could be 
argued that social policy during the first half of the 1980s was greatly affected by the 
requirements of economic policy, that is stabilisation measures, so that its development 
was significantly limited. 
In order to minimise the inflatory impacts of wage growth, the state was not only trying 
to destroy the power of the labour forces, but also to exclude the labour from wage 
settlement procedures. Social security programmes were substantially subjected to the 
necessity of fiscal restraint so that the development of social welfare was systematically 
limited together with the reduction of fiscal welfare. Yet the very success of stabilisation 
was greatly ascribed to the sacrifice of certain social classes, notably farmers. In other 
words, stabilisation measures resulted in economic difficulties among farmers that the 
state should respond to. Regarding education and training policy, we have found that the 
changed role of the state in the economy characterised by the transformation from 
sectoral intervention to functional intervention was also reflected in the policy 
objectives in education and training areas. 
The government increasingly focused on science and technological education and 
highly skilled workers' training. Therefore, it is clear that social policy was significantly 
166 
constrained by economic policy, though the content and form of social policy was 
affected by the extent of political power resources (Shin, 2000b). 
5.2.4. Social Policies under Globalisation: 1993-1997 
During the Kim Young Sam government (1993-1997), globalisation became a dominant 
policy idea in all state policies, which provided a significant momentum for business to 
retain its prevalence in society. Economic policy, which was driven under the name of 
globalisation policy, accelerated a transformation towards a market-based economic 
system by implementing a variety of deregulations and financial liberalisations. Despite 
these measures, the Korean government never became a minimalist one. The 
government continued to play the role of a participant in the market to encourage 
business activity and help domestic firms maintain competitiveness in the world market. 
In particular, the government largely adopted a strategy of competitiveness dependant 
on production costs, mainly driven by lowering labour costs and deregulation. This 
strategy was largely affecting social policy, requiring the redesign of social policy. In 
March 1995 President Kim Young Sam declared `Segyehwa' (Globalisation) of the 
quality of life in March 1995 (Yoon, 1996), and organised the Working Committee for 
National Welfare Reform to prepare a blueprint for national welfare. The Committee 
detailed the President's declaration on `Segyehwa' of the quality of life, which 
proclaimed that the state would ultimately guarantee a minimum standard of living for 
every citizen. Furthermore, considering that the economic atmosphere focuses on the 
nation's competitiveness, the Committee proposed the paradigm shift of welfare policy 
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from a welfare programme to a productive and preventive welfare programme (Yeon, 
1996). 
The creation of a new paradigm, one which is capable of blending growth and welfare 
harmoniously, is required for long-term balanced development. Through measures 
focused on the development of human resources, welfare projects should function to 
stimulate the growth of the people's potential while at the same time attempting to 
distribute fairly the results of socio-economic development, which is an essential 
requirement for enhancing the quality of life. In May 1995, the National Welfare 
Planning Board was formed by the Segyehwa Committee. And in February 1996, this 
Board announced `the Vision of the 21st Century National Welfare Reform' to enhance 
the quality of life. The Vision set out three specific goals as a means to achieving the 
main goal, which was to establish a future Korean welfare model and to provide 
advanced welfare services. The first specific goal was the attainment of a balance 
between economic integration of traditional Korean customs with the positive elements 
of the welfare system found in advanced countries. The last entailed the establishment 
of preventative and productive welfare services. Concrete strategies for achieving these 
goals were proposed. Firstly, by constructing a nation-wide social insurance system that 
should be mature. Secondly, securing a national minimum standard of living in the 
public assistance programme and expanding the base for a self-reliance programme that 
should result in the expansion of the productive welfare base. Thirdly, implementing a 
social welfare service that should be universal and preventive through family and 
community-oriented services. Finally, the participation of non-governmental 
organisations, firms and local community members should be emphasised (Yeon, 1996). 
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The Kim administration had been cautious in implementing democratic reforms as well 
as in expanding the social security system. The Employment Insurance Act was 
promulgated in 1993 and put into effect in 1995, as planned by the previous 
administration (Yoon, 1996). When the National Welfare Pension Law was amended in 
1986, a compromise was made to merge severance allowance into the national pension 
gradually, and to create an unemployment insurance system. Long before the National 
Pension Scheme was introduced, the Severance Allowance System, predicated upon the 
Labour Standard Law of 1953, was functioning as a lump-sum pension for retiring 
elderly employees and as unemployment compensation for young workers who had 
been laid off. The law stipulated that employers should pay departing employees a 
severance allowance (one month's remuneration for one year's service). Employers 
insisted that to introduce the national pension insurance system, the employer's burden 
of financing the severance allowance should be reduced or eliminated. For the workers, 
as the severance allowance was already an established legal right as a deferred wage, 
which was the sole the responsibility of the employers, the employers'. demand was not 
acceptable. The compromise was to merge the pension and the severance allowance and 
to implement unemployment insurance during the period of the Seventh Five-Year 
Social-Economic Development Plan (1992-1996) (Lee, H. K., 1999). 
The new Employment Insurance Law of 1993 clearly emphasised its prioritised function 
of job training, education and placement over and above its income support function for 
the unemployed. It has three major elements. The first is the Employment Stabilisation 
Scheme to prevent unemployment, bring about a smooth employment adjustment, 
improve employment conditions and increase employment opportunities. The second is 
the Job Ability Development Scheme to encourage vocational training in the private 
169 
sector and to enable workers to develop and improve the capabilities required in their 
jobs throughout their working lives. The third is the Unemployment Insurance Scheme 
to alleviate hardships resulting from the loss of wage income through unemployment. 
The unemployment insurance component began with establishments having 30 or more 
employees, while the first and second components were applied to establishments with 
70 or more employees, until their coverage expanded further in January 1998. The 
Korean Employment Insurance System was motivated by the necessity of an active 
labour market policy to help the structural adjustment effort in the labour market. The 
labour market was still very tight. The rate of unemployment had remained under 3.1 
per cent ever since the late 1980s (Lee, H. K., 1999). 
Generally speaking, the efforts of the Kim Young Sam administration in social welfare 
reform were focused on the systematic search for a new comprehensiveness in the 
changing international environment. It wanted to encourage private sector initiatives to 
participate in the provision of social welfare services and to expand the social security 
system within the general principle of small government with productivist priorities. 
But it had neither the comprehensive immediate action plans to strengthen the private 
sector, nor the notion of the balance of the responsibility between the state and the 
private sector. In other words, much of the concrete and specific choices of policies and 
programmes were left open for further discussion (Yoon, 1996). 
The state's role in the provision of social welfare as a regulation was intact. The 
extension of the NPP to farmers and fisherman and the introduction of the EIP took 
place during the Kim Young Sam government. However, the government continually 
played the role of a regulator rather than a provider in welfare provision. In particular, 
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welfare reforms in the Kim government seem to be towards more limited income 
security programmes. They included tightening conditions of access to unemployment 
benefit, putting more emphasis on active measures, introducing a private pension 
scheme, adopting a market-conforming approach in pension and cutbacks in pensions. 
At the same time, the government increasingly emphasised the responsibility of the 
family and the role of the private sector in welfare provision. 
The need for competitiveness also increasingly became the main objective of labour 
policy. The Kim government, in the early years, actively encouraged workers to make a 
concession to business with respect to wages. Labour flexibility and deregulation 
concerning labour protections were sought by the revision of labour related laws. The 
new direction in labour affairs can be said to strengthen labour flexibility and lower 
labour costs. Regarding the education and training system, the Kim government did 
make a considerable change by putting more emphasis on a vocational education system. 
Consequently, it could be argued that there was a strong linkage between economic 
policy and social policy during the Kim government. With globalisation policy, the 
government increasingly became a competition state to create and/or maintain 
competitiveness for domestic firms and thus social policy was increasingly required to 
adopt the needs of competitiveness. There seems to be little doubt that one reason for 
this ongoing shift was the imperative of international competitiveness within the 
dynamics of increased economic integration. In this regard, it could be argued that 
social policy in the Kim government was transformed towards ` a business friendly one'. 
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As the policy response of the government to the social problems produced by social 
changes during the industrialisation period were explored, Korea implemented nearly all 
types of social security programmes, with the exception of family allowance. 
Nevertheless, some of them were simply underdeveloped or premature, so that they did 
not play an important role in protection against the risks and insecurities of the market. 
Others were designed to provide relatively small amounts of benefits, so that people had 
to find substantial security measures in the non-state sectors, notably the family, 
enterprise and commercial sectors. All these deficiencies can be ascribed not only to the 
small commitment made by the state to increase social welfare but also to inadequate 
policy design. If the role of the state in welfare provision can be divided into four types 
- 
operator of transfer, provider, financier and regulator 
- 
the government played little 
part in the first three. Instead, it played the role of a regulator, not only by setting the 
regulations which the non-state sector should observe but also by imposing greater 
control on the running of social security programmes. 
5.3. The Basic Features of Korean Welfare System before the Economic 
Crisis 
Since the 1960s, as noted, demand for welfare services has greatly increased because of 
socio-economic problems such as mass-unemployment, family disorganisation and 
disparities in income levels among the social classes in Korea. However, there was 
general hostility to western ideals of the `welfare state' within successive Korean 
Governments 
- 
except paradoxically amongst employees of the state. Welfare provision 
for civil servants, the military and police, teachers, etc was and remains extensive and 
generous (Gough, 2001). This in part reflects the importance placed upon those groups 
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for the stability of the State. Policy makers in Korea set economic growth as the 
fundamental goal and have generally pursued a coherent strategy to achieve it. This has 
been combined with various social policies, but all entail the explicit subordination of 
social policy to economic policy and economic growth. This has been possible because 
Government officials, mainly as a result of the deference paid to them by virtue of 
Confucian societal values (Sakong, 1993) are relatively insulated from interest groups 
and have a high degree of internal coherence and loyalty. (Gough, 2001; Ham, 1997). 
5.3.1. The Emergence of Public Welfare Provision 
Korean governments consistently recognised the importance of `human capital' in 
economic development and this is reflected in a policy emphasis upon education and 
health provision. This can be seen in Table 5.3. However, to put this in comparison, the 
Korean figures are significantly lower than the percentages of GDP spent by the UK on 
Education and Health in the same year (5.2 and 5.75 per cent respectively). In total, 
Korea only spent around 10 per cent of its GDP on welfare, in contrast to around 29 per 
cent of GDP in the UK (OECD, 1996). This was possible because health insurance 
schemes in Korea include high co-payments or user charges, so that health care finance 
is in effect about half-public and half-private. Furthermore Korea's housing policies 
were mainly based upon regulations, with little state provision and finance, although the 
government closely controlled the housing market. Moreover, user fees charged by 
public schools were typically higher in Korea compared with the West. Perhaps most 
important, however, the need for a pubic assistance programme was limited, thanks to 
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civil laws enforcing care for their family members upon families 
- 
which means not just 
spouses and children, but also siblings and parents. (Jacobs, 2000). 
Table. 5.3. Aggregate public expenditures on social welfare in Korea, 1995 
Percentage of GDP (%) 
Education 4.94 
Health care 0.47 
Social security & welfare 2.15 
Housing & community development 3.05 
Total 10.61 
Source: National Statistics Office, 1997. 
The widespread availability of public health care in Korea suggests that most sick 
people had some access to health care. However, it can be seen that there remained 
significant inequalities. In Korea, state employees had their own distinct insurance 
systems that were superior to those of the general population. Moreover, the provision 
of a wide range of private welfare rose, and therefore the government decentralised 
public hospitals and placed key services under tender. For those citizens who could 
afford it there was the option of moving abroad for health treatment (Gough, 2001). 
Indeed Korea could be argued to have a form of public health insurance that could be 
classified as a `National Health Service'. It is certainly the case that `in the space of a 
little over a decade Korea had moved to a fully-fledged National Health Insurance 
system 
- 
universal and integrated, but with high co-payments and not yet geared to 
functioning in a re-distributive fashion' (Gough, 2001, p. 172). 
In addition, the local autonomous government structure, launched in 1991, drew 
inhabitants' attention to social welfare benefits in their region. Following affiliation to 
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the United Nations, international co-operation was expected to increase, and some 
projects, such as extension of health and medical services and welfare services were 
urgently required to prepare for the national unification. More systematic programmes 
and activities by the Government were needed to overcome the problems and satisfy the 
demands for health and welfare services (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 1997). 
In order to meet people's expectations and desires and to establish and promote social 
welfare policy harmonised with income and economic levels, the Government made 
continuous efforts in the fields of public health and social welfare. To improve the level 
of national health and medical care including mental health care, the Korean 
government implemented policies in the following areas: 
(a) Health Promotion and Protection; 
(b) Control of Communicable Diseases; 
(c) Control of Mental Health; 
(d) Medical Care System; 
(e) Food and Pharmaceutical affairs 
(Ministry of Health and Welfare, 1997) 
In addition, to improving social welfare services, the Korean Government carried out 
the following policies: 
(a) Public Assistance; 
(b) Social Welfare Services for vulnerable people such as the poor, the elderly, 
women, the disabled and children; 
(c) National Pension System; 
(d) Health Insurance and Medical Aid 
(Ministry of Health and Welfare, 1997) 
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As shown in Table 5.4, the total expenditure for social security, that is, the expenditure 
for social insurance, public assistance and personal social services programmes 
combined, amounted to 4.5 per cent of the GNP in 1996. 
Table 5.4. Trend in Social Security Expenditure by Programme: 1965-1996 
Year 
Total 
(billion won) 
(ado) 
Social 
Insurance 
(%) 
Public 
Assistance 
(oha) 
Welfare 
Service 
(o/a) 
S. S. Total  
expend. 
% GDP 
Central 
gov't 
SS exp 
% GDP 
Exp. / 
Capita 
(1,000 
won) 
1965 58 (100) 24.4 73.6 2.0 0.71 
- 
0.2 
1970 261(100) 55.5 42.7 1.8 0.97 
- 
0.8 
1975 870 (100) 41.6 56.1 2.3 0.89 
- 
2.5 
1980 6,107 (100) 65.9 32.0 2.1 1.67 0.5 16.0 
1985 16,766 (100) 76.2 21.1 2.7 2.32 0.5 40.8 
1986 19,461 (100) 75.6 19.7 4.8 2.15 
- 
47.3 
1987 23,181 (100) 74.6 20.7 4.8 2.19 
- 
55.8 
1988 30,594 (100) 75.2 21.2 3.6 2.43 
- 
72.9 
1989 40,036 (100) 75.3 20.4 4.3 2.83 
- 
94.5 
1990 53,919 (100) 74.3 19.4 6.3 3.15 0.8 125.8 
1991 70,846 (100) 68.5 19.2 5.7 3.43 0.9 163.8 
1992 80,484 (100) 77.8 16.9 6.0 3.50 1.0 184.3 
1993 105,717 (100) 81.4 10.4 4.6 3.98 0.9 201.1 
1994 116,779 (100) 85.1 10.8 4.1 3.48 0.9 239.2 
1995 137,008 (100) 85.6 10.0 4.6 3.93 0.8 303.8 
1996 172,879 (100) 85.9 9.2 4.9 4.47 0.9 379.5 
Source: Government Budgets, the Ministry of Economic Planning Board, each year; White 
Paper of Health and Welfare, Ministry of Health and Welfare, each year. 
This presents a considerable growth from 0.7 per cent in 1965 and 2.2 per cent in 1987. 
The amount of social insurance expenditure increased rapidly and steadily from 24 per 
cent in 1965 to 86 per cent in 1996, whereas that for public assistance expenditure 
decreased drastically from 74 per cent in 1965 to 9 per cent in 1996. Expenditures on 
social welfare services fluctuated between 1.8 per cent in 1970 and 6.3 per cent in 1990. 
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However, as Table 5.5 demonstrates, compared to other OECD countries public 
spending on social protection, including pensions, is extremely low in Korea. The 
exception to this is pensions for the military and other public sector employees. The rest 
of the population is largely reliant upon the national pensions system. The National 
Pension Scheme did not start until 1988, but it has since been extending its coverage 
and building up its fund over a 20-year period. As Gough points out full pensions will 
not really start to fall into place until 2008 (Gough, 2001). 
Table 5.5. Social Security Expenditures in Selected Countries 
Korea United United Germany Sweden 
Kingdom States 
Total Social Security Expenditure as 5.28 23.64 15.66 30.05 38.33 
Percentage of GDP' 
Mandatory Private Social Benefits as 1.40 0.23 0.47 1.39 0.62 
Percentage of GDPb 
Private Share (b/a) (%) 26.5 1.0 3.0 4.6 1.6 
Source: Shin, ZUUUb. 
Note: Korea figures are for 1996; other countries for 1993. 
a) Including public social expenditure and mandatory private social benefits. Voluntary private social 
benefits are not included. 
b) Mandatory private social benefits are defined as those benefits which economic agents (often 
employer) are legally obliged to provide, or benefits derived from private insurance arrangements 
which economic agents are forced to take up. 
5.3.2. Social Policy under the Economic Growth Strategy 
In Korea, political debates around welfare policy development illustrate tensions 
between welfare expansion and economic growth. Indeed, the Park regime in the early 
1960s already recognised the legitimacy of citizen's basic social rights and the state's 
obligation to protect them. Park's broad-based welfare programmes could not be 
implemented due to economic concerns. 
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Korean governments considered economic development as their top policy priority, and 
assumed only a limited role in social welfare since the beginning of the country's rapid 
industrialisation. In particular, social welfare policies between the 1960s and the 1970s 
were considered secondary to economic policy and were developed only to the extent 
that they would not hinder economic development. Such policies as these mainly dealt 
with problems associated with industrial accidents caused by the process of 
industrialisation. For example, the Industrial Injury Compensation Act (1963) and the 
Medical Insurance Act (1962) were enacted during the 1960s. However, legislation was 
enacted in the 1970s to reduce social inequality caused by economic development and 
to improve the welfare of the Korean people, for example the National Welfare Pension 
Act (1973). During this period, much social welfare was focused on pension and health 
care schemes for employees in industrial firms and government or private school 
employees. It was not until the beginning of the 1980s that social welfare was adopted 
by the Korean government as a national goal as a means to achieve a democratic 
welfare society. 
Shin (2000b) has argued that economic and social policies have not been determined in 
isolation from each other. He also has pointed out that the form and content of social 
policy has been greatly constrained by the requirements of economic policy. 
Since the early 1960s the Korean government chose the strategy of minimising labour 
costs for competitiveness in the world trade markets, which has subsequently had an 
important effect on shaping social policy. Social policy in Korea has been embedded 
in and constrained by the requirements of economic policy. Yet, the nature of policy 
linkages between economic and social policies varies according to the area of social 
policy and the content of economic policy (Shin 2000b, p. i) 
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As Kwon (1999b) points out during the period 1961-87 the governments of Korea 
pursued a strategy that can be summarised as legitimisation through economic 
performance. For instance President Park's government pursued an `economic growth 
strategy' whereas President Chun aimed at `economic stabilisation'. Consequently, 
economic policy took precedence over all other policy considerations, including social 
policy. 
5.3.3. Social Welfare under The government's rationale for fostering Confucianism 
This chapter has outlined the implications of the radical and exceptionally rapid changes 
in the demography, economy and social formations of Korea, over the last few decades, 
for the care and support of its dependant people. The creation of an industrial society, 
the concentration of the urban population, the urgent and massive social problems 
arising from phenomenally rapid urbanisation, the undermining of more traditional 
family and community systems of social support and control: the problem of welfare 
became societal rather than a family problem. 
Nevertheless the development of social policy continued to be facilitated by Confucian 
values. In Korean society, citizens were under strong moral and, sometimes, political 
pressure to sacrifice their individual interests for unconditional family unity, to keep 
familial problems within the family and to abstain from resorting to social or 
governmental measures in an effort to meet familial needs (Kim, 1990; Chung, 1991). 
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Since the 1960s, Korea has shifted from being mainly an agrarian, rural society to an 
urbanised and industrial, newly modernising one. Of all the Asian modernised or 
modernising societies that have Confucian ethical heritages, it appears that Korea is one 
of the most closely bound to the relational aspects of this heritage. As mentioned, 
demographic changes, urbanisation and industrialisation have contributed to changes in 
Korean family structure. Traditionally, the Confucian ethical and relational system 
holds the eldest son responsible for the care of his family and elderly parents, although 
in modern Korea it is possible for another son to assume this care-giving role. The 
second cardinal virtue of Confucianism requires the obedience of the son to the father 
and the third requires the obedience of the wife to the husband. The political structure's 
emphasis on economic development makes it difficult to moderate any social stress 
factors through the development of a countervailing social welfare infrastructure. There 
was indeed a deliberate governmental strategy not to develop a supporting social 
infrastructure or a modern welfare state package of social services and income policy 
programmes such as might assist the elderly and their informal caregivers. 
The government's rationale for fostering `Confucianism' and family responsibility 
appeared to be disingenuous. At times, Korea's political leaders appeared to be 
convinced by their own rhetoric that supportive income and social services would 
undermine the Confucian tradition of family care for dependant people. The political- 
economic drive for low income taxes and low taxes on equity transactions, combined 
with subsidies and incentives to encourage exports plus a substantial commitment to the 
military budget, left few resources available for social services. The government thus 
used the Confucian ethic as `a rationale for its laissez-faire approach to the problems 
posed by dependant people' (Palley 1992, p. 801). 
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While several themes have dominated attempts to account for the economic success of 
these societies 
- 
notably their distinctive `developmental states' and their heavy 
emphasis on education- the most wide-ranging and popularly current explanation has 
been based on culture. As White and Goodman point out: 
Most cultural explanations have in turn been based on some notion of Confucianism 
which is held to be a key part of the shared heritage of East Asia as a whole. In an 
earlier era (the 1950s and the 1960s), Western observers largely perceived 
Confucianism as a heavy constraint on the economic programme because of its stress 
on the importance of preserving tradition, its reinforcement of a social structure which, 
despised and restricted commercial and industrial pursuits, and its hostility to 
technological innovation and entrepreneurship. Since the 1970s, however, 
Confucianism 
- 
in a protean variety of versions 
- 
has been rediscovered as a positive 
historical force (White and Goodman 1998, p. 18). 
Confucianism was certainly commonly cited as having provided the fundamental 
cultural underpinnings for the East Asian economic success. This is seen to be an 
important element in the State's emphasis on education, strong family relations, 
benevolent paternalism, social harmony and discipline, respect for tradition and a strong 
work ethic (White and Goodman, 1998). 
Many right wing theorists and politicians concluded that the nuclear family was the 
main cause of many social problems, in particular, widespread poverty and 
psychological difficulties among the elderly and children. It is argued that the nuclear 
family, did not properly maintain Confucian virtues such as family solidarity, filial piety 
and self-sacrifice. As a consequence it is seen as disrupting the harmonious and stable 
support among family members. This ideological critique was `nurtured by an 
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inadvertent application of the functionalist thesis of family nucleation to Korean 
society' (Chang 1997, p. 23). 
As Chang (1997) pointed out, the Korean experience of averting political demands for 
`progressive' family welfare by moral criticism of the individualist nuclear family, was 
both similar to and different from the Western experience. Furthermore as Chang 
argued, `by comparison with the Western New Right's use of the moral politics of the 
family for legitimating major cutbacks in welfare programmes (or in `rolling back the 
state'), the moralisation of family issues in Korea has had a preventive effect on the 
starting up of any such progressive welfare programmes. In other words, the historical 
contexts in which family politics operate are different. Moreover, the moral politics of 
the family in Korea has involved fewer institutional links with congressional and 
governmental activities than in the West. Social debates and media coverage of family 
issues from a Confucian/liberal perspective have often encouraged non-action on the 
part of the state so that a sort of de-politicisation of family issues has been induced. It is 
in this social and cultural environment of strong public conservatism that de facto 
political manipulation becomes highly effective in suppressing political demand for 
progressive state support and intervention' (Chang 1997, pp. 37-38). 
Nevertheless there remained a further similarity between Korea and the West. The 
moral politics of the family in Korea was effective in legitimating the absence and 
deficiency of public protection programmes for needy families and individuals, but not 
in alleviating family problems via the revitalisation of traditional family structures or 
attitudes. Somerville describes a similar failure of the New Right in western countries as 
being a result of `the sheer weight and momentum of major demographic, economic, 
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social and cultural shifts in the sub-stratum of advanced industrialised societies in the 
twentieth century' (Somerville 1992, p. 119). However, even if we suspect that many 
liberal politicians in both Korea and the West do not necessarily have a genuine 
spiritual commitment to the moral rehabilitation of the family per se, they may still 
experience political success. This is because `the moral discourse on the family does 
appear to have been useful in legitimating their suppression of welfare programmes' in 
the first place (Chang 1997, p. 38). 
Such moral discourse also, of course, impacts upon the role of women in Korean 
society. Kim, H. J. (1996) argues that Confucianism represented a subordination of 
women. In Korea a woman should be a faithful wife, a devoted daughter in law, a self- 
sacrificing mother within the home and denied a role in public life. In Korean tradition, 
when women are married, it is more important for women to take care of their parents in 
law than their own parents. In Korea nearly 54 per cent of elderly people live with or 
very near to their grown up children (Kwon, H. 2001). `Sons provide emotional and 
financial support and resources from outside the family, but they are unlikely to help 
with instrumental, hands on services' (Sung 1990, p. 615). Filial piety may be a 
continuous burden to the majority of women, who end up caring for parents and parents 
in law, in the absence of a policy that addresses the needs of the total population and 
places an undue burden on women (Choi, E., 1994). Inequalities between men and 
women exist in the workplace as well as in the home, they tend to be in lower positions 
when their employers emphasise Confucian values within the workplace, as within the 
vast majority of the ` chaebol'. 
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There was strong criticism, particularly from feminists, that the Korean governments 
promoted Confusion values to facilitate governance of its people rather than from any 
ideological imperative. However, there were indications that the strength of Confucian 
values within policy-making began to change. Women were increasingly active in the 
public sphere and recognition of this was achieved with a reformed childcare policy in 
1997 and the slow improvement in women's rights over the last decade 
- 
though this 
has not been without resistance from traditionalists. 
5.4. Summary 
This chapter has examined the implications of the radical and exceptionally rapid 
changes in the demography, economy and social formations of Korea since the 1960s. 
The industrial and economic base of Korea grew dramatically until the late 1990s. This 
facilitated the development of social policies 
- 
particularly in areas such as education, 
health and housing, which support economic growth. However, although the structure 
of the family changed to be closer to its structure in the West, it could be argued that 
evidence pointing to a broader `Westernisation' of Korean society was premature. 
Confucianism may have been a factor in Korea's development, but it may yet prove a 
hindrance to any further moves to modernity and equalisation of life chances amongst 
its citizens. 
Prior to the economic crisis of 1997 Korea tended to rely on Confucian ideology as an 
apology for limited government action in social welfare provision. The Korean 
government strongly urged its people to provide social support to their family members. 
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Culture thus served as a justification for the lack of a comprehensive social welfare 
system in Korea. Given rapid economic growth and this cultural belief, Korea was not 
under pressure from powerful constituencies to provide comprehensive social welfare 
provision. 
In the following chapter the development of social policy in Korea after the economic 
crisis will be discussed in terms of both cultural and structural influences. The next 
chapter will elaborate these themes in relation to the history of Confucianism as a 
rationality of governance. How does the Korean welfare regime respond to social 
problems in the aftermath of economic crisis? 
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Chapter 6. Social Policy Responses under the Confucian 
Governance II: the Economic Crisis and its Impact 1998-Present 
Since the beginning of the first Five-Year Economic Development Plan in 1962, Korea 
has made major economic achievements. Policies intended to encourage growth have 
led to a substantial increase in the GNP per capita; Korea has now moved to the upper 
developing countries group in the United Nations ranking. A remarkable reduction in 
population growth and dramatic education development have together played a key role 
in economic development. Outstanding progress was made in raising the standard of 
living; average household income levels rose significantly and the unemployment rate 
remained at a low level. Poverty and social difficulties were considered to have been 
solved due to economic growth and full employment while the informal, private and 
familial welfare system compensated for the lack of public welfare. 
The 1997 economic crisis, however, clearly revealed the limit of these policies. Rising 
unemployment and the decrease in nominal wages have destabilised households 
severely, and the poverty level has risen both in absolute and relative terms while 
income disparities are widening. While there has traditionally been a gap between urban 
and rural areas in terms of wealth, new patterns of poverty have emerged in the cities. 
The crisis has brought a realisation that economic development cannot be socially 
sustainable without social policy measures. As a result of this, the government has 
introduced a set of temporary measures as well as an important reform of the welfare 
system. In this respect, this chapter intends to explore the impact of the crisis and then 
identifies the government's response to the crisis. 
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The thrust of this chapter is on the policy responses to perceived social problems in the 
aftermath of the economic crisis. Also, the relationship between the economic situation 
in the aftermath of the economic crisis of 1997 along with social policy making will be 
examined in this chapter. 
This chapter is divided into five sections including the introduction and summary, the 
next section examines the impact of the economic crisis, which produced growing 
demands for social welfare. Section three tries to explore the development of social 
policy in the aftermath of the economic crisis of 1997 in order to clarify the policy 
direction which has primarily influenced mental health policy making. Section four 
identifies the basic features of the policies informed and shaped by Korean politics and 
culture after the economic crisis of 1997. 
6.1. The Impact of the Economic Crisis and Growing Social Demands 
for Welfare 
The Korean welfare regime quickly became overwhelmed by the economic crisis which 
hit much of Asia in 1997. The growth in welfare over the previous thirty years had 
largely relied upon the expansion of employment within the orbit of strong families, 
plus growing co-payment for services. Certainly, the reliance on overseas aid was 
diminishing in the late 1990s but many of the social sectors were open to foreign 
commercial penetration (Gough 2001, p. 181). Gough summarises the main social 
effects of the crisis as follows: `a collapse in currency values, which generated higher 
import prices and extensive internal price changes, including falling asset values; a 
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drastic fall in output and thus in demand for labour; falling state revenues and a squeeze 
on public spending; fears of the erosion of the social fabric' (Gough 2001, pp. 181-2). 
6.1.1. The Social Impact of the Crisis 
The social impact of the crisis was analysed by Manuelyan Atinc and Walton (1998) 
and Manuelyan Antic (2000). They pointed out that the rates and depth of poverty 
increased markedly. Following the crisis, there was a declining demand for labour and 
the resultant loss of wages in the population brought about a collapse in private 
consumption. Interestingly, they noted that rates of inequality did not increase 
significantly, though this was in part due to the collapse in the financial assets of the 
rich and middle classes. Their work points to the ways in which many poor households 
were forced to cut back on nutrition, postpone health care and make other family 
adjustments such as removing a child from education. However, the crisis turned around 
more quickly than most commentators expected, with economic recovery beginning as 
early as 1999. (Shin, 2000a). Gough portrays the situation as follows: 
In Korea, meanwhile, labour demand fell sharply and, though real wages fell, the 
major impact was on unemployment, especially among women. As a developed 
industrial economy, Korean households had fewer rural resources to fall back on. At 
this time, Korea was already embarked on a restructuring of trade, economic and 
social policy, under pressure from the US to liberalise its economic structure. The first 
wave of reforms, introduced by the Rho Tae-woo government in 1988, included 
Medical Insurance, the National Pension Programme, the Minimum Wage and new 
labour laws. Following the financial crisis, a second wave of reforms followed in 
1998-1999, coinciding with the election of Kim Dae Jung as president. The economy 
was significantly liberalised and the close links between the state and the `chaebol' 
were loosened. This was coupled with moves towards a more western style of welfare 
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system. Expenditure on unemployment insurance, wage subsidies and public works 
programmes escalated, to an unprecedented 4 percent of GDP in 1999. In addition, the 
National Health System was restructured and expanded, pension entitlements were 
liberalised and an expanded Labour Standard Law introduced. A `Labour- 
Management-Government' Committee was established which moved away, at least in 
name, from state-business symbiosis to a tripartite 
- 
state-business-labour 
- 
form of 
corporatism. In short, greater exposure to the global economy and the subsequent 
crisis has served to undermine the influence and the social provisions of the chaebol 
and required the state to develop a more autonomous western-style of social policy. 
(Gough 2001, pp. 182-3) 
6.1.2. Mass Unemployment 
The economic crisis of 1997 had a considerable impact on the common people in Korea. 
The crisis resulted in one out of five households having someone unemployed, suicide 
rates rose by 50%, and homeless people slept outside the subway stations (Park, T. W., 
1999). Statistics show that the number of poor people living below the poverty line rose 
to 7.8% in 1998 (MoHW, 1999). Park, T. W. (1999) portrays this situation: 
Men who were the primary breadwinners for their families left home in shame and 
embarrassment after they were laid off. They did not get much assistance from the 
state. Services for homeless people were underdeveloped in Korea. Social tensions 
rose to a dangerous level. Social security benefits for unemployed people were 
considered inadequate (Park, T. W. 1999, p. 133). 
This was a system dependant upon a strong family network and which, over the past 
three decades, collapsed as bread winners could not find work (Yoo, G., 1998). As a 
consequence, urgent relief for suffering people was much needed (Tang, 2000a). 
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Despite IMF rescue packages, the financial crisis was not showing any signs of 
receding. Instead, soaring unemployment and sharply devalued currencies led to the 
further deterioration of an already weakened economy (Lee, H. K., 1999). The 
unemployment rate rose to 7.6 per cent in July 1998 from less than 3.0 per cent before 
1997, due to the massive layoff scheduled by the restructuring public sector and big 
business corporations (Lee, H. K., 1999). Lee, H. K. (1999) explains the situation 
regarding unemployment: 
These official statistics on unemployment did not include the unemployment of daily 
workers, whose numbers add up to some 1.9 million. More than 1.5 million 
unemployment officially counted plus about 0.4 million unemployment daily workers 
makes about 2 million unemployed already. The rise in the number of the homeless 
was a relatively new but prominent social problem in most of the large cities. A good 
deal of survey research on the situation of the unemployed and the homeless was 
needed to develop appropriate programmes for them (p. 35). 
The economic decline, corporate crisis and a credit squeeze caused lay-offs, real wage 
declines, weak demand for new labour market entrants and falling margins in the 
informal sector. Unemployment in Korea reached 7.6 per cent in July 1998 (1.5 million) 
and the increases in unemployment in turn required increased outlays of unemployment 
benefits by the Government under the EIS, just when public revenues were declining. 
Most of the unemployed are expected to be people not covered by the EIS, and it will be 
important to find ways to shelter these individuals from the worst of the crisis. In 
addition, the crisis will have a significant impact on the elderly who are unable to rely 
on relatives and friends for support, since the NPS is not due to begin disbursement 
until the year 2008. 
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The economic crisis affected the poor by reducing income, and by increasing prices, 
unemployment and underemployment. Unemployment rose from 3 per cent before the 
crisis (7.6 per cent in July 1998) to about 8 per in 1999. As the number of poor 
increased, it placed pressure on the government, at a minimum, to improve the current 
fractional coverage of the Livelihood Protection and Medical Aid programmes. 
F 
{ 
I, 
Between October and December 1997, the Korean won depreciated by over 50 per cent, 
increasing the relative price of medical care. This price increase occurred at a time when 
Koreans, and especially the poor and unemployed, were least able to afford the high 
out-of-pocket costs of health care. 
6.1.3. The Impact of the Economic Crisis on Family 
After the economic crisis unemployment in Korea may have a greater social impact than 
the number represents. Korean society was unaccustomed to high unemployment 
because of its rapid economic growth and the corporate culture of lifetime employment. 
Consequently, institutional capability, such as a social safety net to deal with 
unemployment, is rather poor. Furthermore, married women are not active in the labour 
market and households are usually dependent on the labour income of their (male) 
heads. Unemployment of the male head of the family means not only financial disaster 
for the family, but also a social stigma and mental burden to the male head himself. 
The male unemployment rate went up to six per cent in all age group between 35 and 59. 
Considering that a great number of people among them were the main breadwinners in 
households, social stress was much higher that the figure suggests. For example, the 
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crime rate increased by 11 per cent in 1998 compared to 6.3 per cent in 1997 and the 
increase in divorce was up by 25 per cent in 1998 compared to 0.9 per cent in the 
previous year. 
The most widely investigated problems among the unemployed in their family are 
material deprivation and family disruption due to one member's unemployment (Lee, E., 
2000). After the economic crisis both unemployed and employed experienced severe 
reductions in income, resulting in reduced consumption of food (70 per cent among the 
lower class), clothes and shoes (30 per cent), entertainment (29.4 per cent), furniture 
and home appliances (28.6 per cent), and eating out (28 per cent) (National Statistical 
Office, 1999). Lower-class unemployed people suffer more from income loss and 
income reductions because most of them are excluded from various social benefits such 
as unemployment insurance, pensions, and retirement benefits. According to the 
National Survey on Income (1999) in Korea, income gaps categorised by levels of 
educational attainment were exacerbated after the end of 1997, with 16.7 per cent of 
income reductions and 15 per cent of reductions in household spending for middle 
school graduates, and 14.2 per cent and 20.4 per cent for some university graduates. 
The National Statistical Office reported that the bottom 20 per cent lost 20 per cent of 
their income and reduced 15 per cent of their household spending, while the top 20 per 
cent gained more income by 27 per cent in 1999. This result shows that economic 
difficulties are not evenly distributed across social class, and lower class people suffer 
more from economic deprivation while the rich gain more profit from higher interest 
rate changes as a result of the economic adjustment programme right after the IMF 
intervention. This social disparity is associated with a high level of suicide and crime 
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rates, loss of self-efficacy and control, and a high level of alcohol consumption and drug 
abuse. 
Furthermore, social and economic crises in Korea affected marital conflicts and 
weakened family relationships, showing a high increase in divorce cases from 22,324 
couples in the first quarter of 1997 to 36,735 couples in the same period of 1998, or a 64 
per cent of increase (National Statistical Office, 1999). Family disruption such as 
divorce and frequent marital conflicts between a couple would influence higher cases of 
runaway youth and nutritional deficiency among children as well as loss of close social 
relationships, which are detrimental to the physical and mental health of the 
unemployed. 
6.1.4. Growing Social Demands for Social Welfare 
It is also worth noting that there was a sweeping change in the public perception of the 
role of the state in social welfare over this period. According to the survey research 
conducted twice, in May 1997 and in October 1998 (see Table 6.1), 83 per cent of the 
respondents replied that the state was responsible for citizens' social welfare in 1998, 
whereas 49 per cent responded in that way in 1997 (Shin 1997; 1998). 
The figure suggests that social demands for social rights have been largely 
acknowledged among the public in Korea since the economic crisis of 1997 bringing 
about growing demands for social welfare. In particular, the structure of income 
distribution got worse after the crisis. According to the data from the World Bank 
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(Show, 1999), the number of people living in poverty in urban sectors increased from 
8.6 per cent in 1997 to 19.20 per cent in 1999. This increase clearly indicates that the 
crisis has engendered large reallocations of people and sharp declines in middle-class 
standards of living. 
Table 6.1. The people's attitude over the state's responsibility for individual welfare % 
May 1997 1 October 1998 
Individual responsible 1 51 117 
State responsible 149 183 
Note: These figure were obtained from the following question: please choose one statement that 
comes closest to your view: Individuals should be responsible for their own welfare; The state 
should be responsible for everyone's economic security. 
Sources: Shin and Rose, 1997 and 1998. 
In this situation, policy initiatives that go against the perceptions of a large number of 
citizen voters might well prove unfeasible. Thus, the government in Korea has to be 
sensitive to the changed public perceptions. Social security policy has emerged as a 
crucial measure to respond to them, not least the establishment of a social safety net. 
Along with the growing social demands for social welfare, the Korean government had 
to respond to the problem of mental health particularly as a social rather than family 
problem in terms of social protection. 
6.2. The Policy Response of the Government after the Crisis 
In the aftermath of the economic crisis Korean social policy has continued to be adapted 
to the economic market system. The government has attempted to pursue a strategy of 
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moderate development in welfare provision, in which the average level of provision, 
measured either by per capita social expenditure or its ratio to GDP, would be prevented 
from going to either of the two extremes, remaining instead on roughly the existing 
level. It is an important part of the government's social policy agenda to adjust the 
structure of welfare provision. 
6.2.1. Expansion of Unemployment Insurance 
The unemployment insurance programme has also been greatly expanded and reformed. 
Unemployment insurance was launched in 1955 to cover only full-time workers and 
companies with 30 employees or more. After the crisis, it was expanded to include 
workers at all workplaces in October 1998. In order to better support the unemployed, 
the government introduced new programmes and increased the budget for 
unemployment. As a result of this, the benefit period has been extended and the amount 
of aid available increased. Spending on active labour market policies also increased 
from 0.2 per cent of GDP in 1997 to 2.4 per cent in 1999 (Ministry of Health and 
Welfare, 2000). Within the Employment Insurance Service, the government has 
provided subsidies to firms that employ workers who had been laid off (the subsidy 
period has been lengthened to eight months and firms are allowed to collect more than 
one subsidy at a time). Various wage subsidies have also been introduced to encourage 
firms to retain workers (4200 companies received such support in 1998). The share of 
the expenses went to public works projects and to loans for the unemployed. For such 
loans, applicants are required to find co-signers, thus ensuring that only the relatively 
better off unemployed have a chance of getting a loan. Concerning public works, in 
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1998, the number of applicants for these programmes was 400,000, of which 100,000 
were at a central level and 340,000 at a local level (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 
2000). Public works programmes were conceived as an income support for the 
applicants. The eligibility criteria are mainly based on income, skill, age (30-55), and 
family dependence. Practically, public works have been useful for the public sector as 
they mainly apply to university graduates who have helped to improve the 
computerisation of government records. 
Measures have also been taken to expand the Public Employment Service and improve 
its efficiency. A one-stop service system was created in August 1998 integrating 
vocational training, employment insurance and other services. The number of offices 
was tripled from 52 to 142 in 1999 (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2000). They are 
concentrated in the seven largest cities where four fifths of the unemployed reside. 
However, the number of staff working in these offices remains low compared to the 
number of persons registered, which has increased eightfold. As a result of the reform, 
the number of people who have received benefits rose to 300,000 in 2000, up from 
50,000 in 1997. The total amount of payments also rose to 470 billion won (235 million 
GBP) in 2000, up from 79 billion won (39.5 million GBP) in 1997 (Ministry of Health 
and Welfare, 2001). 
6.2.2. The Employment Insurance System (EIS) and Work Injury Insurance (WII) 
In the aftermath of the economic crisis, declining macroeconomic conditions brought 
about major disruptions in the labour market. Soaring unemployment caused 
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disproportionate suffering among non-regular and low-educated workers. Remaining 
jobs became unstable and the hard-core disadvantaged group in the Korean labour 
market experienced recurrent unemployment. Wage differentials between low-end 
workers and others widened while income distribution was aggravated (Lee, W. et. al., 
2001). 
Paradoxically, non-regular workers and employees in small business were restricted or 
excluded from social insurance coverage. In other words, the existing welfare system, 
including the WII and EIS, turned out to be insufficient to cover all types of workers 
(Lee, W. et. al., 2001). Moreover, before the crisis, only those workers belonging to 
firms with more than 30 employees were covered by the EIS (Ministry of Health and 
Welfare, 2001). 
In the light of such shortcomings, the Korean welfare system, including the social 
insurance system, is in need of some major revisions so that all types of workers are 
appropriately protected from the potential hazards of work-related injury or 
unemployment, and hence are ensure more economic stability throughout their lifetimes 
(Lee, W. et. al., 2001). 
The coverage was extended in March 1998 to workers of firms with at least five 
employees and, in October 1998, to firms with less than five employees, and to 
temporary and part-time workers employed for at least one month and working more 
than 18 hours a week. Despite these major improvements, much remains to be done to 
upgrade the system to be closer to the OECD standard. First, the number of workers 
covered by the EIS is still insufficient: only 12.8 million out of the 20 million Koreans 
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employed in July 1999 (OECD, 2000). The categories of workers who are still not 
eligible include part-time workers. Part-time workers who have worked more than 18 
hours a week and 80 hours a month are eligible, along with civil servants, the self- 
employed and unpaid family workers. Second, the number of those who actually receive 
benefits is low (only 12 per cent of the unemployed) (OECD, 2000). This is mainly the 
case for workers of small enterprises whose employers have not paid their contribution. 
Apart from the strict eligibility criteria previously mentioned, there are a great number 
of potential beneficiaries who are not informed of its existence, even though significant 
efforts were made to raise public awareness through large-scale and continuous 
advertising campaigns (television, subway posters) after the currency crisis. Third, 
unemployment benefits are equal to only 50 per cent of the workers previous salary. 
This can, to a certain extent, be considered as an incentive for the beneficiaries to find a 
new job. Finally, the duration is still too short. The most important challenge for the 
government is now to increase greatly the coverage of the EIS. Local government can 
play a role by helping to identify the characteristics of the excluded unemployed and by 
improving circulation of information about the programme. 
Previous to July 2000, the Work Injury Insurance Programme required companies to 
employ five or more workers for an employee to become eligible for insurance coverage. 
To aid the victims of industrial accidents and their families, coverage for industrial 
accident compensation insurance was expanded in July of 2000 to include self- 
employed workers. Recognising that those employed in the workforce are not the only 
ones in need of assistance, services for the elderly, the disabled, and children have also 
been improved and expanded under new governmental programmes and policies 
(Korean Information Service, 2001). 
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In the recent evolution of Korean social safety nets, coverage extension of the EIS has a 
special meaning in that it stimulated coverage extension of other social insurance 
programmes. In July 2000, following the initiative of the EIS, WII and the Wage Claim 
Guarantee Fund extended their coverage to workers of small firms with less than 5 
employees. National Health Insurance extended its coverage in July 2001, prior to 
which it covered those workers in firms with less than 5 employees only in the capacity 
of self-employed, not as employees (Lee, W. et. al., 2001). 
Although the EIS and WII programmes do not themselves enhance job security or work 
safety, they do help workers to become more actively involved in the production 
process, thus enhancing their productivity. Consequently, as measures of the productive 
welfare system, the EIS and WII enhance welfare and productivity by protecting 
workers from various risks such as illness, work injury, disability, unemployment, and 
retirement without deterioration of work incentives (Lee, W., Hur, J., and Kim, H. 
2001). 
6.2.3. Increasing Temporary Public Works Programmes and Expansion of Basic 
Livelihood Protection 
The TLP was created after the 1997 economic crisis with the aim of helping newly 
unemployed people whose income was less than 230,000 Wons (one-sixth of the 
average factory workers wage) (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2000). After 1982, the 
number of recipients of livelihood programme assistance was gradually declining, but it 
has started to recover slightly since 1997 with the introduction of the TLP. In 1999, the 
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total number amounted to 1.9 million people, or 4.4 per cent of the population, but only 
half of those are estimated to be living below the poverty line (Ministry of Health and 
Welfare, 2000). 
As the nation struggled through the financial crisis of 1997-8, the government firmly 
held to its welfare goals and formulated policies to expand the social safety net. One 
policy that supports the framework for productive welfare is the Basic Livelihood 
Protection system. To deal with poverty in a more fundamental way, the government 
introduced the system in October 2000 (Korean Information Service, 2001). 
Significant changes have recently been introduced with the enactment of the National 
Basic Livelihood Security Law in August 2000 which went into effect in October 2000. 
With this law, social assistance will become a right of all those who meet the eligibility 
requirements. Furthermore, the level of Livelihood protection, which has been gradually 
raised to near the minimum cost of living (60 to 90 per cent in 1997), has reached the 
100 per cent level (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2001). At the same time, in 
compliance with the principles of productive welfare, beneficiaries of social assistance 
who are able to work will be obliged to search for jobs and to accept training, public 
works jobs and any job placements provided by the local welfare office (Korean 
Information Service, 2001). 
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6.2.4. National Pension System 
Further steps to expand social welfare have also been taken. The National Pension 
System was first introduced in 1988 to include all offices and workplaces with 10 or 
more employees. In April 1999, it was expanded to cover the entire working population. 
The number of insured persons under this plan stood at 7.84 million in 1997. In more 
recent years, a total of 16.68 million workers at all levels of society subscribe to the 
pension plan, individually or collectively, through their employers. As of January 2001, 
the number of pensioners stood at 620,000. The government has also introduced a 
pension plan for elderly people who reside in rural areas. Citizens in this age bracket 
and rural locals qualify to receive a pension after paying into the system for a minimum 
of five years (Korean Information Service, 2001). 
6.2.5. Introduction of Means-tested Non-contributory Assistance to the Elderly 
Poor 
To help stabilise the livelihood of low-income elderly persons, the government 
significantly expanded the target population of those receiving subsistence grants to 
715,000 in July 1998, up from 265,000 before the programme was initiated. As part of 
the programme to improve health and medical services for the aged, the number of 
nursing homes for the elderly and treatment centres for those with senile dementia rose 
to 121 in 2000, compared to only 63 in 1997. By 2000, the number of centres 
despatching nurses for home treatment had increased to 76, up from 46 in 1997 (Korean 
Information Service, 2001). 
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The Old Age Allowance is provided under the Livelihood Programme for the elderly 
poor who are not covered by the public pension scheme. The number of recipients was 
660,000 in 1999 and reached 715,000 in 2000 (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2000). 
There are public programmes to enhance employment opportunities and health for the 
elderly. As the support of family members of the elderly is weakening, institutional care 
has been developed, including welfare facilities such as elderly homes and nursing 
homes. In particular, social community care services for the elderly have been extended 
with currently 78 home help services, 42 day care centres and 21 short-term centres. 
Central and regional governments support the leisure facilities. (Ministry of Health and 
Welfare, 2000) 
The National Pension Scheme does not cover the totality of the population, as 
qualification for a pension requires a minimum of ten years of contribution. However, 
people who fulfil specific conditions may qualify for a pension with only 5 years 
contribution. Other occupational pension schemes established for civil servants (1960), 
military personnel (1963) and private schoolteachers (1975) cover 200,000 persons, i. e. 
6 per cent of the labour force. The coverage was limited to workers of firms with 5 or 
more employees. Special provisions were introduced in 1995 to expand coverage in 
rural areas to those who work in farming, forestry, livestock raising or the fishery 
industry. The self-employed in urban areas later became eligible for the voluntary 
pension scheme. Now, workers of all firms are covered by a compulsory scheme and it 
was recently extended to informal workers, not in their capacity as workers but as 
regional subscribers, which means that they have to pay all the contributions 
themselves, with no payment from the employers. There are plans to change their status 
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to that of other workers. Under the new scheme, the number of beneficiaries is expected 
to increase twelve-fold over the next decade. Another problem is that the level of 
benefit remains low in the total income of the beneficiaries. Thus, retirees have to rely 
on other income sources such as an employment wage and family support (Ministry of 
Health and Welfare, 2000). 
6.2.6. Health Care 
The government's future aim of an advanced health care society calls for the 
establishment of lifetime health maintenance systems, an efficient health care service 
and promotion of the health care industry by revising relevant laws. The government 
envisages the average life expectancy to be 75 and the infant mortality rate to be under 
7.0 percent by 2003. It also plans to cap the rate of chronic disease to about 24-25 
percent. To help attain these goals, the government plans to cut the adult smoking rate 
from 35.1 percent to 30 percent and the obesity rate from 20.6 percent in 1995 to 15.0 
percent by 2003 (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2001). 
Furthermore, the government is considering raising the health insurance premium and 
implementing measures to prevent unjustified claims on medical bills. Significant 
structural reforms are required to respond to the needs. 
A new system incorporating corporate insurance (for wage earners) and regional 
insurance (for non-wage earners) has recently been launched by the Ministry of Health 
and Welfare with the aim of increasing coverage and improving management. Under 
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this new system, premiums will be set at 2.8 per cent of the monthly income of each 
policyholder, depending on their financial status. Consequently, those with higher 
incomes are expected to pay higher premiums. This new system also provides extended 
coverage of services, including those related to disease prevention and rehabilitation, 
whereas the previous system only covered treatment of diseases. The main idea behind 
this system is to combine the financial holdings of the 139 corporate insurance 
associations and the 188 branch offices of the National Health Insurance Corporation 
(Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2000). However, this option faces strong resistance 
from corporate insurance associations which refuse to support the high deficit of the 
regional insurers. The health insurance scheme is run by three groups: salaried workers, 
civil servants and teachers, and the self-employed. While the insurance scheme for civil 
servants and teachers will show a surplus this year, those for salaried workers and the 
self-employed are registering deficits. 
6.3. Characteristics of the Korean Welfare System after the Crisis 
Following the crisis, the Korean government has realised that, in existing welfare states, 
unemployment and income disparity are severe problems and excessive welfare 
expenditure has threatened government finance, driving it towards a budget deficit 
crisis. Also the government has been aware that over-generous welfare allowance has 
been criticised for diminishing welfare recipients' work incentive. In order to cope with 
these problems comprehensively, the government has attempted to find a new welfare 
model. In the establishment of a new welfare state model, several essential elements are 
to be considered: `unemployment, income inequality, the financial crisis, stagnation and 
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deteriorating work incentives' (Chung, K. B. 2001, p. 1). To address these negative 
elements, more comprehensive policy planning needs to occur. 
6.3.1. Emergence of Productive Welfare Model 
President Kim Dae-Jung has proposed a policy called `productive welfarism'. He 
defines productive welfare as an ideology, as well as a policy, that seeks to secure a 
minimum living standard for all people, while expanding opportunities for self-support 
in socio-economic activities for the purpose of maintaining human dignity (Presidential 
Office, 2000). 
The Korean government has put a high priority on promoting `productive welfare', 
which means helping the needy while increasing their productivity. The government has 
been paying close attention to developing the nation's human resources by introducing 
various support programmes for society's most vulnerable citizens, including destitute 
workers and low income families. As a result specific policies have been implemented 
under the goals and principles of the productive welfare policy (Korean Information 
Service, 2001). Moreover, responding policies were among the swiftest and most 
comprehensive in Asia, including: (a) the expansion of unemployment insurance 
coverage and benefit duration; (b) increasing temporary public works programmes; (c) 
the expansion of basic livelihood protection, extending; and (d) introducing means- 
tested non-contributory assistance to the elderly poor. These experiences have promoted 
significant reform in welfare policy. The Minimum Standards Security Act was 
legislated in August 1999, marking a transformation to a human development and 
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welfare-to-work approach (Wolfensohn, 2001, p1). Beginning in October 2000, food, 
clothing, housing, education, and healthcare are subsidised through cash and in-kind 
transfers for those households who do not meet the minimum (income-based) living 
standard, with benefits linked to participation in labour programmes such as public 
works and job training for those able to work. 
President Kim Dae Jung's vision of a system of productive welfare is made against the 
background of the serious financial crisis, which started at the end of 1997 and brought 
the impressive economic growth record to a sudden and unexpected halt. The crisis 
forced the government to agree to a rescue package with the IMF. Unemployment grew 
rapidly and peaked at more than 8 per cent in early 1999, and more than one million 
Koreans were thrown into poverty (OECD, 2000). The economic crisis hit vulnerable 
groups hard, increased the proportion of temporary workers and reversed the trend of 
steady improvement of income distribution, according to one recent analysis of the 
impact of the crisis (Kwon, S. 2001). As a social policy response, the government has 
introduced reforms in the areas of labour market policies and social safety nets, which 
helped the economy to renew growth, and the unemployment rate to fall. 
A major focus of productive welfare lies in enhancing the people's standard of living 
through aspiring both equity and efficacy objective. An equity objective or an equitable 
distribution of wealth establishes a basic framework that ensures that every individual in 
the society is able to enjoy a minimum level of standard of living. Equally important, 
this minimum standard of living can be sustained or uplifted by means of stable 
economic growth that generates employment opportunities and constant income 
sources. In this respect, productive welfare can make a significant contribution to 
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mitigating the adverse effects of the crisis and thus to strengthening social integration 
(Kakwani and Son, 2001). 
6.3.2. Four Pillars of Productive Welfare Model 
Productive welfare is largely composed of four pillars: the establishment of a basic 
social safety net; the establishment of a self-support system for socially vulnerable 
classes; job creation, social investment, human development; and a streamlining and 
modernisation of the welfare system. All four pillars are essential to productive welfare 
and cannot be pursued independently, but should be closely associated, maintaining a 
mutually complementary relationship. In other words, effective self-support assistance 
can be provided only on the basis of a solid basic social safety net system. Human 
development and job creation will also be facilitated when society is well equipped with 
a basic social safety net system. Furthermore, self-support, human development, job 
creation and institutional streamlining can eventually reduce the social burden and 
function as building blocks for a stronger industrial foundation. In addition, these 
elements can foster the improvement of the basic livelihood security system of all 
people in the society. As mentioned previously, all four productive welfare pillars, when 
combined are, expected to create a synergistic effect, contributing to quality of life and 
national productivity improvement. Therefore, when all four programs are fulfilling 
their roles effectively, productive welfare supports social development and aims to 
balance resource demand and supply (Chung, K. B., 2001). 
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The establishment of a basic social safety net is the most fundamental prerequisite of 
Productive Welfare for promoting social solidarity. Centrepieces of the basic social 
safety net are basic livelihood security, basic welfare service provision, and human 
resource development. 
The National Minimum Living Standards Security Act aims at protecting people's basic 
livelihood. In order to achieve this, a range of efforts is underway with a view to 
efficiently providing basic income, healthcare, and educational opportunities. The 
Korean government executed a comprehensive and general revision of the Livelihood 
Protection Act and introduced the National Minimum Living Standards Security Act in 
October 2000. Under this Act, the Government seeks to ensure that basic needs are met 
for all people living below minimum living standards regardless of their work 
capability. As result, the number of beneficiaries of Basic Livelihood Security reached 
1.55 million, three per cent of the total population and three times the number of people 
covered before the Act. 
The Act seeks to secure a `home-based' society by implementing various programmes 
to strengthen family function and to ensure that people have the at-home welfare 
services they need. To achieve this goal, a multi-layered and organic social support 
system should be established to strengthen the family self-care system; at the same time, 
in the spirit of social solidarity, society should implement non-governmental caring 
mechanisms for those needing social protection. 
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To this end, family-support service delivery systems should be extended to complement 
diversified family arrangements. Introduction of a tax benefit system and incentives for 
protection providers should be actively reviewed for enhanced family protection. 
6.3.2.1. Basic Social Safety Net 
The social safety net has a three-tier structure (see Table 6.2). The first tier consists of 
four social insurance schemes including medical insurance, national pension, 
employment insurance and industrial-injury insurance. 
Table 6.2. Productive Welfare Policy': Basic Social Safety Net 
Policies Goals Programmes 
Basic Livelihood Livelihood security Basic income/health hhousing/education 
Security Simultaneous and sufficient benefit provision required 
Basic Service Homelike society At-home welfare service, strengthening function 
Provision Caregiver allowance 
Overhauling of Social integration Primary safety net (social insurance) 
- 
secondary safety net 
Social Safety Net (social assistance) 
- 
tertisafety net (emergency aid 
Source : Chung, K., 2001. 
The Korean government has introduced these social insurance schemes and through 
rapid expansion has established universal coverage of the social insurance scheme. The 
second tier represents social assistance for people under the poverty line. In Korea's 
case, the introduction of the National Minimum Living Standards Security Act has 
allowed all people living under the poverty line to receive social assistance benefits. 
The third tier is emergency aid to provide prompt assistance at the time of an emergency 
situation including natural disaster, war, economic crisis and massive unemployment. 
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Emergency food aid and medical services are good examples of the third tier of social 
safety net programmes (Chung, K. B., 2001). 
6.3.2.2. Self-support Policies 
Self-support policy can be divided into a counter-poverty measure on the one hand, and 
supporting instruments for the socially vulnerable such as the elderly, women and the 
disabled on the other (see Table 6.3). Although counter-poverty efforts are underway, to 
create community-based volunteer jobs, social jobs and self-support small businesses, 
more active and progressive measures are required to help the poor to climb out of the 
poverty trap. 
Table 6.3. Productive Welfare Policy : Self-support Policies 
Policies Goals Programmes 
Human Resources Functional capacity Vocational training, social education/lifelong education 
Development Improvement Caseworker retraining 
Anti-poverty Poverty eradication Community-based voluntary workers/self-support 
Measures project/creation of social jobs 
Anti-poverty support 
Productive Welfare Utilisation of elderly Job information service and small business incubator 
Policy for the Expertise and skills programmes 
Elderly Support for paid community volunteer workers 
Productive Welfare Utilisation of women Women manpower development, public educare programmes. 
Policy for Women Manpower women manpower network 
Self-support Policy Increasing Education programmes, vocational training, and small business 
For the Disabled Self-support ability of incubator programme, disabled workforce network 
The disabled 
Source : Chung, K., 2001. 
Productive welfare policies for the elderly aim at utilising their expertise and skills. 
Related efforts include a number of programmes that provide support for elderly 
business start-ups, elderly job searchers, and paid volunteers. To make the policy more 
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efficient, a full-scale elderly workforce network is required. Productive welfare policies 
for women should be directed towards full utilisation of women's labour through the 
development of women-oriented programmes. Currently, a far-reaching network for 
women manpower and human resource development is required along with childcare 
assistance programmes and the promotion of the rehabilitation of all persons with 
disabilities by implementing a range of pro-disabled programmes. Vocational 
rehabilitation education and business incubator programmes are available to the 
disabled (Chung, K. B., 2001). 
6.3.2.3. Job Creation and Social Investment 
Job creation measures and social investment seek to counter unemployment, create 
social sector jobs, increase the incentive for people to work and create the impetus for 
greater labour flexibility (see Table 6.4). 
Table 6.4. Productive Welfare Policy : Job creation and social Investment 
(Health/Education/Housing/Culture) 
Policies Goals Programmes 
Employment Employment enhancement Employment network, productive welfare network 
Network Wage-assisted employment 
Increase work 
Incentives 
Creation of Social Creation of Social Home helpers and community-based volunteer workers, 
Jobs Jobs that serve community cleaning works, environment protection project, 
Public interest p ublic project, public enterprises (co-operatives) 
Investment in Health promotion/ Health education centre/Health Expo/Health zone 
Preventive Healthcare Disease prevention 
Health and Welfare Knowledge-based, high New medical instruments and drug development, food and 
Industries value-added cosmetics, and biotechnology & information technology 
Indus 
Source : Chung, K., 2001. 
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Some of the existing measures include an employment network, productive welfare 
networks and wage-assistance mployment. Also, a number of programmes are in place 
to create social jobs that serve public interest, including the home-helper project, 
community-based volunteer works, community cleaning, environmental protection 
works, public projects and public enterprise development. However, a greater 
investment is required to improve the performance of these programmes (Chung, K. B., 
2001). 
The social investment policy on preventative health care seeks to achieve increased 
productivity by promoting health and preventing diseases through health education 
centres, health expositions and health zones (Chung, K. B., 2001). 
Health/welfare industry policy aims to transform the health industry into a knowledge- 
based and high value-added industry. A comprehensive set of strategies is under 
preparation with a view to fostering new innovations in drugs, medical instruments, 
food, cosmetics, information technology, and biotechnology. Health and biotechnology 
industries require further concentrated investment (Chung, K. B., 2001). 
6.3.2.4. Improvement of System Efficiency 
The existing welfare system will achieve greater efficiency with current efforts to 
stabilise social insurance finances, formulate a social insurance information 
infrastructure, build linkages among social insurance schemes, establish improved 
delivery mechanisms and invigorate performance-based management. Currently, a 
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comprehensive set of financial measures is under preparation to ensure long-term 
stability of social insurance funds (Chung, K. B., 2001). 
As Table 6.5 shows, to ensure wider public accessibility to social insurance information, 
an array of new programmes is under development, among them an individual 
health/welfare care system, and the establishment of a national health care/welfare 
information infrastructure. The efficiency of the social insurance system will be further 
improved with additional measures to be taken to establish linkages among the four 
social insurance schemes (Chung, K. B., 2001). 
To achieve increased efficiency in the service delivery system and health/welfare 
management, further efforts are required to initiate health/welfare service evaluation 
and implement performance-based management systems for social insurance agencies 
(Chung, K. B., 2001). 
Table 6.5. Productive Welfare Policy : Improvement of System Efficiency 
Policies Goals Programmes 
Financial Stabilization Financial stabilisation of the National Pension 
for Financial balance 
Social Insurance Financial stabilisation of the National Health Insurance 
Informatisation of Health/Welfare cards 
Social Insurance Information accessibility 
Sector Health/Welfare information infrastructure 
Linking Various Efficiency of Institutional link among the four major social insurance Social Insurance Management and 
schemes Schemes Operation 
Increased efficiency Health/Welfare service evaluation system Performance-based 
management 
And responsibility in Performance-based management of social insurance 
Management or anisations 
Source : Chung, K., 2001. 
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6.3.3. Debates on Productive Welfare Model 
The Kim Dae Jung administration's social welfare policy has two noteworthy aspects. 
First, it draws attention to the relationship between globalisation and social welfare. 
Despite the general argument that the progress of globalisation undermines nation- 
states' autonomy and causes retrenchment of state welfare (Teeple 1995; Mishra 1999), 
Korea's social welfare has expanded amid rapid globalisation with the IMF's bailout 
funds. Korea is an uncommon case in which globalisation contributes to the expansion 
of social welfare and, therefore, the social welfare reform policy of the DJ 
administration is being watched with keen interest (Lee, H. K., 1999; Shin, 2000a, 
2000b) 
Second, by comparing the DJ administration's social welfare policy with the social 
welfare systems found in the welfare regimes of advanced nations, its characteristics 
may be identified and it may be possible to predict a shift to a specific welfare regime. 
Some contend that the DJ administration's social welfare policy has neo-liberal traits 
and it will mirror, in terms of actual policy content, the liberal welfare regime found in 
the United Kingdom or the United States (Chung, 2000; Cho, 2000). On the other hand, 
some note that the social welfare scheme pursued by the DJ administration has the 
institutional characteristics of the conservative/corporatist welfare regime in Continental 
Europe (Kim, H., 2000). 
Existing research has reviewed the changes in the social welfare scheme under the DJ 
administration based on Esping-Anderson's typology. There are three different 
assertions on the characteristics of the Korean social welfare scheme and the welfare 
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regime it follows. First, the DJ administration's social welfare policy displays neo- 
liberal characteristics, as a result of welfare reform, a move towards a liberal welfare 
regime is expected. Second, the Korean social welfare scheme includes institutional 
characteristics found in the European conservative welfare regime. Third, researchers 
who put forward the East Asian welfare model 
- 
before the inauguration of the DJ 
administration 
- 
claimed that the Korean welfare system is similar to that of Japan. 
There have been crucial debates on the Korean welfare state regime's character among 
social policy commentators since the economic crisis of 1997 (Lee, H. K., 2002). 
Chung, M. K. (2002) and Cho, Y. H. (2002) have explored `the accomplishments and 
limitations of the welfare reforms undertaken by the Kim Dae Jung government based 
on the recent debates about the main characteristics of the welfare reforms'. They argue 
that Korean welfare reforms in the aftermath of the crisis are a typical neo-liberal 
approach. 
Kim Dae-Jung government's welfare reforms basically aimed at protecting the 
vulnerable generated by the massive neo-liberal economic restructuring. The 
government expanded the coverage of the insurance programmes and modernised the 
pre-modern public assistance programme. And other parts of the reforms, for example, 
the integration of corporative medical insurance programmes, have emphasised the 
solidarity principle of the welfare system. However, the overall content and 
consequences of the reforms still maintained the neo-liberal character emphasising the 
commodification of labour and the role of the market in welfare provisions. Thus, 
according to Esping-Andersen, welfare reforms can be characterised as a mix of 
conservative and liberal regimes. Thus, the Kim Dae Jung government's welfare 
reforms should be interpreted as having a partial continuity from the previous 
`developmental welfarism' rather than a `paradigmatic shift' completely broken off 
from the past (Chung, M. K 2002, p. 161). 
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Cho Y. H. and Chung, M. K. suggest `an alternative regime type' in order to better 
explain the characteristics of the Korean welfare system including those of some East 
Asian states such as Japan and Taiwan' (Cho, Y. H. 2002; Chung, M. K. 2002). 
As Kim, Y. B. points out, there are four arguments about the typology of the Korean 
welfare state. They include the Asian/Confucian type, the hybrid type, the liberal type 
and the conservative type. He concludes that that the nature of Korean welfare reforms 
is more of a Conservative Coporatist model. 
The three arguments do not fully explain the characteristics of the Korean Welfare 
State. First, the Asian/Confucian argument confused the temporal characteristics due 
to the immaturity of the Korean Welfare State with a structural one. Second, the 
division between insider and outsider which the Hybrid argument stresses, would not 
likely be one of the structural characteristics of the Korean Welfare State because after 
the economic crisis, the number of the insured under the social insurance increased 
rapidly. Third, the low expenditure level which the Liberal argument depends on, 
stems not from the institutional characteristics but from immaturity of institutions 
(Kim, Y. B. 2002, p. 108). 
He insists that the three arguments mentioned earlier do not fully help to understand the 
main characteristics of the Korean Welfare State (Kim, Y. B., 2002). 
In addition, Nam, C. S. (2002) agrees with Kim Y. B's argument. 
Comparing the pre-crisis and post-crisis welfare system, this article finds that figure 
for the de-commodification have maintained low to medium level and trends of 
conservative stratification have been steadily strengthened and figure for familialism 
have remained very high. Based on these findings, this article argues that the 
characteristics of the Korean welfare system are closer to those of conservative 
welfare regimes. However, some anomalies of the Korean welfare system which are 
216 
not congruent with the characteristics of typical conservative welfare regimes should 
be approached from somewhat different perspectives from three regime theses (Nam, 
C. S. 2002,202). 
Kim, Y. B. (2002) emphasises that the DJ Government's welfare reform efforts were 
aimed at keeping and protecting the right of the poor and isolated to live by re-enforcing 
state responsibility. 
The social welfare policy of the Kim Dae Jung administration leans towards state 
welfare, which stresses the state's responsibility for welfare, and as a consequence of 
recent social welfare reform, the Korean social welfare scheme is a combination of 
institutional characteristics of various welfare regimes (Kim, Y. M. 2002, p. 108). 
There are many important unanswered questions in the debate on the Korean welfare 
regime (Kim, Y. M., 2002). Interestingly enough, all of them share the same analytic 
framework, i. e., that of Esping-Andersen's three world typology. Nevertheless, their 
conclusions vary widely. Esping-Andersen's frame of analysis should be revised, if not 
replaced, by a new frame, embracing the development of the new global economy. And 
the experience of Korea, not only in economic growth but also in social transformation, 
is indeed so unique and condensed that it has to be incorporated into the study of 
welfare regimes in general (Lee, H. K., 2002). 
In this respect, Holliday (2000) has attempted to add a fourth criterion to the three 
Esping-Andersen's three worlds typology. He has argued that Korea can be placed in 
the fourth criterion called `a productivist world of welfare capitalism'. There are two 
central aspects of the productivist world of welfare capitalism. These are: `growth- 
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oriented state and subordination of all aspects of state policy, including social policy, to 
economic/industrial objectives' (Holliday 2000, p. 708). 
6.3.4. Social Policy under the Economic Recovery and Stabilisation Strategy 
As Holliday (2000) has argued, Korea could be said to have a productivist welfare 
regime where social policy is subordinated to economic policy. This, of course, is not 
unique to Korea. Indeed, within this generic welfare regime, Holliday argues that 
Korea, along with Japan and Taiwan, is in a developmental-universalist stage of 
development, where the state underpins market and family provision with some 
universal programmes, where it sees those provisions failing (Holliday, 2000). As 
Holliday goes on to argue this is mainly to reinforce the elements of production within 
society. Certainly, from 1960 to 1987, Korea's welfare seemed to comprise an 
authoritarian developmental state with a residual `competition-compatible' form of 
social policy. With the emphasis upon developing human capital for the benefit of the 
economy, the social ministries were placed in a subordinate position in relation to the 
Economic Planning Board. This authorised state funding only in areas of productive 
social investments 
- 
in particular education (Shin, 2000b). The government stepped 
back from taking any more interventionist a role in social development. As a 
consequence, government expenditure on social development was minimal in the lead 
up to the economic crisis of 1997 (Kwon, S., 2001). 
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Korea's experience illustrates `the importance of economic growth for poverty 
reduction, but the crisis underscored the need to achieve "balanced"' growth to 
maximise the gains to the poor and vulnerable' (Wolfensohn 2001, p. 3). However, 
another important consideration is the impact of the international economy on the long- 
term pattern of the co-ordinating mechanism in Korea and accordingly on the pattern of 
welfare state development. The Korean economy has been further incorporated into the 
international economy through market opening, particularly financial market opening. 
The impact of the international economy has been ambivalent in the sense that it has 
reinforced the existing interrelations of economic actors on the one hand, while on the 
other hand it has opened up a new chance to change them. These mixed results can be 
traced back to domestic politics; which is to say, the interrelations among state, 
business, and organised labour. 
Much of the impressive national response to the crisis stems from its public policy 
decisions. Structural reforms have made Korea's economy more competitive and 
market-driven. Significant progress has been achieved towards stabilising the financial 
system, including liberalising capital markets and foreign investment and 
strengthening the institutional framework for corporate governance. Market discipline 
in an environment of transparency plays an increasingly important role' (Wolfensohn 
2001, p. 2). 
The Kim Dae Jung administration started with the IMF intervention at the end of 1997 
and set its plans based on a free-market economy with the ideology of neo-liberalism. 
As noted earlier, its welfare policy emphasised a balanced welfare state, productivist 
1 This involves finding a balance between a competitive economy and a caring society, striving to include 
those who are not able to compete adequately, helping people to improve their opportunities and support 
themselves. This notion of balanced, quality growth forms the foundation of the productive welfare 
concept in Korea. Balanced growth also underpins the recommendations of the current World 
Development Report on attacking poverty (Wolfensohn 2001, p. 3). 
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welfare, and welfare pluralism (Chung, 1998). These welfare policies are generally seen 
as appropriate for highly advanced countries rather than a country like Korea, which has 
a very low level of social welfare provision. That is, if the policy were implemented 
with the ideology of neo-liberalism, the responsibilities of nation's welfare system 
would have been evaded even during the recession. 
6.3.5. The Neo-liberal Approach to Social Policy? 
Analysing the social welfare policy of the early period of the Kim Dae Jung 
administration, Chung Mu-Kwon notes that while this administration's welfare policy 
has some radical aspects compared to past administrations, `when it is seen from the 
broader context of neo-liberal restructuring, it may be more fair to say that it just does 
not conflict with neo-liberal values in terms of the contents of social policy reform and 
its outcomes' (2000, p. 354). He states that some may interpret the extension of social 
insurance coverage and the enactment of the National Basic Livelihood Security 
(NBLS) Act under the DJ administration as measures to expand the safety net 
mechanism needed for the social security system to have a favourable neo-liberal 
framework. He warns against the possibility of reducing the Kim administration's social 
welfare reform to establish the safety nets recommended by the World Bank. 
Acknowledging some neo-liberal characteristics in the DJ administration's welfare 
reform, some researchers further diagnose that the Korean welfare regime is moving 
towards a liberal welfare regime. To substantiate their argument they raise several 
points: the `productive welfare' initiative focused on `social assistance for low-income 
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earners and not the public in general; the main interest is given to resource distribution 
through the market rather than expansion of income transfers and social security; the 
role of NGOs, local communities, and private companies as providers of social welfare 
increases dependency on the market' (Cho 2000, pp. 99-100). 
Esping-Andersen (1999) points out some characteristics of a liberal welfare regime in 
his recent book, Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies. Firstly, liberal policy 
is residual in the sense that social guarantees are typically restricted to `bad risks'. 
(More weight is given to needs-based social assistance programmes than rights 
programmes. ) Secondly, it is residual in responding to risks at the societal level. (The 
United States does not provide national health care, child allowance or maternity 
benefits. ) The third characteristic is its encouragement of private welfare through the 
market (Esping-Andersen 1999, pp. 75-6). 
Gilbert (2001) argues that the productive welfare model is largely, though not entirely, 
concerned with economic considerations - employment, productivity, and self-support. 
Although DJ Welfarism (productive welfare policy) also discusses the need for policies 
devoted to the care of those unable to work, clearly the repeated thrust of this approach 
is to make people self supporting. Indeed, in the words of the Presidential Committee 
for the Quality of Life, `the objective is to include everyone in the workforce, regardless 
of ability, disability, deprivation, or privilege' (Gilbert 2001, p. 5). 
However, the unemployment policies introduced after the economic crisis emphasised 
workfare, where the main' idea is to support only those who are able to work. The 
possible consequence of workfare is not to take people out of poverty by providing the 
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opportunity to participate in the labour market, but to ensure that even eligible welfare 
recipients will lose their right to receive benefit if they do not work. Thus, rather than 
constructing a social safety net, it is apparent that the welfare plan would work only for 
those who are able to work, while excluding those who are in need of social care and 
support for a while to be able to work. 
Furthermore, in the aftermath of the economic crisis, the government has tended to 
stress the greater role played by family members, particularly women, in providing care 
for their elderly relatives and the desirability of multigenerational households over 
nuclear families. A similar emphasis on the caring roles of the family and community is 
also seen in the Korean state's renewed public emphasis on the country's Confucian 
cultural tradition. 
6.3.6. Continuity of Fostering Confucianism and Family Responsibility 
Social policy has changed to become more egalitarian, in the wake of the economic 
crisis in 1997. In addition, there have been many recent social policy reforms to cope 
with social problems caused by the economic crisis. However, how much such policies 
can mean in practice for families in Korea remains an open issue, since Confucian 
traditions with regard to family obligation remain strong. 
Sung, S. (2003) has argued that Confucian tradition in the woman's role remains too 
strong an influence. Confucian welfare regimes are deeply gendered, especially in terms 
of women's responsibility for unpaid care work. Thus Confucian traditions continue to 
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have an influence on working women's experience of reconciling paid and unpaid work 
as well as shaping of state policy. Sung has explained more detail about care work: 
The Confucian impact on state policy can be seen most clearly in care provisions (or 
rather in the lack of them). Care work is mainly regarded as a family responsibility, 
which directly leads to its being the women's responsibility. In terms of childcare, the 
number of private nurseries is much greater than the number of public ones. The 
government tries to impose responsibilities on employers to establish nurseries in the 
workplace for working women, which may have the result of discouraging the 
recruitment of female workers. Although the government provides a subsidy to 
employers who establish workplace nurseries, the amount of subsidy is insufficient to 
encourage employers actually to establish them (Sung, S. 2003, p. 356). 
As far as the care for the elderly is concerned, the government still emphasises the 
Confucian virtue of `filial piety'. The virtue itself is a good one. However, if the 
government places an emphasis on Confucian virtue in order to avoid responsibility for 
care for the elderly, emphasising the virtue can result in attributing responsibilities to 
families and individuals from a morally unsound governmental position. Certainly it is 
the case that unpaid care work seems neglected in Korean state policy and is considered 
the responsibility of women. To be sure, the problem of ignoring the issue of unpaid 
work in social policy has not been peculiar to the Korean government. 
After the economic crisis of 1997, the Kim Dae Jung government emphasises improving 
women's rights to work by increasing the number of women workers in the public 
sector. However, caring for dependants still remains a family responsibility. 
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6.4. Summary 
This chapter has explored the government's policy responses after the economic crisis 
of 1997. Since the economic crisis of 1997, Korea has experienced a rapid expansion of 
the social welfare provision following a series of reforms. These reforms went beyond 
the functional minima necessary to deal with social problems caused by the economic 
crisis. The changes in the social security system in Korea in the wake of the financial 
crisis are paradoxical from the perspective of globalisation enthusiasts. The social 
security reforms have proceeded as a crucial measure in coping with the soaring 
unemployment as well as alleviating the insecurities associated with structural 
adjustments. 
These reforms have not been limited to the establishment of the social safety net. Rather, 
they have been developing towards a more redistributive and comprehensive welfare 
system. In addition, the economic crisis changed the socio-economic conditions so that 
no one could be sure of avoiding unemployment. This in turn changed attitudes towards 
social solidarity and the role of the state in social welfare provision. 
However, the government has tended to stress the greater role played by family 
members, particularly women, in providing care to their elderly relatives, and the 
desirability of multigenerational households over nuclear families. A similar emphasis 
on the caring roles of the family and community is also seen in the Korean state's 
renewed public emphasis on the country's Confucian cultural tradition. 
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In the following two chapters the development of mental health policy in Korea will be 
discussed in terms of both cultural and structural influence, in relation to the emergence 
of mental health problems and the subsequent government's responses. 
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Chapter 7. The Emergence of Mental Health Policy during 
the Industrialisation Period 
The previous two chapters have outlined the implications of the radical and 
exceptionally rapid changes in the demography, economy and social formations of 
Korea over the last few decades for the care and support of its dependant people. With 
the creation of an industrial society, the concentrations of urban population, the urgent 
and massive social problems arising from phenomenally rapid urbanisation, the 
undermining of more traditional family and community systems of social support and 
control, the problems of welfare have become a societal rather than a family problem. 
Nevertheless, the development of social policy continues to be facilitated by Confucian 
values. In Korean society, citizens are under strong moral and, sometimes, political 
pressure to keep familial problems within the family and to abstain from resorting to 
social or governmental measures in an effort to meet familial needs (Kim, 1990; Chung, 
1991) 
The political structure's emphasis on economic development makes it difficult to 
moderate any social stress factors through the development of a countervailing social 
welfare infrastructure. There has indeed been a deliberate governmental strategy not to 
develop a supporting social infrastructure or a modem welfare state package of social 
services and income policies/programmes such as might assist dependant people and 
their informal caregivers. 
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The thrust of this chapter is on policy responses to perceived social problems related to 
mental health (i. e. the increasing number of people with mental health problems) and 
the way in which the problems of mental health were individualised within families. 
Mental health policies during the industrialisation period were informed and shaped by 
a strong Korean cultural tradition and repeated affirmation of the values and practice of 
Confucianism. 
This chapter is divided into five sections including the summary, the first section 
outlines the brief history of mental health care prior to the 1960s. Section two tries to 
examine the relationship between social changes and mental health during the 
industrialisation period. Section three explores the government's response to the 
problems of mental health and then in section four the basic features of the mental 
health policy that was informed and shaped by Korean politics and culture during the 
industrialisation period are identified. 
7.1. The Brief History of Mental Health Care Prior to the 1960s 
There was a traditional attitude towards those people with mental health problems 
before the Western psychiatric model was introduced in Korea. Traditionally, mental 
health problems were not perceived as medical problems, but as a spiritual problem or 
one of social relations, often ascribed to possession such as by foxes and badgers (Lee, 
1988). The traditional medical treatment in the ancient period (2333 B. C. 
- 
108 B. C. ) of 
Korea considerably emphasised physical treatment as we have seen in the records on the 
227 
psychotherapy cases dealt with by non-physicians. In Korea the differentiation of a 
physician from a non-physician, empirical rationalism from shamanism' existed in the 
earlier period (2333 B. C. 
- 
), since one of ancient Korean history books entitled the 
Reminiscent History of Three Kingdoms recorded psychotherapies conducted by 
Buddhist monks. Similar to the West, in the history of Korean psychiatry both religious 
healing and empirical healing cannot be overlooked, since Shamanistic healing 
methods2 for chronic disease flourished (Lee, 1988). 
A range of techniques was employed to rid individuals of possession, including turning 
to shamans and purification. Healing in terms of Korean shamanism belongs to a type of 
healing in ecstasy and healing through strong affective experiences. Organised religions 
were also turned to for assistance, including Buddhism, which came to Korea from 
China in the fourth century A. D. At times Buddhist temples provided those with mental 
health problems with places of refuge, and some of the temples appeared to be popular 
especially for their capacity to assist. In addition, families were responsible for dealing 
with their mentally ill family members without any government-based assistance. For 
the most part, households were obligated to assist their own members. Constructing a 
locked room or cell at the family home to confine those with mental health problems 
was the most common method for dealing with them until the early twentieth century. 
In Korea, shamanism-earlier among Korean religions-continues to have a large number of adherents, 
often in combination with other beliefs. Shamanism recognizes a myriad of spirits who can work for good 
or ill. They must be propitiated to avoid evil, cast out if need be, and solicited to ensure success and 
fortune. Families, houses, natural objects all have spirits. Many ancient customs have to do with winning 
the spirits' favor or averting their wrath. In Korea (unlike in Japanese Shinto, which in some other ways 
in similar), there are few large shamanistic shrines or groups of practitioners. However, Buddhist temples 
typically have a small building dedicated to the "mountain god, " implicitly a shaman deity, and some 
villages and families have modest shrines. 
2 The adepts of shamanism are mostly women, known as mudang or manshin, who inherit their 
possession or otherwise demonstrate special communication with the spirits; they are ' retained by 
individuals or families in time of special fortune or special trouble. Often they perform a lengthy 
ceremony called Kut, including costumes, song, and dance, to communicate with the spirits and 
sometimes to be possessed by them. 
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This was a common practice in Korea until very recently and it is similar to practices in 
the West during the pre-and early industrial period. As can be seen from the treatment 
of Mrs Rochester in Jane Eyre written by Bronte. 
Western medical theory first came to the attention of Koreans when Adam Shall, a 
Jesuit missionary, introduced Galen's physiology in 16453. Preventive measures against 
epidemics were embarked upon in the 1880s and in 1885 Kwang Hae Won, a royal 
hospital, was founded and the following year a medical-school was established by the 
government, but psychiatry courses were not offered at that point. A government 
newsletter reported in 1910 that a course on psychiatry was first established to treat 
people with mental health problems. However, only in the 1930s was western 
psychiatry (German psychiatry was introduced by the Japanese) known to a few 
Koreans and in the 1940s several Korean students at the Medical College of Kyungsung 
Imperial University embarked on an ambitious beginning in the study of western 
psychiatry. If we regard this start as the true starting point of western psychiatry in 
Korea, Korean psychiatry only has a 60 year history. Even during these periods western 
psychiatry had hardly enough time to settle down mainly due to the loss of a number of 
psychiatrists, who were either missing or dropped out of school during the Korean War 
(1950-1953). Only an introductory course on the outline of German descriptive 
psychiatry and the operation of the classroom-within-the clinic method were continued 
during this period4. 
3 However, it was 100 years later that the vaccination for smallpox seemed to be practiced by Jung Yak- 
Young. 
The studies on brain pathology, psychoanalysis, social psychiatry, medical history, drug abuses, Korean 
folklore and culture were also taught during this period. 
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There were some ideas and movement towards formulating mental health law in Korea 
after the Japanese Colonial Period. Prior to Japanese rule Korean psychiatric 
professionals had to learn Japanese mental health laws and systems. This legislation 
however did not apply to Korean people in general. In the aftermath of the Japanese 
occupation of Korea, many psychiatric professionals expected the establishment of a 
mental health law to settle the practice of modem techniques for prevention and cure of 
mental illness. There were, however, some difficulties to the enactment of the law 
because of political turbulence and the Korean War. During the Korean War (1950- 
1953), Korea experienced a system of military mental health hygiene, which introduced 
American psychiatry, skill, and knowledge of mental health into Korea. The 
introduction of the American psychiatric model influenced the development of the 
mental health system and expanded the psychiatric manpower. It was considered a 
golden opportunity to promote a mental health system and tackle mental health 
problems after the Korean War. While the WHO campaigned with the movement of 
World Mental Health Year, the Korean government established the Mental Health 
Consultative Committee to formulate a mental health act bill after reviewing the 
Japanese Mental Hygiene Act. Around 1958 a group of Korean psychiatrists who had 
studied in the United States, played an important role in providing a turning point in the 
development of psychiatry in Korea. Though the trends of European psychiatry were 
introduced into Korea in the latter part of the 1960s and the early 1970s, still Korean 
psychiatrists pay much attention to the trends in American psychiatry. 
Generally, Koreans treat people with mental health problems as abnormal and tend to 
keep them at a distance. Up to the 1960s, there were fewer people with mental problems 
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in Korea. Accordingly, the government's response to the problems of mental health was 
relatively passive. During this period, families were still left to deal with the upset their 
family member generated when the prevailing methods did not ameliorate those with 
mental health problems. 
7.2. Social Changes and the Emergence of Mental Health Policy 
There has been an argument that changes in social factors are commonly associated 
with the increased prevalence of mental health problems although there are considerable 
problems involved when attempting to determine the importance of social factors in the 
aetiology of mental health problems (Corney, 1985). Also Comey (1985) pointed out 
that `chronic social difficulties such as financial hardship, social isolation, migration 
and low social class have been shown to be associated with an increased prevalence of 
mental illness' (p. 28). In this regard, it could be argued that Korean people experienced 
psychological distress and mental health problems due to considerable social changes 
during the industrialisation period. 
Behaviourists tend to attribute the relationship between social change and stress to the 
speed of cultural change imposed on people, the gap of change expected between the 
traditional culture and the new culture, the strengths available, and the coping patterns 
utilised by the society in dealing with the social change (Tseng et. al., 2001). Based on 
this, it is possible to predict that Korean society will have had a pattern of adjustment to 
the social improvements they were making, which may have led to outcomes that may 
be similar to those in Western societies. 
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7.2.1. Industrialisation and Mental Health 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the social and economic changes associated with 
industrialisation are important factors contributing to rise of the asylum in nineteenth 
century Britain. Also, Kathleen Jones (1960) saw industrialisation as a causal factor 
influencing the prevalence of mental health problems: 
In the first half of the nineteenth century, the tide of industrial change brought new 
wealth and new opportunities to a few, but squalor and hardship to many. The social 
problems with which small rural communities had dealt casually, but on the whole 
effectively, became acute in the towns, where families were crowded together in 
conditions of dirt and disease and despair; but industrialisation, if it intensified social 
distress, also provided the means of dealing with it. (Jones 1960, p.! ) 
In the same vein, in the 1970s and 1980s, there was a rapid social shift due to 
industrialisation and urbanisation and an increase in problems caused by 
industrialisation and urbanisation. This led to Korean psychological conflict and the 
phenomena of anomie. Lee, B. (1982) argued that cultural changes caused by 
industrialisation and urbanisation play a great role in mental health. 
Those who migrate from the countryside to big cities and who live in the progress of 
drastic industrialisation and urbanisation. The drastic changes in the value system, in 
family relations, in the roles of man and woman also have a serious effect on mental 
health (Lee, B. 1982, p. 26) 
Moreover, modernisation, accompanied by demographic changes, urbanisation and 
industrialisation, contributed to changes in Korea's family structure. These trends, plus 
other modernisation changes such as the increased nuclearisation of families, were 
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indicative of the fact that the availability of households that care for their relatives who 
have mental health problems also shrank (Palley, 1992). 
In order to understand how and why the Korean mental health policy has been 
developed, we need to examine the socio-economic changes in the aftermath of 
industrialisation. Rapid industrialisation, modernisation and urbanisation brought about 
enormous socio-economic changes. These changes include urbanisation, demographic 
changes, economic growth, changes in industrial structure, and export-oriented 
development strategies. As a result of this, a range of behavioural and mental health 
problems appeared in Korea. There was an increase in the incidence and prevalence of 
schizophrenia, dementia, depression and other neurological disorders. The disruption of 
traditional family ties and roles including a move away from the tradition of the 
extended family resulted in an apparent increase in alcohol dependence, unsanctioned, 
hazardous and harmful drug use and suicide. The impact of family disintegration 
emerged as highly visible public health problems (WHO, 2001). 
7.2.2. Social Indices associated with Mental Health 
As noted, socio-economic changes due to industrialisation are more likely to be one of 
the crucial factors which have contributed to mental health policy making in Korea. In 
addition various social indices resulting from socio-economic changes urged the 
government to introduce a mental health care policy and system. There is no simple way 
to describe the mental health of a society as a whole, but these include mental health 
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problems that are closely related to socio-psychological conditions, such as the 
disruption of families by divorce, substance abuse and delinquent or suicidal behaviour. 
7.2.2.1. Gradual Increase in Divorce Rates 
Although the importance of the family and marriage was emphasised in Korean society 
in the past, there are indications that, in some instances, the family system has 
undergone stress and marital relations are vulnerable, as reflected in the gradual 
increase in divorce rates. It is more likely to be important that divorce does not 
necessarily indicate a decline in mental health. It may merely reflect a common, socially 
accepted resolution for unsatisfactory interpersonal relations between spouses. Yet, 
because the crude divorce rate is objective statistical information that is readily 
available for cross-societal examination, it will be used here as one possible indication 
of the stress associated with marital life. According to the Annual Report on the Vital 
Statistics, the crude divorce rate increased from 0.5 per cent in 1975 to 2.5 per cent in 
1997 (National Statistical Office, 1998). 
As show in Table 7.1, several factors have contributed to the gradual increase in divorce 
rates in Korea, where families traditionally have been highly valued. In the past, 
marriage was regarded as the backbone of the family. It was considered that, once they 
married, a husband and wife should maintain their relationship for the rest of their lives 
- 
whether the marriage worked or not. However, this view is changing. Gradually, 
emotional satisfaction has become more important that marital bonds. This is 
particularly true among those who were married by arrangement while they were young 
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and have been forced to maintain their marriages for the sake of their children, even 
though their husband-wife relationship has not been satisfactory. 
Table 7.1. Composition by Previous Divorce Status : 1990-1997 
Year 
Problems in 
Relationship 
with spouse 
Economic 
Problems 
Family 
Discord 
Health 
Problems Others 
1990 81.5 2.0 3.4 1.5 11.5 
1991 81.9 2.0 3.5 1.4 11.4 
1992 83.1 1.9 3.1 1.4 10.5 
1993 81.7 2.3 3.1 1.1 11.8 
1994 80.4 2.8 2.7 1.1 13.0 
1995 80.1 3.0 3.0 0.9 13.0 
1996 80.5 3.5 2.8 1.0 12.2 
1997 79.4 4.2 2.9 1.0 12.4 
Source: NSO (1998) Annual Report on the Vital Statistics, Seoul, Korea, NSO. 
A higher prevalence in rates of mental illness among the separated and the divorced has 
been found by many studies (For example, Goldberg and Huxley, 1980). This may be 
due to depressed or anxious individuals being more prone to marital disharmony or due 
to marital disharmony and a lack of a supportive intimate relationship increasing an 
individual's vulnerability to the effects of life-events (Corny, 1985). 
7.2.2.2. Rapid Increase in Substance Abuse and Crime Rates 
Substance abuse within a society is measured by the recorded number of people arrested 
for substance abuse 
- 
mainly for defined illegal substances. It must be cautioned that 
such figures are very much influenced by political attitudes towards abusive behaviour, 
including patterns of law enforcement. These go beyond the general social attributes of 
substance abuse, including social stability, economic condition, availability of substance 
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supply, and people's attitudes towards the abuse of certain substances. As Table 7.2 
demonstrates, the rate increased steadily from the 1980s to 1996. 
Table 7.2. Substance Abuse: Annual Number of People Arrested by Rate per 100,000 
population or percentage of user in the past year. 
Year 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1996 
Rates 1.8 1.8 2.3 4.1 4.1 4.2 5.2 
Rnirrce- NPA (19 971 Annnn l Stnti. cticc of Pnlire_ Seniil Knrea NPA 
In addition, the safety that is enjoyed in a society is another index that reflects its quality 
of life and mental health. A high rate of criminal behaviour is an indication of safety 
problems in a society. A steady rise in crime rates was noted in Korea from the 1970s to 
1995 (see Table 7.3. ). 
Table 7.3. Annual Crime Rates Per 100,000 Population 
Year 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Rates 3,224 3,528 3,812 4,081 4,287 4,509 
Source: NPA (1997) Annual Statistics of Police, Seoul, Korea, NPA. 
7.2.2.3. Vicissitude of Suicide Rates 
It is said that there are many causes of suicidal behaviour. A severe mental health 
problem including major depression, is one. Yet, many suicides are caused by emotional 
problems relating to stress in life. It has been illustrated that the annual suicide rate will 
fluctuate in association with the social situation. Thus, annual suicidal behaviour can be 
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used as one rough index of the mental health of a society. As completed suicides are 
easily recognised, annual data is relatively reliable, although social attitudes towards 
suicide and patterns of reporting such behaviour may influence the official data. 
Among Koreans, the highest annual suicide rate was noted between 1965 and 1975 
- 
one to two decades after the Korean War ended and the society was recovering from its 
impact. The rate was around 30 per 100,000 population, the highest in Asia. The rate 
declined gradually thereafter reaching 20 per 100,000 in the 1990s. Data from Korea 
indicated that suicide rates may rise when there is a rapid socio-economic improvement, 
supporting Durkheim's (1952) observation and theory that the suicide rate is high 
during economic booms as well as during economic depressions. 
7.2.2.4. Increasing Number of People with Mental Health Problems 
As previously explored, in the aftermath of industrialisation and urbanisation the 
number of people identified as mentally ill tended to rise over time (see Table. 7.4). The 
prevalence of mental health problems increased prior to the economic crisis of 1997. 
Korean society moved towards urbanisation and industrialisation while experiencing 
rapid population increase. The rate of mental disability increased from 1.03 per cent 
(male, 0.87 per cent; female 1.19 per cent) in 1980 (Moon, 1981) to 1.45 per cent (male, 
1.02 per cent; female, 1.88 per cent) in 1986 (Kim, 1988; Moon, 1981). In 1991 the 
Korean government estimated that there were 907,000 people (2.16 per cent) suffering 
from mental illness, of whom 105,000 people were considered to be in need of care and 
psychiatric treatment. It is difficult to estimate the numbers or the percentages of people 
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with mental health problems because of the widely accepted Korean culture of privacy 
and dignity. In 1989 there were 5,346 mentally retarded people who had been admitted 
to institutions for the handicapped (Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 1990). 
Table 7.4. Psychiatric Patients Institutions and Inmates : 1985-1995 
(Unit : person) 
Number Admission 
No. of 
Entrustment 
relatives to relatives 
"--"--" 
with care 
Transfer Deaths Others 
1985 47 2,515 2,787 2,409 2 88 233 200 
1990 74 3,138 1,192 2,973 517 194 261 
1995 75 2,556 544 1,808 166 552 179 228 
Number of Inmates as of Year End 
Less than 18 years old 18 years old or over Both sexes Male Female Male Female Male Female 
1985 10,719 
1990 17,432 
1995 18,182 
6,479 
10,790 
11,182 
4,240 
6,642 
7,000 
41 39 
40 31 
11 10 
6,438 
10,750 
11,171 
4,201 
6,611 
6,990 
Number of Inmates as of Year End 
Symptom 
Schizophrenia Depression Epilepsy Mental Retardation 
Senile drug addiction 
& etc 
1985 8,843 680 331 274 591 
1990 14,176 838 551 521 1,346 
1995 15,283 575 449 608 1,267 
Qm ircp" MnHHW (19971 White Paner of Health and Welfare. Seoul. Korea. MoHW. 
Since the government did not provide reasonable benefits for people with mental health 
problems and the benefits of the institutions are limited, those who were rich or who 
could manage to sustain a basic living hesitated to send a family member to the welfare 
facilities for the handicapped. Therefore, it can be said that people with mental health 
problems who were admitted to the institutions are only those people who have no 
guardian (family and relatives) and are unable to maintain their livelihood (Kim, 1994). 
It means that family care was the main source of mental health services. 
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In this section, the range of social indices related to mental health have been 
demonstrated in order to understand mental health policy making in Korea. It appears to 
be supported by the fact that these various social indices, owing to the rapid socio- 
economic changes, which the Korean government began to introduce its mental health 
care policy and system, are a crucial impetus. In the following section, how the socio- 
economic changes affected the family structure and family care for people with mental 
health problems will be explored. 
7.2.3. The Impact of Social Changes on Informal Care by Family 
Demographic, social, economic, and cultural changes associated with modernisation 
have affected the care needs of people with mental health problems and the family's 
capacity to provide care. The growing participation of women in the labour market is 
likely to affect the availability and the capacity of family carers, particularly women 
carers. Most of the trends have resulted in or are likely to result in a weakened capacity 
of the family to provide care for people with mental health problems. The Korean 
literature has reached a similar conclusion: although family support and care for people 
with mental health problems has decreased compared with past levels, the tradition of 
family care still remains strong in modem Korean society, but tends to indicate that it 
will be weaker in the future (Suh, 1999; MoHW, 2000). 
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There has been a considerable impact on informal care by families with 
industrialisation. This remarkable social change affected those who were most 
vulnerable in the community including people with mental health problems. 
The advancement of industrialisation has weakened the informal care by families, and 
the demand for care has increased steadily along with people with mental health 
problems. 
(Suh 1999, p. 1). 
In addition there was a considerable change in industry after industrialisation. This 
change heavily influenced informal family care. 
With the advancement of industrialisation, there was a shift away from working at 
home towards waged work in the secondary and tertiary industries and this shift 
impacted on the preconditions of family care. 
(Kim, D. 1990, p. 409). 
The industrialisation of Korean society has led to a dramatic upsurge in the need for 
care, whereas, at the same time, its capacity for informal care has decreased at a rapid 
rate. 
Korean economic development has proceeded at a rapid rate for the past two decades 
but with neglect to some areas of human development, especially in the cases of 
mental illness. The very process of industrial development and the unavoidable social 
changes are, in fact, important factors in the overall rise of mental illness in many 
NICs. 
(Suh 1999, pp. 1-2). 
Industrialisation in the post-war period profoundly changed the employment structure, 
and rural-to-urban migration of the population brought about an increase in the number 
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of nuclear families. These developments undermined the preconditions underscoring the 
traditional approach of informal care. 
Due to the process of industrialisation and urbanisation some important family 
functions, such as health care, education and some kinds of domestic work, have been 
taken away from the family system and taken on board by other sectors. The increase 
of care needs and the decrease of the capacity for informal care is an outcome of 
modernisation. 
(MoHW 2000, pp. 2-3). 
In Korea, it is predicted that the influence of traditional values will be much weaker in 
the future. The informal caring relationship and the capacity for informal care is 
inevitably declining with the advancement of industrialisation and the economic crisis 
of 1997. Therefore, it will become more difficult to rely so much on the informal sector 
and the heavy care load is likely to generate serious antagonism in the informal caring 
relationship. 
The informal caring relationship tends to be more antagonistic and the younger 
generation and women are rebelling against traditional styles of informal care. 
Therefore, if the government wishes to avoid a crisis, it is necessary for it to have a 
wide range of options in order to retain residual welfare provision for vulnerable groups 
such as the elderly, people with mental health problems and the other people in need. 
,. , 
-r 
7.3. Government's Responses prior to the Economic Crisis 
The Korean government's response to the issue of mental health care'was likely to be 
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passive before the 1960s, and this was partly due to the relatively small numbers of 
people with mental health problems in the total population. Rapid social changes, 
however, suggest the significance of planning social policy for supporting people with 
mental health problems and their families in the long term. Moreover, demographic and 
social trends were likely to bring an imbalance between the demands for the care of 
people with mental health problems and the availability of carers responding to such 
demands. Policy considerations arose in the field of mental health through the process 
of Korean economic development and national financial growth. Therefore, a more 
positive mental health policy was expected to develop. In effect, Korea had a greater 
concern for mental health policy than ever before (Suh, 1999). 
7.3.1. Policy Developments during the 1970s and 1980s 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, Korea experienced a period of industrialisation and 
urbanisation through the 1970s and 1980s. There were people who suffered mental 
problems even in an agrarian society, but their numbers were few. They were 
embarrassed by the inhumane treatment they received when they appeared in the 
community, instead of being treated by a mental health service. Since the 1970s, 
however, because of accelerated industrialisation and urbanisation in Korea, the number 
of patients in the mental health field increased. Like many developing countries, in 
Korea, care programmes for individuals with mental health problems had a low priority. 
Provision of care was limited to a small number of institutions 
- 
usually overcrowded, 
understaffed and inefficient - and services reflected little understanding of the needs of 
ill individuals or the range of approaches available for treatment and care. Prior to the 
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1980s there was no psychiatric care for the majority of the population in Korea, the only 
services available were in mental hospitals (Suh, 1999). 
In 1984, the government attempted to formulate national plans for mental health 
services, develop human resources and integrate mental health with general health care, 
in accordance with the recommendations of a 1974 WHO expert committee. The 
government adopted the principles of the protection of persons with mental health 
problems and the improvement of mental health care, emphasising protection of the 
rights of individuals with mental health problems. It was recognised that violation of 
human rights could be perpetrated both by neglecting the patient through 
discrimination, carelessness and lack of access to services, as well as by intrusive, 
restrictive and regressive interventions. 
In addition, the Korean government took an interest in social welfare and mental health 
as the GNP per capita rose from $82 in 1961 (Economic Planning Board, 1988) to reach 
$2,826 in 1987 (Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 1987). As mentioned earlier, 
during this period, the social changes were rapid because of industrialisation and 
urbanisation and Korea experienced increasing mental health problems due to both 
psychological conflict and the phenomena of anomie. Therefore, the Korean 
government established three national mental hospitals, eight city and provincial mental 
hospitals, and supported 77 mental sanatoriums. In those facilities, 58 medical doctors 
and 48 doctors were employed in national facilities. The Korean government provided 
treatment to patients through 1,950 beds in national mental hospitals and 1,758 beds in 
public mental hospitals (Kim, 1989). 
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Moreover, the government built facilities and placed personnel, having developed an 
interest in that policy area. Also, private organisations established mental sanatoriums 
for mental patients and operated them with governmental support, and private 
organisations and religious organisations established private institutes where mental 
health patients were accommodated and treated (see Table 7.5). Because Korean society 
become much more complex and mental patients increased, there was another social 
problem. In 1983 human rights became an issue for patients in the private institutes and 
brought about recognition of problems related to treatment concerns for mental illness. 
The Medical treatment and management system was supposed to provide for primary 
and secondary treatment. Health centres, consultation offices, and a psychiatrist's office 
were in charge of the diagnosis of patients, consultation, treatment, and management of 
outpatients. 
Table. 7.5. State of Medical Care System for Mental Patients, 1989. 
Division No. of Facility No. of Bed % 
Total 446 29,910 
Special Beds Sub Total 373 12,863 43 
Special Mental National 3 1,950 
Hospital Public 2 500 
Private 16 3,920 
Dept. of Psychiatry in General 118 4,205 
Hospital 
Hospital 229 1,230 
Public Sanatorium 5 1,058 
Sanatorium 77 17,047 57 
Source: MoHSA (1989) White Paper of Health and Social Affairs, Seoul, Korea, MoHSA. 
There were six national mental hospitals, special mental hospitals, and mental 
sanatoriums, which provided secondary treatment and were supposed to take charge of 
rehabilitation, training, treatment, and the rejoining of society based on their respective 
functions (The Sixth Socio-Economic Plan, 1986). According to statistics prepared by 
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the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, there were 10,803 beds for mental patients, 
although the number of inpatients was 37,698 (Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 
1990). So there was a great shortage of beds, and very poor conditions. Table 7.5 shows 
that as late as 1989, there were 373 special hospitals which had 12,863 beds and 73 
sanatoriums which had 17,047 beds. Approximately 105,000 people were believed to 
need medical care; therefore it was difficult to cope with that situation with the number 
of beds. 
In reality, in 1989 there were 37,698 inpatients for the 10,803 beds: 5,942 in national 
hospitals, 4,041 in public hospitals, 19,584 in corporate hospitals, and 8,131 in private 
mental clinics (hospitals). The total number of mental out-patients was 1,904,703 
persons: 235,378 persons in national hospitals, 209,915 persons in public hospitals, 
991,209 persons in corporation hospitals and 462,201 persons in private clinics (see 
Table. 7.6). 
Table 7.6. Activities of Hospitals with Mental Health Services, 1989 
Inpatients Person Outpatient P erson 
No. of 
No. of 
Inpatients 
No. Of 
Bed- 
Daily 
Average of 
Average 
Length No. Of Outpatients 
Average 
/Day 
Bed 
Utilisation Beds days Inpatients of Stay Rate (%) (Person) (Day) 
Mental 10,803 37,698 3,541,13 9,702 94 1,904,703 5,218 89.8 
9 
National 2,246 5,942 581,462 1,593 98 235,378 645 70.9 
Public 731 4,041 242,564 665 60 209,915 575 91.0 
Corporation 4,599 19,584 2,088,22 
1 
5,721 107 997,209 2,732 124.4 
Private 3,227 8,131 628,892 1,723 77 462,201 1,266 53.4 
Source: MoHSA (1990) Yearbook of Health and Social Statistics, Seoul, Korea, MoHSA. 
However, most mental hospitals were usually centralised and not easily accessible, so 
people often sought help from them only as a last resort. The hospitals were large in 
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size, and built for economy of function rather than treatment. In a way, the private 
mental sanatorium (asylum) became a community of its own with very little contact 
with society at large. Furthermore, Korea did not have adequate training programmes at 
a national level to train psychiatrists, psychiatric nurses, clinical psychologists, 
psychiatric social workers and occupational therapists. Since there were few specialised 
professionals, the community turned to the available traditional healers. 
As a result of these various factors, there was a negative institutional image of people 
with mental health problems, which added to the stigma of suffering from mental health 
problems. These institutions were not in step with developments concerning the human 
rights of people with mental health problems. People with mental health problems were 
involved in labour activities under conditions of slavish subordination. Sexual rights 
and communication rights were not generally restricted, but limitations and restrictions 
were imposed in order for them to receive treatment under a restricted environment 
based on protection. 
The slow spread of health insurance cover to the whole population seems to have led, in 
Korea, to an increasing number of patients being treated in psychiatric hospitals. The 
number of psychiatric in-patients increased from 14,456 in 1984 to 45,194 in 1997 
(MoHW, 1998). Most of these (about 80 per cent) are `admissions by relative', the 
equivalent to the caretaker system, with voluntary and emergency admissions running at 
about 10 per cent each. Groups of mentally disabled patients were `accommodated in 
concentration camps not treatment organisations', 10,000 people with mental health 
problems were detained in camps for juvenile vagrants and were receiving 
`maltreatment rather than humanistic treatment for care' and 18,000 people with mental 
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health problems, accommodated forty to fifty to a room without access to a doctor, 
`enduring animal like living conditions with cruel violence and surveillance' (Kim, C. B. 
1993, p. 184). 
Not until the early 1980s did the Korean government appoint an expert commission to 
investigate both the living and treatment conditions of people with mental health 
problems. After the broadcast of the TV series `Chujuk 60 Bun' which revealed the poor 
condition within private mental sanatoriums, the government sought to prepare a plan 
aimed at providing services including prevention and treatment of mental health 
problems and social integration programmes. To this end, the government established a 
plan for managing those with mental health problems from 1984 to 1991. This plan 
influenced by government policy aimed at activating a welfare society (Oh, 1997). 
7.3.2. Policy Developments during the 1990s 
During the 1990s the definition of mental health policy can be broadly interpreted as 
including a concern for treatment and rehabilitation and having the characteristic of 
isolation in mental health facilities. First of all, the policy for treatment and 
rehabilitation in the 1990s called for implementation of a plan that increased the number 
of national mental hospital from three (1991) to six and increased the number of doctors 
and beds to fifty-eight doctors and 1,950 beds in 1993. Also, the Korean government 
implemented a policy to increase the number of public mental hospitals in the city and 
provincial areas from eight to fifteen in 1993, and to increase the number of doctors to 
more than forty-eight and the number of beds to more than 1,785 in 1993. The Korean 
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government supported seventy-seven mental sanatoriums that were being turned into 
formal medical facilities. This policy intent can be seen in article 6 and 10 of the Mental 
Health Act, which allows a person who receives a license for the establishment of 
corporate mental health care to establish and operate mental sanatoriums (Dong-A Illbo, 
1990). 
Secondly, Korean mental health policy during the 1990s has the characteristic of 
isolation in mental health facilities. The Korean government and ruling party prepared a 
bill and tried to enact it in article 21 concerning legal hospitalisation. These articles 
were opposed by Korean human rights organisations and mental health science 
organisations. The articles were heard in a public hearing. The proposed legal 
hospitalisation article provides that in cases where someone who can be acknowledged 
as harmful to self or others rejects hospitalisation and for whom an agreement from a 
guardian can not be received, a governor or city mayor, after receiving the diagnosis of 
two psychiatric specialists, can ask for mental health care facility protection and 
treatment. The emergency hospitalisation article prescribes that in cases where someone 
is highly likely to injure themselves or others and the situation is very urgent, after 
being seen by medical doctors and policemen, he or she can be hospitalised in an 
emergency. 
In addition, the younger members of the Korean Association for Neuropsychology, the 
Medical Doctors' Association for the Practice of, Humanism, and human rights 
organisations were against these changes, especially the members of the Medical 
Doctors' Association for the Practice of Humanism. Dr. Byunghoo Kim of Chongno, a 
neuropsychologist in Seoul, questioned whether any legislative members had been in 
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the mental sanatoriums that they intend to acknowledge as medical psychiatric facilities. 
He opposed the legislative intention of the government, arguing that a mental 
sanatorium accommodates forty to fifty patients without even one doctor and that 
patients admitted suffer from violence, surveillance, and animal-like living conditions, 
like a prison (Dong-A Illbo, 1990). 
However, the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, which was a major agency in the 
Korean government, attempted to implement a policy to increase medical facilities 
related to mental health. Also, the government and ruling party tried to promote the 
legalisation of the use of mental health facilities by enlarging the function of treatment, 
rehabilitation, and isolation. 
Finally, the mental health services implemented during the 1990s by the Korean 
government tended to fail to secure enough financial resources so that mental patients 
could be treated to return to society as normal persons. More mental hospitals were 
expected to be established and the number of doctors and their working conditions was 
expected to be improved even though the number of beds was increased, as the budget 
of the Korean government increased from $32.9 billion (24 thrillion 666.9 billion Won) 
in 1991. 
7.3.3. Mental Health Research Projects funded by the Central Government 
In 1994 the Ministry of Health and Welfare began to call for some research projects on 
the development of mental health care services. These are: `Aju' University's research 
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on `on-the-spot survey of inpatients and inmates with mental health problems and a 
guideline of reclassification of them'; the Korean Institute of Health and Social Affairs' 
on-the-spot-survey of mental health facilities and mental sanatoriums; Seoul National 
University's research on the policy proposal on mental health. The result of these 
projects produced some significant suggestions. These were: an overview of the present 
condition of mental health care services; the actual condition of long-term inpatients 
within hospitals and long-term inmates within sanatorium; the problem of inadequate 
admission procedures; the necessity for the development and proliferation of 
rehabilitation therapy and community placement and settle-down programmes; the 
requirements of introducing community mental health care (Ministry of Health and 
Welfare, 1994; Seoul National University, 1995; Korean Institute of Health and Social 
Affairs, 1994). 
`Seodaemun-Ku' Welfare Centre in Seoul developed a model which was able to manage 
people with mental health problems who are cared for in their own homes in the 
community. `Sarangpat' Rehabilitation Centre (formerly mental sanatorium) which is 
located in `Kyonggi' Province offered a project on the development of community 
placement programmes model for long-term inpatients to `Aju' University. This project, 
however, had limitations in continuing to spread out to the other mental health facilities 
due to funding difficulties. 
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7.3.4. Formulating a Mental Health Act 
The government of Korea formulated a mental health law. The law included major 
substantive and procedural changes to the mental health regime criticised at home and 
abroad as systematically incapable of protecting the human rights of hospitalised mental 
patients. The act was Korea's first legislative initiative expressively concerned with the 
protection of mental patients' rights and an institutional shift away from inpatient 
confinement and treatment toward community-based social rehabilitation of people with 
mental health problems. 
It envisioned fundamental changes in the legal regime and institutional environment 
regarded by many as shaped unduly by public safety concerns to the exclusion of 
therapeutic rehabilitative goals. It was more likely to be an urgent task to draft a bill 
with broader perspectives for an ideal law in line with government policies for social 
welfare being carried out actively. The World Health Organisation (WHO) attempted to 
put forth a series of reference materials for countries which need either to legislate or 
revise their mental health laws. Like many developing countries, after entering a phase 
of industrialisation and economic growth, Korea has paid attention to learning a great 
deal from the experience of other countries and utilising this knowledge in establishing 
an efficient public mental health system and formulating an ideal law sympathetic to 
encompassing its unique values and cultural tradition, while keeping pace with modern 
techniques for the prevention and cure of mental illness. In this respect Korea attempted 
to follow the legislative guidance contained in the WHO publication entitled The Law & 
Mental Health: Harmonising Objectives (WHO, 1970). This guidance suggested ten 
items to be considered prior to formulating a new law or amending an existing one. 
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They were (a) policy and objectives; (b) authority; (c) budget; (d) operations; (e) 
research and training; (f) access to services; (g) protection of individuals; (h) minimum 
standards for mental health manpower and resource; (i) regulation of therapeutic 
medicines and other treatment methods; and (j) delegation of regulatory powers. 
Furthermore Korea considered adding some points which were important to take 
account the unique circumstances of Korea, and avoid copying the laws of other 
countries. Other crucial points to consider in the formulation of a law were the attitudes 
and knowledge about mental illness of the general public and government officials, 
educating them about mental illness, the nation's unique value system based on its 
traditional culture, and the psychiatric healing methods and ideas of the past. 
The Korean Constitution 10 expounds human dignity and values and the protection of 
fundamental human rights. Mentally disordered offenders can not be punished by reason 
of criminal incapacity in Criminal Code 10, and are to be hospitalised under the Social 
Protection Act enacted in December 1980. Furthermore, the mental health act was 
enacted in order to take measures to protect people with mental health problems and 
persons dangerous to themselves or others. 
In 1968, the Korean Neuropsychiatric Association attempted to harness public opinion 
for the enactment of the Mental Health Act. The Korean Government had some 
difficulties in establishing the Act. In 1985 and 1990, the Ministry of Health and Social 
Affairs put forward proposal for the Act twice. That proposal was far from the ideal 
form which has been suggested by the Korean Neuropsychiatric Association; in 
particular, the issues of involuntary commitment procedures and systems and standards 
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of the mental health facility of the government proposal was too controversial to be 
accepted. 
As mentioned, involuntary hospitalisation was very controversial in the government 
proposal of the Mental Health Act. The Korean Neuropsychiatric Association suggested 
some essential components of involuntary commitment procedures (Kim, E. Y., 1991). 
These were: 
(a) Two physicians' (mainly psychiatrists) agreement or the agreement of one 
physician and one approved mental health professional for long term involuntary 
hospitalisation of mental patients; 
(b) At least one physician's agreement for short term involuntary commitment for 
evaluation even in emergency situations; 
(c) Agreement of mental health personnel or a security officer for the involuntary 
commitment of extremely dangerous mental patients in the case of an emergency 
situation impossible to get agreement from a physician; 
(d) The patients who are involuntarily committed should have the right to treatment 
and the right to refuse treatment. 
There were some issues and regulation that the Mental Health Act must contain (Kim, 
E. Y., 1992). 
(a) Regulation of staffing ratio of mental institute, statement of qualification of 
mental health professional; 
(b) Regulation to protect patient's privacy and to prohibit unnecessary physical 
restraint and isolation of patient; 
(c) Regulation to promote adequate treatment; 
(d) Issues and regulation concerned with local mental health tribunal and its activity. 
Passed by the National Assembly in December 1995, the Mental Health Act included a 
number of significant features: 
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(a) Defined the hospitalisation procedure (voluntary admission, admission by 
consent of family members, emergency admission, admission for assessment, 
admission by a guardian); 
(b) Defined the rights of people with mental health problems and limited restriction 
of patients' rights in hospital; 
(c) Defined the qualifications of mental health workers (mental health nurse, mental 
health psychologist, mental health social worker); 
(d) Defined the minimum qualifications for mental hospital, psychiatric long-term 
hospital, psychiatric clinic in terms of man-power, facilities; 
(e) Promoted the mental health service in Health Centres; 
(f) Defined the characteristics and qualifications of new mental health facilities 
(psychiatric long-term hospital and community rehabilitation centre). 
(Ministry of Health and Welfare, 1999) 
7.3.5. Implementation of Mental Health Act 1995 
In 1996 the debate on the enforcement ordinance and enforcement regulations of the 
Mental Health Act 1995 was a hot potato. A great number of different views from 
professional groups surrounded the implementation of the Act. The controversies over 
this were: the qualifications of mental health professional manpower; the requirement of 
training courses and a qualifying examination; and the roles and responsibilities of 
mental health professionals. 
In 1996, there was a considerable debate on establishing social rehabilitation facilities, 
especially the size and type of facility, the main body of management and the methods 
of funding system. The debate was more likely to have been confused because there was 
no experience of operating this kind of facility. The Mental Health Act 1995 does not 
embrace the basis for the establishment of community mental health centres, regulation 
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for establishing and operating workshop facilities and home visiting and case 
management services and community education and support. This was due to a lack of 
understanding about the concept of community mental health care. In Korea themes of 
mental health, such as human rights of those with mental health mental health problems, 
social integration, rehabilitation, and improving quality of life, which had been ignored 
for a long time were discussed substantively and reached a stage of implementation 
through the enactment of the Mental Health Act 1995 and the Community Health Act 
1995 (Suh, 1999). 
However, in the aftermath of the Mental Health Act 1995, the Korean government 
attempted to play an active role in defining problems and setting goals in the mental 
health area. Policy makers did not wait for the system to work; they directed its 
operations by establishing problem-defining and priority-setting mechanisms within 
government. Prior to the Mental Health Act 1995, decision makers seemed prefer to 
await pressure to act to the more proactive role of encouraging pressure from certain 
groups (essentially providing support for the process) and actually monitoring events so 
as to determine results and judge where action was needed. The government attempted 
to play an active role in the development of a mental health policy: 
Formulating mental health legislation; establishing comprehensive mental health 
policy; expanding mental health facilities and mental health workers (mental health 
infrastructure); reconsidering the socio-psycho-medical model; rethinking the policy 
direction for community-based mental health service provision; allocating the budget 
for mental health research, policy development and pilot projects; establishing the 
system for management of mental health problems; improving the quality of care in 
mental health facilities especially mental sanatorium. 
(Ministry of Health and Welfare, 1997a). 
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The Korean government was aware of the problem of basing a mental health policy 
solely on traditional hospital-based psychiatry. 
The definition of mental health policy can be broadly interpreted as including a 
concern for treatment and rehabilitation and having the characteristic of isolation in 
mental health facilities. 
(Ministry of Health and Welfare, 1997b). 
In February 1997, there was a meeting on the formation of a Central Mental Health 
Commission 
- 
the Deputy Minister of Ministry of Health and Welfare was in the Chair 
- 
which represented mental health professionals 
- 
psychiatrists, nurses, psychologists and 
social workers and consumer groups. This committee dealt with long-term and short- 
term mental health policies aimed at reinforcing rehabilitation and treatment for those 
with mental health problems for the first time since the Mental Health Act 1995. 
The Ministry of Health and Welfare (1997) held the Ist Central Mental Health 
Commission which dealt with short-term and long-term mental health policies: They 
established policy direction on mental health care: 
(a) To expand public mental hospitals; 
(b) To reinforce function of rehabilitation and treatment; 
(c) To establish and support social rehabilitation centres; 
(d) To shift mental nursing facilities to mental hospitals. 
(MoHW, 1997) 
To expand state mental hospitals and reinforce the function of rehabilitation and 
treatment, the plan was aimed at establishing two new state-sponsored mental hospitals 
and establishing occupational rehabilitation centres in the existing state mental hospitals 
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in order to shift mental health services from hospital care to social rehabilitation and 
treatment. To this end, training facilities and equipment and staff would be increased. 
To established and support social rehabilitation facilities, up to 2003, Social 
Rehabilitation facilities provided social skills training and occupation training so that 
those with mental health problems were enabled to adapt to daily living in the 
community. To encourage non-government organisations (voluntary organisations) to 
take part in providing mental health services and programmes, the government would 
provide some subsidies and grants. To reinforce treatment throughout the shift from 
mental nursing facilities to mental hospitals, the 78 existing mental nursing facilities 
would be converted to mental health hospitals in order to reinforce the function of 
treatment. The government would support 1,000 million won (0.5 million GBP) per 
mental nursing facility to convert their function. 
Short-term policy direction was aimed at protecting the individual human rights of those 
with mental health problems and reinforcing the function of state mental hospitals. Mid 
and long term policy direction aimed at expanding mental health facilities providing 
appropriate treatment and rehabilitation services and programmes and establishing and 
supporting social rehabilitation centres. 
In addition, a system of Mental Health Review Tribunals was created to review all 
involuntary admissions and to hear appeals from patients about their release or 
improvement of treatment. They also raised some agendas on human rights for those 
with mental health problems. People with mental health problems were segregated from 
their own home and community. There was a consensus on mental health services 
toward community-based care in order to protect individual human rights and increase 
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quality of life. 
7.4. Characteristics of Mental Health Policy before the Economic 
Crisis 
The evolution of mental health policy in Korea until the 1990s has been examined. 
Since the Mental Health Act 1995 was passed the government has established some 
measures to promote mental health care programmes and services for mental health 
patients, particularly those who were discharged from mental hospital. The division of 
Mental Health was established in the Ministry of Health and Welfare in 1997. It is an 
interesting point that the state role in the provision of social welfare as a regulator was 
intact during this period. 
7.4.1. Mental Health Policy Making under the Economic Growth Strategy 
The developmental experience of Korea in the 1970s, in particular 1973 when the 
Heavy and Chemistry Industrialisation Plan was being launched, should be a model of 
the developmental state. Compared to the active role of the state in the economy, 
however, the developmental state in Korea played only a small role in social welfare. 
The welfare system was a residual system (Shin, 2000b). The National Pension 
Programme was put off for an indefinite period in spite of the legislation of 1973. The 
Medical Insurance Programme was partially introduced only for workers working in 
large firms. The state hardly committed to increasing its burden for social welfare. Thus 
during the 1970s, economic development was carried out with little degree of social 
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welfare. There is no doubt that the predominance of economic development driven by 
the HCI in the policy making process significantly influenced the form and content of 
social policy in the 1970s. It is clear that social policy was significantly constrained by 
economic policy, though the content and form of social policy was established by the 
political elites. In these circumstances, up to the 1990s the national mental health 
system was not established in Korea because those with mental health problems were 
supported by families and communities. In this respect government has long neglected 
its role in the development of a mental health care system. Also, relatively small 
problems and pressures on mental health policy making, such as a proportionately lower 
population of people with mental health problems and comparatively active informal 
welfare practices seem to be the main factors enabling the government to legitimate a 
lower standard of mental health services. 
It is an interesting point that there was a series of legislation concerning social security 
in the early 1960s. However, only a few programmes, including the Industrial Accident 
Compensation Insurance (IACI) and the Occupational Pension Scheme for government 
employees and military personnel together with pilot medical insurance programmes, 
which could not be denied as being a social security system in a strict sense, came into 
effect in the 1960s. Social security expenditure was inevitably very low, remaining at 
around one per cent of the GDP (see Table 7.7). Thus, Korea witnessed the 
establishment of a preferential welfare system to provide special treatment only for very 
limited groups whose support might be crucial for the survival of the regime. It was 
clear that social policy including mental health policy during the 1960s was greatly 
constrained by the requirements of export-oriented industrialisation. 
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Table. 7.7. Medical Expenditure on Psychiatric Service in Korea 
(unit: million won) 
Type of 1992 1996 
service Total Psychiatric B/A Total Psychiatric B/A 
Medical Service (%) Medical Service (%) 
Expenditure (B) Expenditure (B) 
(A) (A) 
Total Inpatient 1,525,138 90,557 5.9 2,968,749 181,440 6.1 
Outpatient 2,479,880 64,732 2.6 4,991,011 113,906 2.3 
Total 4,005,018 155,732 3.9 7,960,731 295,346 3.7 
Medical Inpatient 1,376,498 47,013 3.4 2,690,731 85,593 3.2 
Insurance Outpatient 2,327,486 56,296 2.4 4,732,984 101,373 2.1 
Total 3,703,984 103,309 2.8 7,423,716 186,966 2.5 
Medicaid Inpatient 148,640 43,544 29.3 278,018 95,847 34.5 
Outpatient 152,394 8,436 5.5 258,277 12,533 4.9 
Total 301,034 51,980 17.3 536,295 108,380 20.2 
Source : MoIIW (1997) White Paper of Health and Welfare, Seoul, Korea, MoHW. 
The extension of the National Pension Programme (NPP) to farmers and fisherman and 
the introduction of the Employment Insurance Programme (EIP) took place during the 
Kim Young Sam government (1993-1997). However, the government continually 
played the role of a regulator rather than a provider of welfare provision. In particular, 
welfare reforms in the Kim Young Sam government seem to be towards more limited 
income security programmes. They included tightening conditions of access to 
unemployment benefit, putting more emphasis on active measures, introducing a private 
pension scheme, adopting a market-conforming approach in pension and cutbacks in 
pensions. At the same time, the government increasingly emphasised the responsibility 
of the family and the role of the private sector in welfare provision. It is argued that the 
social policy in the Kim Young Sam government was transformed towards ` a business 
friendly one' (Shin 2000b, p. 246). In this context, mental health policy was still a low 
priority until the 1990s although Korea had been under a great deal of internal and 
external criticism for its mental health system being overwhelmingly hospital based 
while other advanced industrial countries in Western Europe and North America had 
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experienced a policy shift from institution to community care for those with mental 
health problems. 
7.4.2. Who's to Care? State, Market, or Family? 
People with mental health problems were cared for by their families and communities 
rather than by the state. Prior to the 1970s, familial care (kinship obligation) was a 
crucial resource in caring for those with mental health problems and the state stood back 
from service provision. In other words, there was an emphasis on familial responsibility 
rather than on the responsibility of the state to ensure the wellbeing of its citizens before 
the 1970s. Family care was seen to be the preferred option for the provision of care to 
'needy' individuals. If family care was unavailable or insufficient, then people should 
have the option to choose to purchase care from a private supplier, or to receive support 
from voluntary agencies, rather than automatically assume that services would be 
provided directly by the state. 
In the family system in Korea the head of a family (i. e., the father) possessed exclusive 
authority and ownership of property and the eldest son inherited this privilege. The head 
of the family was also obliged to take care of family members and administer their 
activities. The family was then understood to be a `co-operator' to limit any increase in 
public welfare expenditure, and it came to be regarded as the main source of welfare 
provision. There is little doubt as to the importance of families in the overall Korean 
welfare mix. Public social services, be it to the aged, children or people with mental 
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health problems, are truly marginal because it is institutionally assumed that the family 
must carry the real responsibility. 
Given that home confinement was no longer an option, hospitalisation had several 
advantages. First, it preserved the primary mental health policy goal of social order by 
indefinitely confining individuals, much like home confinement did. Secondly, by 
adopting a policy that encouraged the building of private psychiatric hospitals, the 
government distanced itself from a primary social welfare role vis-a-vis people with 
mental health problems and their families. Third, although hospitalisation was not as 
good as home confinement in preserving family responsibility for family members, 
hospitalisation in private psychiatric hospitals did preserve many of the features of 
family responsibility (i. e. the family paid). 
Related to other dependent populations, older people benefited more than others as 
Korea switched from a focus on economic growth to a more balanced growth. In that 
same vein, people with mental health problems perhaps benefited the least. Part of the 
explanation was certainly the relationship of social welfare and economic policy to 
populations and sectors directly affected by economic policy which benefited the most 
from the development of a social welfare policy. There was an implicit obligation 
towards those who created the rapid economic growth, and are now the elderly. 
Additionally, urban and economic growth patterns broke down the tradition of the eldest 
son's family caring for ageing parents. The wives of the eldest sons, on whom this 
responsibility fell, are often working now themselves or are otherwise unable or 
unwilling to assume this role. 
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Social welfare policy towards families and children also benefited, largely driven by 
economic concerns. Educational policy was highly vocational and related to the needs 
of industry. Other family benefits were similarly tied to economic issues. Family- 
allowance benefits encourage families to have children, a concern as Korea experiences 
a declining birth rate and a declining work force. 
In contrast, people with mental health problems had almost no role in the Korean 
economy except as a commodified group for the psychiatric hospitals. As individuals 
and as a group, they were not needed in the economy. `Capitalism needed skilled 
workers and therefore the state intervened to provide an educated and healthy 
workforce. To maintain legitimacy, the state provided transfer payments for the 
unemployed and the elderly. Infrastructure expenditure on hospitals, roads, and housing 
could be described as contributing to the accumulation process' (Mullard and Spicker, 
1998, p. 45). 
Although the government has been active in developing progressive social welfare 
policies for much of the populations, this has been pursued most aggressively as it 
benefits or is an outcome of the economy. People with mental health problems do not fit 
into that equation in any obvious way. To that extent, they have remained beyond the 
concern of policy development. While there have been consistent internal critics of 
Korean mental health policy at least since 1980s, the government was notably 
unresponsive to them until the early 1990s. 
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7.4.3. The Lack of Mental Health Facilities and Staff 
In order to cope with mental health problems, psychiatrists and mental health-related 
workers are expected to work in the front lines of mental health. Thus, in a way, the 
number of psychiatrists available in a society may serve as some kind of index of the 
nature of the mental health system functioning in the society. The figures available for 
Korea between 1965 and 1995 reveal that the number of psychiatrists per 100,000 
population was much lower than in some western societies, particularly the United 
States (see Table 7.8), where the number of psychiatrists was 8.9 per 100,000 
population in 1990. Korea had the much lower number of 3.9 in 1990. 
Table 7.8. The Number of Psychiatrists Per 100,000 Population 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Korea 
USA 
0.4 
- 
0.8 
- 
1.2 
5.6 
1.2 
7.0 
1.6 
7.8 
2.4 
8.0 
3.9 
8.9 
Source: 
1) MoHW, Annual Statistics of Ilealth and Welfare, Seoul, Korea, MoHW, Various Years.. 
2) Department of Health & Human Service (1997) Health United States, 1996-97 and Injury 
chartbook Hyattsville, MD, Department of Health & Human Service. 
The above table regarding the number of psychiatrists available in the two societies 
needs thoughtful interpretation. Several issues need to be considered, such as the major 
function of psychiatrists in their clinical work. In many societies, psychiatrists are 
primarily involved in the delivery of care to severe psychiatric patients, mainly in 
inpatient settings, and less involved in mental health-related work, such as 
psychological counselling for those with less severe mental health problems in a 
population or mental health education and preventive work for the normal population. 
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The geographic distribution of the availability of psychiatrists within a society also 
needs to be considered. Like many developed societies, there is a heavy concentration 
of psychiatrists in urban settings and severe shortage in rural areas, even though the 
total number of psychiatrist is relatively high. As Table 7.9 shows, another index 
conventionally used to reflect the quality of psychiatric service is the number of beds 
available per 10,000 of the population in Korea. 
Table 7.9. The Number of Psychiatric Beds Per 10,000 Population 
1980 1983 1990 1994 
Korea 
USA 2) 
- 
12.4 
1.7 
11.3 
2.9 
11.2 
2.9 
10.7 
Source: 
1) WHO (1995) Report of the Fifth Co-ordinating Group Meeting on Mental Health 
Programme, Office for the Western Pacific : Manila, WHO. 
2) Department of Health & Human Service (1997) Health United States, 1996-97 and Injury 
chartbook Hyattsville, MD, Department of Health & Human Service. 
7.4.4. The Poor Quality of Mental Health Services 
One needs to be careful not to simply consider a greater number of psychiatric beds as 
being equal to better mental health services. The number merely indicates quantity and 
does not reflect quality of services. However, it does reflect, to some extent, the amount 
of psychiatric service available to the population, particularly for severely ill patients. 
Closely related to the number of psychiatric beds available in a society is how the 
psychiatric beds are utilised. For instance, are the beds used for acute care or for 
custodial care? This indicates the nature of the psychiatric system and the services that 
are offered in a society. 
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From a public health point of view, one should ask about the distribution and 
availability of service systems in the society as a whole. It can be problematic if the 
quality of available psychiatric service is very uneven. Actually, this is a serious 
problem still observed in many parts of the world, including Korea. There was an urgent 
need for societies to develop mental health service networks that extend into the 
community rather than remain contained in institutions in large urban settings. There is 
also a great need to expand the function of psychiatrists from caring for severe mental 
patients to patients with minor psychiatric or mental health work. In Korea at present, 
psychiatrists concentrate heavily on the biological treatment of severe patients in 
inpatient settings, and almost neglect the psychological care of the large number of 
patients with minor disorders in outpatients settings, who are in great need of service. In 
other words, there is a need to expand psychiatric work to mental health work. 
There is a need for the development and implementation of programmes whose goal is 
to normalise the lives of persons with mental health problems and integrate them as 
fully as possible into community life. The recent growth of the consumer and family 
advocacy movements has also served to increase the social visibility and political clout 
of people with mental health problems. In addition, an increased recognition in many 
nations of the need to better safeguard the human rights of people with mental health 
problems leads one to hope that perhaps a better future is possible for those suffering 
from serious, long-term mental health problems. 
There were some problems with hospitalisation under the Mental Health Act 1995. The 
Act created no provisions for community-based services. Screening services were a 
function of the hospitals themselves. Discharge was rare and, when it occurred, post- 
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hospitalisation care was a family responsibility, thus obviating the need for formal 
aftercare services. Prevention services were also a missing feature of the act. 
7.4.5. Social Control rather than Care and Treatment 
Mental hospitals began to become more numerous in the 1980s and 1990s (see Table 
7.10), a time when Korea's increased industrialisation led to greater urbanisation and 
increased population mobility. These social trends meant that families were less able to 
care for, or provide home confinement for, mentally ill family members and preferred to 
pay for their care through external agencies instead. 
Table 7.10. Trends of Psychiatric beds in Korea 
(unit: beds, %) 
'84 '87 '90 '93 '96 '97 
Mental National/ 1,930 2,663 3,708 4,284 5,570 5,779 
Hospital Public (100) (137) (192) (221) (289) (299) 
Private 1,022 2,542 4,964 5,763 9,360 11,255 
(100) (248) (485) (563) (916) (1101) 
Subtotal 2,952 5,205 8,672 10,047 14,930 17,034 
(100) (176) (293) (340) (506) (577) 
General General 11. 2,064 3,371 4,219 5,488 7,754 7,608 
Hospital & Hospital (100) (163) (204) (265) (376) (369) 
& Psychiatric clinic 1,091 999 1,218 1,384 1,492 1,644 
Hospital (100) (91) (111) (126) (137) (151) 
Subtotal 3,155 4,370 5,437 6,872 9,246 9,252 
(100) (138) (172) (217) (293) (293) 
Subtotal 6,107 9,575 14,109 16,919 24,176 26,286 
(100) (156) (231) (277) (396) (430) 
Psychiatric asylum 8,349 12,538 17,432 17,696 18,182 18,908 (100) (150) (208) (211) (218) (226) 
Total 14,456 22,113 31,541 34,615 42,358 45,194 
(100) (152) (218) (239) (293) (313) 
Total population 40,406 41,575 42,869 44,056 45,248 45,991 
(1,000) 100 (103) (106) 109 (112) 114 
Source: MoIIW (1998) Yearbook of Health and Welfare Statistics, Seoul, Korea, M0IIW. 
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Hence, moral hospitalisation became the main approach to treatment. However, this was 
not the goal of policy towards those with mental health problems before 
industrialisation, and this did not appear to be the goal of policy during the 
industrialisation period. Rather, social control remained the consistent goal. 
Thus, in these three areas, minimising state financial involvement, retaining family 
responsibility for family members and social control, hospitals would have had to 
provide benefits over home confinement. There was no impetus to change the 
traditional policies and practice towards people with mental health problems. Home 
confinement fulfilled the function of maintaining social control, and the official but 
unimplemented policy of hospitalisation fulfilled the need to appear modem while also 
meeting changing family situations. Korea was still peripheral enough as a nation, and 
mental health policy was marginal enough as social policy. 
The overall concern of mental health policy was its need to change from the 
maintenance of social order to something else - treatment or rehabilitation, for example. 
However, there were several problems militating against this, Korea retained a very 
strong social stigma towards mental illness, people with mental health problems, and 
families with mentally ill members. This excluded the mentally ill from being 
considered a part of the social group. Consequently, their reintegration into the wider 
society became problematic. The problem was whether to reintegrate them and on what 
basis? 
4 
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7.5. Summary 
This chapter has explored the government's policy responses to perceived social 
problems related to mental health prior to the economic crisis of 1997. During the 
industrialisation period, people with mental health problems tended to be treated with 
contempt and to be left alone in Korean society. Recent value changes have tended to 
weaken the consciousness of family care for those with mental health problems. While 
there were rare cases of people with mental health problems in the earlier agrarian 
society, the prevalence of mental health problems has increased because of the 
population increase, urbanisation, industrialisation, the conflict of feudalism and the 
free economy, and the seriousness of social conflict. Also medical facilities and the 
number of doctors and beds has been increasing. Private organisations have established 
mental sanatoriums, accommodating mental patients, and are receiving governmental 
benefits. 
However, there was low priority for mental health care until the 1980s in Korea. People 
with mental health problems were cared for by their families and communities rather 
than by the state or other services. Since the 1980s there have been remarkable advances 
in the understanding of and response to mental health problems from both the state and 
the public. There has also been a great recognition of the need to promote mental health 
service provision. 
An overriding feature of the Korean mental health system prior to the economic crisis of 
1997 is its concern for maintaining social order and the perception that those with 
mental health problems somehow contribute to a threatening of the social order. 
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Although there are private psychiatric hospitals, their fees for treatment (both in-patient 
and out-patient) are covered by national health insurance schemes. Therefore, private 
hospitals are rather keen to keep as many patients as possible as long as possible for 
financial reasons. This system has resulted in a very long average length of stay for 
mental patients in Korea. 
Despite the forces of industrialisation and urbanisation, most Korean families were 
encouraged to keep the traditional values of caring for their mentally ill family members, 
and the family continued to be the basis of the care of those with mental health 
problems. This assumption is shared by policy makers who believe that the sense of 
family responsibility for the care of those with mental health problems should be 
encouraged and activated by policy intervention. 
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Chapter 8. Reconstructing Mental Health Policy after the 
Economic Crisis of 1997 
The previous chapter examined the development of mental health policy during 
industrialisation. Through the analysis of mental health policy prior to the economic 
crisis of 1997, the changing role of the state in providing mental health care services for 
those with mental health problems has been found. Along with the expansion of the 
welfare policy programme, Korean mental health policy and practice was developed. To 
respond to mental health problems, the Korean government established a mental health 
policy and formulated mental health legislation to provide those with mental health 
problems with mental health care services. Also the government aimed to overcome the 
disparity between the needs of people with mental health problems and the available 
services. 
However, Korea was under a great deal of criticism from at home and abroad for being 
out of step with the rest of the industrialised world on basic issues of individual human 
rights. There was also a great deal of internal and external criticism for its mental health 
system being overwhelmingly institutionally based while other advanced industrialised 
countries had moved to community-based services. To respond to these criticisms the 
Korean government attempted to establish a mental health policy and to formulate a 
Mental Health Act. The policy and legislation was expected to protect some individual 
human rights, and it allowed for the creation of some community-based programme 
models that had always existed in Korea, but which were not officially authorised. 
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Following the enactment of the Mental Health Act 1995, the role of government was 
strengthened in the mental health policy arena. 
However, from the end of 1997, the Korean GDP was halved (in dollars terms) and the 
country was on the brink of bankruptcy. Although the Korean government managed to 
avoid a financial moratorium with the help of the International Monetary Fund, the 
financial crisis began to take its toll. For instance there was a massive increase in 
unemployment. The Korean welfare state also began to feel severe strain due to this 
economic and social crisis. In the wake of the economic crisis of 1997, the Korean 
government had to manage a financial moratorium with the help of the IMF. In such a 
circumstance, Korean welfare programmes including mental health care were 
constrained by spending considerations. In this respect, it might be that spending 
consideration influenced the mental health policy and practice. 
The thrust of this chapter is on policy responses to perceived social problems related to 
mental health (i. e. the increasing number of people with mental health problems) along 
with the inauguration of a relatively progressive government in Korea in the aftermath 
of the economic crisis. The question this chapter seeks to answer is whether the role of 
the state within the welfare system was changed in the area of mental health policy. 
This chapter is divided into four sections including the summary, the first section 
examines the relationship between the social changes and mental health in the aftermath 
of the crisis. Section two tries to explore the reconstructed mental health policy under 
the productive welfare approach. In section three, the basic features of mental health 
policy and practice after the economic crisis are identified. 
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8.1. Economic Crisis and Growing Demands for Mental Health Care 
This section begins by describing those socio-demographic characteristics of Korea 
which are likely to have a significant impact on its population's needs for mental health 
services in the aftermath of the economic crisis. Second, the prevalence of various 
mental health problems in Korea has been directly measured in some recent studies, and 
this epidemiological work also provides valuable evidence on the likely extent of 
Koreans' mental health needs. 
The evidence supporting this view comes from two major sources. First, several socio- 
demographic indicators have been found to have a marked influence on the prevalence 
of mental health problems and on mental health service utilisation. These include rates 
of unemployment and homelessness, and overall social deprivation. 
8.1.1. Unemployment and Mental health 
It is said that large-scale layoffs by companies, international economic competition, 
computerisation and other factors, are associated with the increased prevalence of 
mental health problems. Tausing and his colleagues (1999) point out this: 
Recent large-scale layoffs by companies known for the stability of their work force, 
international economic competition, computerisation, boring simple jobs, and other 
factors suggest that workers may be increasingly anxious about keeping jobs or about 
having enough money to get by, about supporting their family, and planning for the 
future (p. 70). 
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With regard to the likely impact on needs for services in Korea in the aftermath of 
economic crisis, a series of studies has demonstrated that unemployment appears to 
have a considerable negative effect on mental health, with associations including 
depression, poor self esteem, anxiety, substance abuse and negative effects on 
relationships (Johoda, 1979; Frese and Mohr, 1987; Crawford et. al., 1987; Warr et. al., 
1988; Bhugra, 1993). 
Kanunerling and O'Connor (1995) found unemployment to be the best predictor of 
admission rate, reporting a 0.94 correlation between these two variables. A study in 
north east London found that local rates of unemployment accounted for 81% of the 
variance in the rates of accumulation of new long stay patients in different health 
districts in the area (Thornicroft et. al., 1992). High level of unemployment and suicide 
rates has been found to correlate in several Western countries (Pritchard, 1992; Platt et. 
al., 1992). Thus this demographic characteristic again suggests the need for mental 
health services in Korea. 
In Korea, during the economic crisis of 1997, large numbers became unemployed and 
unable to support dependants. An enduring image from that time is the man jumping 
from a building ledge to commit suicide after depression linked to his financial losses. 
Some unemployed men left their homes each day as though they were still working so 
as not to reveal to their neighbours that they had been laid off and in order to retain 
some sense of identity for themselves (Lee, E., 2002). 
High unemployment rates may also have an impact on the types of services needed by 
people with ongoing mental health problems. Whilst they may be able to find jobs in 
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times of full employment, they are a group which is likely to be especially vulnerable to 
losing or not being able to find work when the country is in recession. A need for help 
with employment and with activity in general are thus likely to be currently at a high 
level among those with long-term mental health problems. 
8.1.2. Homeless and Mental Health 
The implications for population mental health needs of the homeless population are 
again considerable. There has been a study on mental health problems among homeless 
people after the economic crisis of 1997 (Kwoen, et. al., 1999). The main premise of the 
study was that mental health problems of the homeless tend to isolate them from society, 
prolong their period of homelessness and make it difficult for them to re-establish their 
well-being. Kwoen and his collegues (1999) reviewed a number of mental health 
problems, a correlation was found among the mental health problems and changes in the 
problems with the lapse of time. They presented the major findings as follows: 
(a) Drinking problems of the homeless was much greater than normal persons 
(b) As for psychiatric symptoms, somatization, phobic anxiety and psychoticism 
were more serious than other symptoms 
(c) Drinking problem were positively related to somatization, phobic anxiety and 
psychoticism, so that homeless persons with drinking problem had more serious 
psychiatric symptoms 
(d) The period of homelessness was related to drinking problems, that is, the 
homeless who were living on a street-corner during a period of over 18 months 
had the most serious drinking problems 
(e) The period of homelessness was related to psychiatric symptoms, that is, 
homeless persons at an early stage and for a long period of time (over 18 months) 
had the most serious psychiatric symptoms (Kwoen, et. al 1999, p. 47). 
275 
In this respect, there was also a growing demand for mental health care for homeless 
people at the early stages of homelessness in order to prevent them from prolonging 
their homeless period. 
Conventional mental health services often fail to contact or engage the homeless 
mentally ill, so that specific services are needed. For example, clinics may be provided 
in places where the homeless tend to congregate or assertive outreach work is carried 
out on the streets. The needs of the homeless are particularly likely to be multiple, with 
many requiring interventions for physical health and psychological and social problems, 
so that there is a particularly important need for services which can provide a range of 
types of intervention and for good inter-agency co-ordination for this group. 
8.1.3. Social Deprivation 
The relationship between mental health problems and various measures of poverty, low 
social class or social deprivation became a major focus for psychiatric epidemiology in 
the first half of the twentieth century. Many positive findings have been reported since 
the original observation in the 1930s in Chicago where it was noted that there was a 
higher rate of admission for psychosis in poorer central areas than in more prosperous 
outer areas (Faris and Dunham, 1939). A series of subsequent studies have confirmed 
this tendency for people with mental health problems to be concentrated in inner cities 
(Eaton, 1985; Giggs and Cooper, 1987). The effects are particularly clear for 
schizophrenia, and there has been a debate over whether people born in the inner city 
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are at higher risk of psychotic illness ('social causation hypothesis'), or whether this 
finding is the result of mentally ill people tending to migrate to inner cities even if they 
are born elsewhere ('social drift hypothesis'). Recent research has tended to support the 
former view, that there is a true increased incidence of schizophrenia in individuals born 
or brought up in an urban environment (Castle et. al., 1993; Dauncey et. al., 1993). 
However, it is likely that `social drift' operates as well, with the number of individuals 
with schizophrenia in the inner city inflated by migrants from more prosperous areas 
(Buszwicz and Phelan, 1994). 
Despite Government measures, the sharp decline in incomes and the fact that most of 
the unemployment occurred among low paid temporary workers, meant poverty rose 
substantially. While estimates of poverty differ quite widely depending on whether 
consumption or income-based poverty estimates are used, all estimates show that 
poverty increased between two to three-times between the third quarter of 1997 and the 
third quarter of 1998, when poverty rates appear to have reached a peak. Estimates used 
by the Government (KIHASA), which are measured in terms of income, show an 
increase in poverty from 2.4 per cent in the third quarter of 1997 to 7.8 per cent in the 
third quarter of 1999. 
World Bank estimates of the percentage of poor, measured by consumption expenditure, 
find that poverty rose from 8.5 per cent in the third quarter of 1997 to almost 24 per 
cent in the third quarter of 1998. Moreover, since the squared poverty gap index which 
measures the severity of poverty increased by more than the poverty gap index through 
the third quarter of 1998, the impact on the poorest was more severe. 
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The true impact of the crisis on poverty requires taking into account the trend reduction 
in poverty that would have occurred had the crisis not erupted. Since Korea had been 
successful in sustaining steady declines in the incidence of poverty throughout the 
1990s, it is estimated that the crisis may have increased the incidence of poverty by over 
128 per cent through the third quarter of 1998 (based on WB estimates measured by 
consumption expenditures). Although these trends had begun to reverse by the end of 
1998, and the incidence of poverty declined to around 16 per cent (measured by 
consumption expenditures) or 7.4 per cent (based on income), this is still nearly double 
pre-crisis levels. 
Thus population-level composite indicators of deprivation already suggest that mental 
health needs may be particularly great. A number of individual demographic 
characteristics are also good predictors of mental health needs and service use, in some 
cases appearing to predict variations in services use more powerfully than composite 
deprivation scores. Korea's position on the indicators most relevant to mental illness 
should be considered. 
8.1.4. Increasing Number of People with Mental Health Problems 
The epidemiological evidence on Korea's mental health needs in the aftermath of 
economic crisis is more likely to be direct, although not as comprehensive or as 
plentiful. As Table 8.1 demonstrates there has been the increased number of people with 
mental health problems after the economic crisis of 1997. 
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Table 8.1. Cc 
Classification 
n of Mental Health Related Statistics between 1997 and 2002 
1997 2002 
Number of People with 
Mental Health Problems 2,730,000 
Source: MoHW (2003) Health and Welfare Statistical Yearbook, Seoul, Korea, MoHW. 
According to a recent survey by the Ministry of Health and Welfare and the Psychiatry 
Department of Seoul National University's Medical School, based on interviewing 6,114 
people over the age of 18 nation-wide, more than one in six (31.4 per cent) thought they 
had experienced a mental illness in their lifetime. By gender, male respondents (38.7 per 
cent) outnumbered female by 1.6 times. Among the so-called psychiatric conditions, 
addiction to alcohol recorded the largest with around one in six (16.3 per cent) having 
experienced it. The percentage is calculated assuming there are 22.6 million people over 
the age of 18. Men (25.8 per cent) far outnumbered women (6.6 per cent). Addiction to 
nicotine stood at 10.2 per cent or an estimated 2.1million, of which men (18.5 per cent) 
also outnumbered women (1.6 per cent). Aside from addiction to alcohol and nicotine, 
the survey estimated 2.81 million adults need psychiatric care for depression of which 
women (19.4 per cent) outnumbered men (7.1 per cent). Emotional instability at 14.8% 
was the most reported disorder followed by panic attacks (9.1 per cent), worrying about 
one's health (1 per cent), psychopathic symptoms (1.1 per cent), and bulimia (0.13 per 
cent). During last year, an average 8.7 per cent of those surveyed, including those who 
were affected by alcohol (5 per cent), nicotine (4.4 per cent), depression (26.9 per cent), 
and anxiety (12.3 per cent) received medical care (Chosun Ilbo, 2002). 
977,000 
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This section has explored a significant impact on its population's needs for mental 
health services in the aftermath of the economic crisis. In the following section, the 
government's policy responses to perceived social problems related to mental health in 
wake of the economic crisis will be examined. 
8.2. Government's Response: Reconstructing Mental Health Policy 
As explored in chapter 7, in Korea the deterioration of social conditions following the 
1997 financial crisis has led to a rise in the demand for welfare services, while family 
ties and mutual co-operation in communities are declining. A new type of poverty has 
emerged among women, children, the disabled and the elderly without relatives, and 
within the urban areas. At the same time, income inequalities are widening, threatening 
a breakdown in social cohesion. In this circumstance, the Korean government has been 
expected to extend welfare provisions for people in need. However, the goverment also 
faced some obstacles to expanding welfare programmes. The obstacles were lack of 
funding and resources allocation. The government had to pursue economic recovery 
and stabilising strategies. The government policies therefore were highly driven by the 
economic situation. 
In this respect, it is particularly important to identify how economic strategy constrained 
mental health policy decisions and the structure of mental health policy institutions. In 
addition, this chapter will look at the impact of this new direction of social policy on 
mental health policy making. As mentioned before, social policy has continued to be 
adapted to the economic situation. The government also attempted to pursue a strategy 
280 
of moderate development in mental health care provision. 
Equally, it is very important to consider the cultural influences in the reconstruction of 
Korean mental health policy in the aftermath of economic crisis. As highlighted in 
Chapter 5 and 6, the Korean government considered the cultural factors before they 
formulated the policy since the 1960s. It is not surprising that the policy makers 
regarded the family as a major welfare resource. They also realised that Confucianism 
still plays an important role in shaping people's attitude to life in Korea. This has been 
institutionalised as an orthodox ideology since the Chosun dynasty (1392-1910). In this 
respect, it is important to examine how the Korean government reasserted social order 
to shape a new mental health policy towards community based service provision for 
people with mental health problems, particularly for those discharged from mental 
hospital and other institutions. Therefore, in this section, it is important to identify the 
ways in which the government reformulated the mental health policy and its system 
under the productive welfare approach. 
8.2.1. The Policy Shift towards Community-based Mental health Care 
As noted in Chapter 3, mental health care over the last two centuries has been 
dominated by the rise and fall of the asylum in Western countries. Moving from 
institutional to community settings has triggered a whole new mental health enterprise 
called `community care' or `care in the community'. 
In December 1995, the Mental Health Act was enacted and has been effective since 
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March 1,1997, and this introduced the concept of public mental health. Since 2000 
people with chronic mental disorders have been included in the criteria for people with 
disabilities who are entitled to receive social welfare services, such as economic support, 
employment and housing. Disability benefits for people with mental disability could 
reduce long-term institutionalisation and lead them to live more easily in the community. 
To this end, the Korean government formulated a document to shape national policy on 
mental health care across the country. According to the Government Plan for 
Community Mental Health Care 2000, it was government policy to encourage 
community-based facilities on the grounds that it is cheaper, cost effective and more 
suited to earlier treatment and rehabilitation (MoHW, 2000). There is no doubt at all that 
there is a model of community care in Korea, and some outstanding examples of 
projects have been designed by Korean people with Korean conditions in mind. In 
addition the government has attempted to set up alternative structures for psychiatric 
care, located outside the mental hospital to promote community integration. There has 
been the development of out patient and day patient services outside of the hospital and 
a range of new community-based treatment facilities have been established. These 
include community mental health centres, and the establishment of multidisciplinary 
community-based psychiatric teams involving general practitioners, community 
psychiatric nurses, psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers and some other staff 
groups (see section 8.3.4). 
The Korean government has also sought to establish new alternatives in the community. 
Consequently Community Mental Health Centres (CMHCs) and Social Rehabilitation 
Centres (SRCs) have been created in catchment areas. This model has been formed on 
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the basis of a unifying mould of mental treatment and social welfare services. The 
support of various services as a dimension of social welfare other than mental services 
based on a medical model should be guaranteed since broad service more than 
prevention, revival and rehabilitation is needed rather than the treatment for mental 
disorders. 
In addition, in order to protect the human rights of people with mental health problems 
and reduce the number of long-term inpatients in mental hospitals or institutions, the 
Government has introduced several projects or programmes. First of all, the government 
began to evaluate psychiatric asylums, especially their openness, quality of service and 
the satisfaction of inmates. Secondly, local government as well as central government 
has been increasing investments in the public mental health programme. Thirdly, by the 
Mental Health Act, each local government introduced the compulsory peer review 
system for extending the length of stay over six months in institutions. Fourthly, by the 
Mental Health Act the Government began to regulate the size of mental hospitals, which 
prohibited constructing new mental hospitals with more than 300 beds. In addition, the 
Government and many NGO's have been participating in a variety of campaigns to 
remove prejudice against those with mental health problems; finally, the Government is 
now trying to achieve up-to-date epidemiological data about mental illness and alcohol 
abuse. From 2000 to 2002 a nation-wide epidemiological study was conducted to check 
the prevalence of mental illness, socio-economic characteristics of people with mental 
health problems and their mental health service utilisation patterns. 
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8.2.2. New Mental health Act 2000 
The main aim of the New Mental Health Act 2000 was reintegrating people with mental 
health problems into the community. The Mental Health Act 2000 formalised this 
endeavour by restricting the number of beds (no more than 300) in mental hospitals. 
This act outlined a number of changes. A central element was the building of a 
comprehensive network of psychiatric facilities (including general hospital units, 
CMHCs, SRCs), administered within each catchment area. In addition the private and 
voluntary sectors were encouraged to provide much of social rehabilitation services and 
programmes. The Act also gave local authorities the powers to run publicly funded 
mental health centres for those with mental health problems. 
As has already been mentioned, Korea proved to be the main exception to this general 
policy trend until 1997. Long-term institutionalisation was the main method of 
treatment and care for people with mental health problems. The average length of stay 
in a Korean mental hospital in 1996 was 136 days, 12 times the average stay of patients 
in the United States. However, like many other industrialised countries Korea has 
developed community-based policies for people with mental health problems. For 
example, the government has made substantial progress in transferring mental health 
service users from institutional to community settings in recent years. In 1995 mental 
health legislation was implemented which seeks to increase patient rights and to avoid 
unnecessary hospitalisation. In 2000 the health and welfare minister endorsed a 
National Mental Health Policy. This laid out plans to promote the development of 
community-based services, together with their better integration with remaining 
institutional services. In recent years, the government has encouraged and supported the 
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development of rehabilitation programmes. The Mental Health Law of 2000 provides 
support for a shift in policy towards supporting to some extent the reintegration of 
people with mental health problems into the community, although implementation of 
this has been slow. 
8.2.3. Building the National Mental Health Service Delivery System 
As the Korean government embarked on a productive welfare approach, mental health 
was not adequately addressed (see discussion in chapter 7). The National Mental Health 
Service Delivery System was a set of recommendations developed to ensure that mental 
health care was explicitly included. 
The early draft of the National Mental Service Delivery Systems was formulated by 
mental health professionals and then subsequently adopted by the Ministry of Health 
and Welfare, the highest health policy-making body at national level. The major 
recommendations were that: 
(a) Mental health must form an integral part of the total health programme and as 
such should be included in all national policies and programmes in the field of 
health, education, and social welfare; 
(b) Strengthening the mental health component in the curricula of various levels of 
health professionals 
(MoIIW, 2000). 
These recommendations were in response to the recognition that mental health 
professionals alone would be unable to meet the growing mental health needs of the 
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population. Even if training facilities for the mental health sector were doubled or 
tripled, it would require several decades to meet such needs. Also, it was recognised that 
services beyond mental health institutions were needed. One of the more important 
elements in the delivery of health care in Korea is the primary health centre. A major 
thrust of the National Mental Health Service Delivery System was to provide mental 
health care at and from these centres (MoHW, 2000). 
The objectives of the National Mental Health Programme were: 
(a) To ensure availability and accessibility of minimum mental health care for 
all in the foreseeable future, particularly to the most vulnerable and 
underprivileged sections of the population. 
(b) To encourage application of mental health knowledge in general health 
care and in social development. 
(c) To promote community participation in mental health services 
development and to stimulate effort towards self-help in the community. 
(d) To reduce the incidence and prevalence of mental health problems 
(e) To reduce mortality associated with mental health problems 
(f) To reduce the extent and severity of problems associated with specific 
mental health problems, including poor health and social function 
(g) To develop mental health services 
(h) To promote good mental health and reduce stigma, through, for example, 
public education 
(i) To promote the psychological aspects of general health care. 
(MoHW, 2000) 
Since its inception, the efforts of the National Mental Health Service Delivery System 
have been directed at promoting and developing state-level programmes, workshops for 
mental health professionals and voluntary organisations, evaluation of mental health 
care provided through primary health centres, the development of a model District 
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Mental Health Programme, and the development of training materials and programmes 
for practitioners and academicians. 
Moreover, the Mental Health Service Delivery System considered adopting the 
`common strategic mental health framework' suggested by the WHO: 
(a) Educate, support and resource primary care in its essential role of helping the 
majority of people with mental health problems. 
(b) Develop effective links between primary and secondary care, with well- 
developed criteria for referral, methods of shared care, adequate information 
systems and communication etc. 
(c) Develop comprehensive local specialist health and social services. 
(d) Develop mental health legislation, which protects human rights and controls the 
circumstances under which patients can be held in hospital or treated without 
consent. 
(e) Develop good practice guidelines on effective interventions in primary and 
secondary care, and on inter-agency collaboration. 
(f) Develop a package of public health measures to reduce suicides and homicides by 
mentally ill people. 
(g) Develop a research and development strategy for mental health. 
(h) Develop a mental health promotion strategy embracing generic settings such as 
the workplace, schools and general health care. 
(i) Educate school personnel about the management of mental health problems. 
(j) Involve user and carers in policy development and in service development and 
delivery. 
(k) If resources permit, develop mental health information systems in secondary care, 
incorporation core clinical minimum data sets and outcome measures that satisfy 
data protection and confidentiality requirements, in consultation with service 
users. 
(1) Develop effective links between the policy makers, the scientific community and 
the mental health delivery system. 
(Jenkins, et. al., 1997) 
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The above strategic framework has been actively addressed by the introduction of the 
mental health centres within general health centres. 
8.2.4. Introduction of Mental Health Centres within General Health Centres 
The public mental health service system has been established in the last few years for 
the protection of people with mental health problems (Mental Health Act 2000, Section 
1). It includes social rehabilitation centres for those with mental health problems, 
general health centres and health centres. Mental health workers have been posted in 
general health centres. 
There have been two types of community mental health services within general health 
centres funded by central government budget. The first one is basic and compulsory 
services and the other is selective services. Basic and Compulsory Services within both 
General Health Centres and Mental Health Centres are: 
(a) Survey for availability of mental health related resources; 
(b) Registration; 
(c) Establishment of referral system; 
(d) Case management; 
(e) Education for users and carers; 
(f) Prevention programme; 
(g) Mental health promotion; 
(h) Campaign for reducing stigma attached to the mental illness; 
(i) Mental health consultation; 
(j) Management and co-ordination of volunteers. 
(MoHW, 2001). 
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Basic and compulsory services within only Mental Health Centres are: 
(a) Support for the meetings of families; 
(b) Day care programmes; 
(c) Occupational rehabilitation programmes; 
(d) Education for mental health professionals; 
(e) Mental health services seminars; 
(f) Regular meetings for consultation and management committee 
(Mo11W, 2001). 
The selective services within General Health Centres and Mental Health Centres are: 
(a) Rehabilitation programmes for people with alcohol and substances abuse; 
(b) Mental health services for the elderly; 
(c) Mental health research; 
(d) Support residential homes; 
(e) Emergency services; 
(f) Mental health services for children; 
(g) Mental health services for the workplace; 
(h) Outpatient services; 
(i) Family support programme 
(MolHW, 2001). 
Under the Korean situation where the sub structural establishment of the mental health 
sector is not yet solid, the public health centre model is more likely to make the most of 
the existing organisations, the institutions, and mental health professionals. In addition, 
a more organic system is likely to be more suitable for the public health centre model 
(see Figure 8.1. ). 
289 
Figure 8.1 Public Health Centre Model 
Support " Supervise 
Local governments 1 1Public / State Mental Hospital 
I Public Sector " Health Services II Private Sector " Social Services 
Public Health Centres 
(Mental Health Centres) 
Social Rehabilitation Centres 
(Welfare Centres etc. ) 
People with Mental Health Problems 
. 
Inpatients in Mental Hospital 
"Cared by in Mental Nursing Homes 
. 
Cared by in their own homes 
Source: Moon, 2000. 
8.2.5. Establishment of Social Rehabilitation Centres 
In order to protect the human rights of people with mental health problems patients and 
reduce the number of long-term inpatients in mental hospitals and psychiatric asylums, 
(Mental Health Act 2000, Section 1) the community health service system has been 
established. 
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The community mental health service system includes social rehabilitation centres for 
psychiatric disability, community mental health centres and health centres. Mental 
health workers were posted in health centres by the end of 1998. Table 8.2 shows the 
planning of the establishment of social rehabilitation centres and community mental 
health centre for the psychiatric disabled from 1998 to 2003 (Ministry of Health and 
Welfare, 1999). 
Table 8.2. Planning of Establishment of Social Rehabilitation Centres for the 
Psychiatric Disabled 
Total 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Social Number of Facilities 97 7 10 20 20 20 20 
Rehabilitation Budget 
185 5 5 25 35 50 65 
Centre (100 million won) 
Community Number of Facilities 165 4 11 40 50 60 60 
Mental Health Budget 
65.0 2.0 7.0 11.0 13.0 15 17 
Centre (100 million won) 
Snurce: MnIIW (1999) Renort ofHealth and Welfare. Seoul. Korea. MoHW. 
8.3. Characteristics of the Reconstructed Mental Health Policy after 
the Crisis 
This chapter has attempted to analyse policy responses from the Korean government to 
deal with mental health problems in aftermath of the economic crisis of 1997. The 
Korean government responded to this problem by introducing the community-base 
mental health policy with regard to the issue of the prevalence of mental health 
problems and mental health service utilisation (e. g. rates of unemployment and 
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homelessness, and overall social deprivation). This section identifies the basic features 
of mental health policy and practice after the economic crisis. 
8.3.1. Focus on Rehabilitation 
Since the 1950s the policies of de-institutionalisation and the development of 
community-based services can be understood to have constituted a process of 
administrative recommendation; a reversal of nineteenth-century policy, with the aim 
being to restore people with mental health problems to the status of (wholly or at least 
partially) functioning members of a market economy. This framework for the 
development of the post-war mental health policy has had a marked impact on service 
development within the countries representing this regime type (Goodwin 1997, p. 108). 
The primary aim of these developments in service provision has been upon 
rehabilitation; the underlying theme of this being that people should be helped to regain 
their independence within a market economy. In England, for example, concern over the 
effects of mental health problems upon industrial efficiency rapidly became apparent in 
the immediate post-war period (Goodwin 1997, p. 108). 
This focus of service development upon the restoration of mental patients to labour 
market activity also characterises other liberal regimes (Goodwin 1997, p. 108). In the 
United States, as de-institutionalisation got under way and the community mental health 
centres movement was emerging, a clear policy emphasis was placed upon 
rehabilitation: 
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The objective of modem treatment of persons with major mental illness is to enable 
the patient to maintain himself in the community in a normal manner. To do so, it is 
necessary (1) to save the patient from the debilitating effects of institutionalisation as 
much as possible, (2) if the patient requires hospitalisation to return him to home and 
community life as soon as possible, and (3) thereafter to maintain him in the 
community as long as possible. (Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health, 
1961) 
The fact is that, for many people subsequently discharged from mental hospital, 
rehabilitation has proved unrealistic and has often tended to obscure this aim, but as a 
goal it tends to be central to the rationale for providing community-based services 
within liberal regimes (Goodwin 1997, pp. 108-9). 
In this respect, it could be argued that the main focus of mental health policy in Korea in 
the aftermath of the economic crisis was a liberal approach, which emphasises 
rehabilitation of people discharged from mental hospitals. To achieve this goal the 
Korean government has established social rehabilitation centres (see Table 8.3). 
This has been the solution of many social reintegration programmes in the West. True to 
adopting Western mental health forms, the relatively few Korean community-based 
mental health programmes that exist frequently voice the same goal. The 
appropriateness of this goal is questionable in the Western context, but it is 
incomprehensible in a Korean context, where one's relationship to the social group is so 
important. 
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Table 8.3. Social Rehabilitation Centres 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Total 6 16 36 94 178 272 
Seoul 4 5 9 13 21 21 
Busan 1 1 2 5 7 7 
Taegu 1 2 2 7 9 10 
Inchon 
- - 
1 1 1 2 
Gawngju 
- - - 
2 3 3 
Taejeon 
- 
1 3 9 15 17 
Ulsan 
- - 
1 
- 
1 1 
Kyonggi 
- 
1 3 9 15 17 
Kangwon 
- - - - 
1 1 
Chungbuk 
- - - - 
2 4 
Chungnam 
- - - 
3 3 4 
Chunbuk 
- - - 
6 8 9 
Chunnam 
- - - 
I I I 
Kyongbuk 
- - 
2 3 3 4 
Kyongnam 
- 
2 2 3 3 3 
Cheju 
- - - 
1 2 2 
Source: MotiW (2003) Mental Health Facilities Yearbook, Seoul, Korea, MoHW. 
Another option is to reintegrate people with mental health problems into viable 
subcultures. However, even the subcultures that exist in Korean society are not 
officially recognised, or certainly not recognised as viable. Like individualism, sub- 
cultural or group identity that falls outside of the norms for general Korean identity is to 
be avoided. Those who opt for independence or a subculture in Korea pay a tremendous 
social and emotional cost for it. In this situation, individuals with mental health 
problems have little chance in the community outside the family. 
The lack of beds is one of the main problems within the mental health system in Korea. 
Due to the lack of psychiatric hospital beds those with mental health problems, 
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estimated at 19,000 patients, are accommodated in inappropriate mental health facilities. 
Furthermore, there is a limited number of facilities which provide rehabilitation services 
and programmes. Consequently, the revolving door syndrome has appeared. It is 
recognised that, particularly for patients with schizophrenia, the cycle of admission and 
discharge is too frequent. It is suggested that patients are sometimes discharged 
inappropriately and that the support services available in the community are inadequate, 
both tending to result in the mental health of the patient deteriorating and consequently 
resulting in readmission. 
8.3.2. Devolution 
In February 2000, the Ministry of Health and Welfare announced a national policy of 
community-based care for those with mental health problems. This policy statement 
mentioned that chronic patients should be discharged from mental hospital into the 
community where they could be offered services by local authorities in the community 
mental health centres and social rehabilitation centres. Local authorities have no 
separate mental health policy and programme. National mental health policy is decided 
by the Division of Mental Health at the Ministry of Health and Welfare. 
The community mental health centre (CMHC) is considered as one of the most useful 
and comprehensive models in community mental health. Since 1995 about 20 CMHCs 
have been established in Seoul and Kyunggi province throughout Korea. Each CMHC 
has its uniqueness and progresses according to the characteristics of its local community 
(Lee, J., 1998). 
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Although under poor conditions 
- 
shortage of professional manpower and experience, 
lack of social support and finance 
- 
the CMHC is now developing and spreading in 
Korea. Lee Jong-Gook (1998) presented several problems for the future of the CMHC 
development. These are as follows: 
A lack of legal basis, difficulty in agreeing with the concept and role of the CMIIC, 
poor linkage of co-worker systems with other resources and agencies in the 
community, and the adequacy of the tools and methods for the evaluation of the effect 
and outcome of the CMIHC (p. 28). 
The development of the CMHC requires consistent and continuous effort from mental 
health professionals, administrative concern and support, consumer (patient and family) 
participation, and community support (Lee, J., 1998) 
According to the Guidelines for Community Mental Health set by the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare (2002), local authorities should allocate the budget for community 
mental health services from their budget. Seoul Metropolitan City receives 40 per cent 
of its budget from central government whereas the other local authorities are given half 
of their budget from central government. This means that the local authority has the 
responsibility for spending on community mental health services even though this does 
not include medical fees for the majority of inpatients. These fees are mostly covered by 
national insurance schemes or by the Government Medical Protection scheme (for the 
poor). However, as Table 8.4 demonstrates, without strong state financial support for 
programming, decentralisation to community-based services for people with mental 
health problems and the establishment of local-level services will both be extremely 
difficult in the future. 
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Table 8.4. Community Mental Health Services within the General Health Centres (GCS) 
funded by Central Government 2001 
Number of General Health Centre Number of GHC funded by 
Central Government Budget 
Total 242 16 
Seoul 25 1 
Bussan 16 1 
Taiga 8 1 
Intone 10 1 
Gong 5 1 
Taej eon 5 1 
Ulsan 5 1 
Kyonggi 39 1 
Kangwon 18 1 
Chungbuk 11 1 
Chungnam 15 1 
Chunbuk 14 1 
Chunnam 22 1 
Kyongbuk 25 1 
Kyongnam 20 1 
Cheju 4 1 
Source: MoHW (2003) Mental Health Facilities Yearbook, Seoul, Korea, MoHW. 
8.3.3. Maximising the Role of Private and Voluntary Sectors 
Since the 1960s, the Korean voluntary sector has been involved over time in mental 
health service provision in various ways. The for-profit sector, active on residential care 
provision, has relatively limited experience in the delivery of services to people with 
severe mental health problems. As community-based services have developed in Korea, 
the voluntary not-for-profit sector had been much involved, and the for-profit sector 
hardly at all. 
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In 1999, there was also the symposium on the Development of a National Mental Health 
System organised by the Ministry of Health and Welfare. This symposium discussed the 
development of a national mental health system through delegation to the private sector. 
Lee, Young-Moon suggested maximising the role of private and voluntary sectors as 
follows: 
The policies of public mental health system have been advanced through cooperation 
and confrontation between public and private parts in developed countries. For 
development of adequate public mental health policies, the indicators of public mental 
health should be established and information of private practice should be connected 
to central government. Also, the sense of responsibility and accountability of mental 
health professionals is essential. The central government and local autonomies have to 
reassign the responsibilities of mental health. Therefore, the privatization of publicity 
should be effective in the actual practices. Also the management and control of actual 
practices need to be delegated to the local government and the central government 
should manage the whole mental health system and make an effort to get budget. Thus 
the decentralization of mental health services is very important. Also, NGO would 
play a very important role in development of national mental health policies (Lee, Y. 
1999, p. 22). 
According to the Mental Health Act 2000, the government encouraged the private and 
voluntary sectors to provide much of the social rehabilitation services and programmes. 
As a result of this, there has been an increasing number of voluntary and private 
organisations that are offering mainly residential, community support, and vocational 
training services. 
The aim of the community-based mental health care model is to minimise the coverage 
of formal welfare and, at the same time, to maximise the role of private organisations. 
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Private organisations are required to widen their activities, not only as non-formal 
providers, but also as subcontractors of public services. In order to amplify private 
activities, the government provided financial support to private agencies and relaxed 
restrictions on their services. 
8.3.4. Different Service Providers 
As Table 8.5 shows, there have been different mental health service providers since the 
late 1990s. These include mental hospitals, departments of psychiatry within general 
hospitals, psychiatric clinics, mental health centres, and social rehabilitation centres. In 
addition, the ` psy complex', the multidisciplinary mental health team has emerged. 
Table. 8.5. Different Mental Health Service Providers: 2001 
No. of Facilities No. of Beds % 
National/Public 17 7,570 13.0 
Mental Hospitals Private 61 2,067 35.5 
Sub total 78 9,637 48.5 
Dept. Psychiatry 149 6,170 10.6 
General Hospitals / (General Hospital) 
Psychiatric Clinics Psychiatric Clinics 522 9,468 16.3 
Sub total 671 15,638 26.9 
Sub total 2,498 50,550 75.4 
Mental Health Centres 46 
- 
Social Rehabilitation Centres 48 0.4 
Total 1,601 64,685 100 
Source: MolLW (2001) White Paper of Health and Welfare, Seoul, Korea, MoHW. 
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8.3.4.1. Mental Hospitals 
As Table. 8.5 shows, in 2001 there were 78 mental health hospitals in Korea. The total 
number of beds was 9,637. These hospitals are categorised as follows: 
(a) National/ public hospitals: 7,570 beds; 
(b) Private hospitals: 2,067 beds. 
In Korea, mental hospitals have by far the largest resources in mental health manpower. 
Even a majority of community mental health programmes are supported by staff 
members of mental hospitals. Mental hospitals deal with patients with behaviour and 
emotional symptoms. Compulsory admission based on the Mental Health Act is one of 
the major responsibilities of mental hospitals. Public funds are provided for: the 
treatment of patients; hospitalisation under the medical protection scheme; and the 
compulsory hospitalisation scheme. Local government support services are related to 
emergency mental health care. They collaborate with mental hospitals in the community 
to develop rotational responsibilities for emergency care on holidays and at night time. 
8.3.4.2. Mental Health Beds in General Hospitals 
University hospitals have a small number of psychiatric beds, and are used as teaching 
hospitals for medical students and post-graduate students. In Korea, very few general 
hospitals have psychiatric wards. However, an increasing number of general hospitals 
employ psychiatrists for liaison services, particularly for terminal cases. 
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8.3.4.3. Psychiatric Clinics 
As Table 8.5 shows, the official number of psychiatric clinics in Korea is 522, a figure 
which includes clinics run by internists and neurologists, who are permitted to treat 
mental patients. This has been the category of mental health service with the fastest 
growth-rate in Korea. 
8.3.4.4. Mental Health Centre 
Mental Health Centres plays a key role in mental health in terms of promotion, 
prevention and rehabilitation. They are also expected to provide technical guidance and 
support for mental health activities carried out at other health centres. 
8.3.4.5. Social Rehabilitation Centres 
In 2001, there were 48 social rehabilitation centres. Currently, there are two types of 
psychiatric rehabilitation services in Korea: (a) social skills training; (b) occupational 
rehabilitation. Occupational rehabilitation emphasises the education and training aspect 
of rehabilitation and integrates its programmes with the treatment service. In Korea, 
occupation rehabilitation is provided by different organisations and at different levels of 
occupational training. The least demanding facilities in which occupational 
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rehabilitation has been provided are the psychosocial clubs of `Samsoknunjib", day 
care rehabilitation services are provided within outpatient clinics and day care facilities. 
Occupational rehabilitation is most intensive in those special facilities that prepare the 
person for a competitive job outside the mental health system. 
8.3.4.6. The Emergence of the `Psy Complex' 
The occupational groups which claim an expertise in mental health, sometimes called 
the `psy complex', include psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, mental health social 
workers, mental health nurses, psychoanalysts, psychotherapists and counsellors 
(Rogers and Pilgrim 2001, p. 20). As mentioned earlier, the multidisciplinary mental 
health team has emerged since a range of community mental health services outside 
mental hospitals have developed (see Table 8.6). 
Table. 8.6. Mental Health Professionals 2000 
Psychiatrists Nurses Social 
Worker 
Clinical 
Psychologists 
National/Public 122 651 35 18 
Mental Hospitals Private 223 945 134 34 
Dept. Psychiatry 362 837 142 114 
General Hospitals (General Hospital) 
/ Psychiatric Psychiatric Clinics 586 503 79 31 
Clinics 
T otal 1,293 2,936 390 197 
Source: MoHW (2000) National Mental Health Service Delivery System, Seoul, Korea, MoHW. 
1 American style fountain house club 
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8.3.5. Government as a Regulator rather than Provider? 
Following the economic crisis the government has been expected to assume a social 
welfare responsibility for people with mental health problems, taking this responsibility 
from the family. While there has been a willingness to do this for other populations (for 
example the elderly), the government has displayed consistent ambivalence about 
assuming this responsibility for people with mental health problems. This ambivalence 
is again reflected in the 2000 revisions to the mental health law. The revised law first 
asserts that local and central government have the responsibility to promote the 
independence of people with mental health problems. It then creates health and welfare 
benefits for people with mental health problems that parallel similar benefits for people 
with physical disabilities and for those with developmental impediments. 
If the reforms in the law were truly aimed at the rehabilitation and reintegration of 
people with mental health problems, one would expect to see a significant portion of 
financial support for people with mental health problems. However, central and local 
governments have yet to mount serious efforts in this area (see Table. 8.7). 
Table. 8.7. Mental Health Services Budget (1999-2000) (unit: 1,000,000 won) 
1999 Budget 2000 Budget Increase 
(A) Claim Adjustment (B-A) 
(B) 
Total 18,206 32,257 22,557 4,351 
Mental Health Nursing Home 17,513 21,172 19,812 2,229 
Social Rehabilitation Centre 
- 
2,718 1,000 1,000 
CMHCs 
- 
690 
- - 
Public Mental Hospital 693 4,359 2,745 2,052 
Source: MoHW (2000) National Mental Health Service Delivery System, Seoul, Korea, MoHW. 
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There have been limited resources within mental health services, and a consequent 
dearth of money for the development of new community-based care services. A result 
of this, there have been growing levels of criticism of the inadequate level of support 
available to discharged patients or to service users who have never been admitted. 
Indeed funding of community-based care is generally acknowledged to be inadequate. 
In this respect, the state has tended to play the role of regulator rather than that of 
provider in the mental health care system in the aftermath of the economic crisis. 
Consequently, although the 2000 law and National Mental Health Plan 2000 create a 
significant policy for people with mental health problems, the limited number of 
programmes available in the community limit the usefulness of the provision. In 
particular, many services have been insufficiently developed to meet existing levels of 
need. 
8.3.6. The Continuation of Family Care without Adequate Support 
As explored in Chapter 7, family care was a crucial resource in caring for those with 
mental health problems, and the state stood back from service provision in Korea. 
There was an emphasis on familial responsibility rather than on the responsibility of the 
state to ensure the wellbeing of its citizens even though the ability of families to provide 
care was decreasing during the industrialisation period. In the aftermath of the economic 
crisis, demographic changes, rising divorce levels, increased geographical mobility and 
increased women's participation in the labour market are all tending to reduce the 
capacity of informal carers to provide care. However, the government's policy shift 
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towards community care tends to see family care as a crucial resource in the mental 
health care system. 
The assumption underlying the introduction of a community-based mental health 
system, that patients would receive support in the community and would thereby benefit 
from being discharged, has proved overly simplistic and sometimes erroneous. In this 
respect, one issue in particular may have received considerable attention. Are families 
able or willing to adopt the role ascribed to them within the community care policy? 
The debate revolving around the shift towards community care often includes the 
implicit reliance on families of the mentally ill to assume a large part of the caring 
responsibility. The Korean experience has proved no exception to this. 
Table 8.8. Destinations of Discharges 2000-2002 
Discharges 
No. Of 
Families or Employment Transfer Deaths Others Classification Institutions 
Relatives With Care 
2000 55 1,910 24 389 136 328 
2001 55 1,562 94 268 115 74 
2002 55 1,413 73 252 156 144 
Source: MoHW (2003) Health and Welfare Statistical Yearbook 2003, Seoul, Korea, MoHW. 
Table 8.8 demonstrates the number of the discharged patients who have returned to their 
families or relatives. In this context, families have continued to play a role for caring for 
their mentally ill members. 
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To achieve the full participation in society which the government has emphasised, a 
fuller range of services to help people achieve an income, transport facilities and 
housing comparable to those around them should be required. However, the 
reconstructed mental health policy tends to have an inadequate range of community care 
facilities. 
The reconstructed mental health policy therefore has further problems for a community- 
based support system. The lack of employment opportunities, and the lack of services to 
support people with mental health problems in finding and holding on to employment, 
is characteristic of a mental health service after an economic crisis. 
As a result of this, there has been a tension between the increased emphasis given to the 
role of the informal carer within mental health policy as the Korean government has 
introduced a community-based scheme which assumes that families want to care, and 
those with mental health problems want to be cared for by their families. Accordingly, 
the main burden of care falls upon women. This still tends to be ignored by policy 
makers. 
In Western countries, feminist critiques of community care argue against the reliance it 
has on informal support as the responsibility of caring often falls on women (Dailey, 
1988). Similarly, the contemporary role of Korean women is one of double presence, in 
managing major responsibilities both at home and in the work place (Sung, 2002; Won, 
2004). Korean women are likely to find themselves responsible for the care of mentally 
ill relatives. 
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8.4. Summary 
This chapter has explored the restructuring of mental health policy after the changing 
economic situation. Some social changes and new trends have been found: an ageing 
society, a globalising economy, a growing demand for social welfare, and a decline of 
the capacity for informal care and pressure on public spending. These changes and new 
trends have important implications for future social policy making in general and 
mental health policy in particular. It reflects the government's declared aims: to adapt 
the social welfare system to the new global (capitalist) market economic system, to 
stimulate economic efficiency in a marketising and globalising environment, and to 
maintain political stability by solving newly produced social problems such as urban 
unemployment and poverty, which are mainly caused by market reform and 
international competition. To achieve these aims, the Korean government has attempted 
to adopt a new form of welfare called the 'productive welfare model'. Some argue that 
this model contributes to the expansion of social welfare. On the other hand, this policy 
displays neo-liberal characteristics as a result of welfare reform, moving towards a 
liberal welfare regime. For instance, there has been a neo-liberal approach to mental 
health care, which is the policy shift towards community-based services. The 
government attempted to establish community mental health centres within public 
mental health centres and social rehabilitation centres for people with mental health 
problems. The main focus of this approach is rehabilitation, which liberalists emphasise. 
However, the `Confucian governmentality' could be utilised by policy makers to 
provide a rationale for their policy making and to cope with economic difficulties, even 
though neo-liberal tendencies have been detected in Korean policies since the economic 
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crisis of 1997. Accordingly, the mental health policies after the crisis were informed and 
shaped by repeated affirmation of the values and practice of Confucianism. 
In addition, it is hard to say that the role of the state has been strengthened in the mental 
health policy arena even though the state came to take increasing responsibility for the 
financing of the other welfare progammes (e. g. unemployment programmes) (see 
Chapter 6). For instance, the aim of the community-based mental health care model is to 
residualise the coverage of formal welfare while maximising the role of private 
organisations. Private organisations are required to widen their activities, not only as 
non-formal providers, but also as the subcontractors of public services. In order to 
amplify private activities, the government has provided financial support to private 
agencies and relaxed restrictions on their services. 
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Chapter 9. Discussion and Conclusion 
This study focuses upon the initiation of the mental health policy in Korea. The study 
found the importance of analysing the cultural/political context of public administration 
in Korea and its contribution to understanding policy. This chapter tries to review the 
findings and insights gleaned from this study's analyses, and discuss the relevance and 
utility of its topics. 
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section summarises findings from 
the four analytic chapters: reflects on how these relate to previous findings and 
assertions concerning the historical evolution of mental health policies and mental 
health services in Korea and discusses which factors have primarily influenced mental 
health policy making. In the second section, the study's insights and contributions to 
mental health policy development and policy making are examined. This second section 
also highlights the contribution the findings make to the body of policy development 
and policy making in the mental health arena. Section three intends to present `positive 
mental health services' in Korea. 
9.1. Mental Health Policy Making under the Confucian Governance 
This study adopts the work of Michel Foucault in order to develop further a set of tools 
for analysing mental health policy in Korea. Through the analysis, the government's 
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rationale for fostering ` Confucianism' has been examined in order to look at the moral 
discourse on the family in terms of technologies of Confucian governance. This section 
more closely examines Foucault's suggestions concerning the rationality of 
contemporary strategies of governing of mental health problems. 
9.1.1. The Emergence of Mental Health Policy under the Confucian 
Governmentality 
9.1.1.1. The Birth of the Mental Health Policy as a Technology of Control 
In chapter 7 and 8 this study found the factors affecting the development of a mental 
health policy in Korea. A number of factors contributing to the promotion of mental 
health policy have been found. Rapid industrialisation and urbanisation resulted in the 
social and occupational displacement of many Koreans. These changes produced the 
problem of the undermining of the traditional family and community systems of social 
support and control for those with mental health problems. Due to these factors, the 
government appears to have shown neither the capacity nor the inclination to develop a 
modem range of social policies and institutions. To this end the government attempted 
to establish a plan to promote a mental health care system. The plan included: the 
protection and improvement of the mental health of the population; the respect for 
human rights and assessment of the needs of people with mental health problems; a 
project for the examination of the current status of the mental health system; the 
establishment of mental health legislation to codify and consolidate the fundamental 
principles, values, and objectives of the Korean mental health policy. 
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As mentioned earlier, Korea delayed establishing a clear policy for the treatment of 
people with mental health problems. Not until 1995 was a Mental Health Act passed by 
the National Assembly and this did not come into force until March 1997. As Neary 
(2000, p. 164) points out `until then, and many would say even now, psychiatric health 
was treated as a social order issue'. The Act committed the state to placing greater 
emphasis on community-based mental health care, although the programme to create 
these community-based facilities is progressing slowly and the number of people being 
hospitalised has continued to increase. 
In this regard, the Korean government attempted to enact the Mental Health Act 1995 
and to develop mental health services. There was low priority for mental health care 
until the 1980s in Korea. People with mental health problems were cared for by their 
families and communities rather than by the state. Since the 1980s there have been 
remarkable advances and an understanding of and response to mental health problems 
from both the state and the public. There has also been a greater recognition of the need 
to promote mental health service provision. 
9.1.1.2. Maintaining Social Order 
This study has attempted to examine the mental health policy since the 1960s. Through 
this examination some main features of Korean mental health policy have been found. 
First of all, social control (custodial confinement) was a central policy concern to deal 
with those with mental health problems rather than their treatment and care. Second, a 
strong medical approach was adopted to cope with those who have mental health 
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problems rather than the adoption of other approaches. Lastly, it is more than likely that 
the government's intervention for people in need of psychiatric treatment and care was 
weak and conservative. It means that government-based assistance was by no means 
widespread, and for the most part households were obligated to assist their own family 
member who had mental health problems. 
Social order is about people fulfilling their social roles and meeting other people's 
expectations of them (predictability). Social orders change and differ between (and 
within) societies. The argument to make is that the state, in emphasising Confucianism, 
is emphasising that families are responsible for their dependants (part of the social order 
it wants to maintain) including people with mental health problems. However, for the 
family to maintain its `normal' social functions and expectations in the public arena it 
often discharges its care responsibility by `buying in' psychiatric services via health 
insurance. This enables both family members to work. 
Inequalities arise when families cannot afford private insurance, and have to provide 
care directly themselves, as this disrupts their other social roles - such as going to work. 
This reduces family income just when there is greater dependency on it 
- 
not a good 
basis for care. 
To study the Korean welfare system, it is important to discuss the grand view of its 
system at the level of social order. This `social order' can be defined structurally as 
social stratification reflected through class structure, as Marxists underscored in their 
analysis of the capitalist order. In Weber's (1978) work, however, this `social order' was 
institutionally defined as a `legislated order' of society validated by law and still 
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normatively, by affection, value rationale and religious beliefs. When mental health 
policy is in question, the social order will affect the type of mental health policy by 
structuring the basic environment of policy making and constituting its organisation and 
services, while, in return, mental health policies restructure the services that exert their 
influence on social order. This `dialectical' relationship indicates the necessity of a 
social order study to understand the `dynamic' of mental health policy making, since it 
is the social order that defines the role of welfare agents and their production of motion 
in mental health policy making process. 
The Korean government considered cultural factors before they formulated the policy. It 
is not surprising that the policy maker focused upon the family as a major welfare 
resource. They also realised that Confucianism still plays an important role in shaping 
people's attitude to life in Korea. This has been institutionalised as an orthodox 
ideology since the Chosun dynasty (1392-1910). In this respect, it is important to 
examine how the Korean government reasserts social order to shape the new mental 
health policy towards community based service provision for people with mental health 
problems, particularly for those discharged from mental hospitals and the other 
institutions. 
Furthermore, an overriding feature of the Korean mental health policy since the 1960s 
has been its concern for maintaining social order and the perception that those with 
mental health problems somehow contribute to social disorder. This makes analysing 
the policy paradoxical for those domestic and international critics who view the policy 
from other vantage points, such as treatment. Additionally, those who view the Korean 
social welfare system as unified,, with a single, progressive purpose, were similarly 
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influenced by mental health policy. Mental health policy appeared inconsistent with 
other social welfare goals and practices. 
9.1.1.3. Caregiving Obligations in Mental Health Policy: Maximisatin of Family 
Responsibility 
In the case of Korea's social policy during the process of industrialisation and 
globalisation, the Korean family, which stresses family obligation, has been emphasised 
as the basic caring unit responsible for the long-term needs of people with mental health 
problems, while public welfare provisions provide only limited assistance to preserve 
the family's welfare function. In this way, responsibility for meeting the needs of 
vulnerable groups has been diverted to the family system. As a consequence, individual 
and family work ethics have been preserved, while the financial sector has been 
enhanced for achieving further accumulation. It is important to stress the importance of 
structural factors, particularly those deriving from the nature of capitalist societies. This 
concerns factors such as the cost of service provision, and problems associated with the 
maintenance of social control. 
Since the advent of community mental health, many parents have been thrust into a new 
role, that of a caregiver to children with chronic or often severe mental health problems. 
Often these children are adults who live at home and require help for day-to-day 
management and functioning. In addition, most of these adult children are also 
unemployed. This caregiving role thus puts great demands and often economic strains 
on parents. Women are particularly affected by this role, as research indicates that 
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women are much more likely than men to become primary caregivers (Tausig, Michello 
and Subedi 1999, p. 65). 
9.1.1.4. Maintaining the Confucian Patriarchal Characteristics of Informal Care 
Most of the discussion of the health care system has concentrated on the provision of 
somatic medicine where the nuclear or extended family and the community have played 
a positive role in both the process of treatment and support of the patient. There has 
been rather less attention paid to psychiatric health care where the role of the family has 
been rather less positive. Indeed, as we shall see, as insurance-based health care systems 
which dramatically reduce the cost of institutional care have been introduced, families 
have been quite happy for their members experiencing mental disorder to spend very 
long periods of time in psychiatric hospitals. Not only is this very costly for the health 
care system but it is also often not in the best interest of the patient. In other words, the 
family or community-based orientation of the welfare system is only a `good thing' 
where there is an identity of interest between what the family/community wants for the 
patient and what is in their best interest. When there is a conflict, when the family 
prefers prolonged institutionalisation to release into the community, the family 
orientation is likely to result in higher costs and treatment that is less beneficial to the 
patient (Neary, 2000). 
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9.1.2. Reconstructing the Confucian Governance of Mental Health 
In this respect the Korean government had to reconstruct its mental health policy and its 
system to prioritise the needs of people with mental health problems and the needs of 
relatives. 
9.1.2.1. Search for a New Technology of Control 
The changes to the social security system in Korea in the wake of the financial crisis are 
paradoxical from the perspective of globalisation enthusiasts. The social security 
reforms have proceeded as a crucial measure in coping with soaring unemployment as 
well as alleviating the insecurities associated with structural adjustments. These reforms 
have not been limited to the establishment of a social safety net. Rather, they have been 
developing towards a more redistributive and comprehensive welfare system. All these 
reforms have taken place at the same time as the Korean economy has been fully 
integrated into the World market. In this respect, it is particularly important to identify 
how economic strategy constrained mental health policy decisions and the structure of 
mental health policy institutions. 
Korea was one of the world's economic miracles in the three decades until 1997, when 
the Asian economic crisis hit. At this point Korea experienced a rapid fall in economic 
growth (and hence lowering quality of life), tumbling stock markets, rising 
unemployment, and growing social inequalities. In chapter eight I explored the 
restructuring of mental health policy after the changing economic situation. Some social 
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changes and new trends have been found: an ageing society, a globalising economy, a 
growing demand for social welfare, a decline in the capacity for informal care and 
pressure on public spending. These changes and new trends have important implications 
for future social policy making in general and mental health policy in particular. It 
reflects the government's declared aims: to adapt the social welfare system to the new 
global (capitalist) market economic system, to stimulate economic efficiency in a 
marketising and globalising environment, and to maintain political stability by solving 
newly produced social problems such as urban unemployment and poverty, which are 
mainly caused by market reform and international competition. To achieve these aims, 
the Korean government has attempted to adopt a new form of welfare called the 
`productive welfare model'. Some argued that this model contributes to the expansion 
of social welfare. On the other hand, this policy displays neo-liberal characteristics, as a 
result of welfare reform, there was a move towards the liberal welfare regime. For 
instance, there has been a neo-liberal approach to mental health care, which underlies 
the policy shill towards community-based services. The government attempted to 
establish its community mental health centres within public mental health centres and 
social rehabilitation centres for people with mental health problems. The main focus of 
this approach is rehabilitation, something which liberalists emphasise. 
9.1.2.2. Fiscally Sustainable Solution?: Minimisation of State Responsibility 
As previously discussed in chapter 3, Scull maintains that, over the post-war period, 
governments in the advanced capitalist countries have become increasingly prone to 
`fiscal crisis': a condition when tax revenues tend to decline while demands for social 
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expenditure tend to increase, resulting in a growing fiscal deficit. The process of de- 
institutionalisation has primarily been the result of a need to reduce costs, and the 
ideology of community care has provided the legitimating cover under which that 
programme has commenced (Goodwin, 1997). This cost-cutting thesis is persuasive in 
relation to this episode of policy formation. The Korean government was keen to 
minimise public expenditure, the encouragement of family care and involvement of the 
private and voluntary sector was a good opportunity to make fiscal saving. 
One explanation is that the cost of institutional care became too great for a publicly 
funded welfare system to accommodate within a capitalist economy (Rogers and 
Pilgrim, 2001, p. 62). 
As Holliday (2000) points out, social policy is strictly subordinate to the overriding 
policy objective of economic growth in a productivist world of welfare capitalism. 
Everything else flows from this: minimal social rights with extensions linked to 
productive activity, reinforcement of the position of productive elements in society, and 
state-market-family relationships directed towards growth. Furthermore as Holliday 
(2000) argued, the two central aspects of the productivist world of welfare capitalism 
are a growth-oriented state and subordination of all aspects of state policy, including 
social policy, to economic/industrial objectives. Alongside these defining features a 
series of additional elements may be found. Policy makers might seek to pursue 
economic growth by facilitative means (Holliday, 2000). 
President Park Chung-hee pursued a social policy motivated almost entirely by 
economic objectives, the influence of which it has never really thrown off (Kwon, H., 
1999). In most cases social rights were extended first to industrial workers, and many 
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have still not been fully universalised. In the case of the National Pension Programme, 
introduced in 1988, a central aim was capital mobilisation during the phase of surging 
economic growth (Kwon, H., 1998b, 1999). Korea's other main social policy 
programmes are Industrial Accident Insurance (introduced in 1964), a Public Assistance 
Programme for the poor (1965), National Health Insurance (1977), and an Employment 
Insurance Programme (1995). With the exception of the Public Assistance Programme, 
Korea's social policy is based on the social insurance principle, and the state plays a 
largely regulatory role (Goodman et. al., 1997). In 1995, the public and private sectors 
in Korea respectively spent 10 and 1 per cent of GDP on social protection. This is a 
rather pure form of developmental-universalism because the Public Assistance 
Programme provides no more than a very basic universal safety net, and all other 
programmes cover only those who have paid into them (Holliday 2000, p. 713). 
Related to other dependent populations, older people have benefited more than others as 
Korea switched from a focus on economic growth to more balanced growth. In that 
same vein, people with mental health problems have perhaps benefited the least. Part of 
the explanation is certainly the relationship of social welfare and economic policy to 
populations and sectors directly affected by economic policy, which have benefited the 
most from the development of a social welfare policy. There was an implicit obligation 
towards those who created the rapid economic growth, and are now the elderly people. 
Additionally, urban and economic growth patterns have broken down the tradition of the 
eldest son's family caring for ageing parents. The wives of the eldest sons, on whom 
this responsibility fell, are often working now themselves or are otherwise unable or 
unwilling to assume this role because of social changes and expectations of women's 
roles. 
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Social welfare policy towards families and children has also benefited, largely driven by 
economic concerns. Educational policy is highly vocational and related to the needs of 
industry. Other family benefits are similarly tied to economic issues. Family-allowance 
benefits encourage families to have children, a concern as Korea experiences a 
declining birth rate and declining work force. In contrast, people with mental health 
problems have had almost no role in the Korean economy except as a commodified 
group for the psychiatric hospitals. As individuals and as a group, they have not been 
needed in the economy. 
Although the government has been active in developing progressive social welfare 
policies for many populations in the aftermath of the economic crisis, this has been 
pursued most aggressively as it benefits or is an outcome of the economy. People with 
mental health problems do not fit into that equation in any obvious way. To that extent, 
they have remained beyond the concern of policy development. While there have been 
consistent internal critics of the Korean mental health policy at least since the 1980s, the 
government was notably unresponsive to them until the early 1990s. 
Many industrialised countries around the world are tending towards developing 
community-based policies for people with mental health problems. In this respect Korea 
has made substantial progress in transferring mental health services users from 
institutional to community settings in recent years. 
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9.1.2.3. The Emergence of Care in the Community Policy as a new Technology of 
Control 
Mental health legislation was implemented in 1997 which seeks to increase patient 
rights and to avoid unnecessary hospitalisation. In 2000 the health and welfare minister 
of Korea endorsed a National Mental Health Policy. This laid out plans to promote the 
development of community-based services, together with their better integration with 
remaining institutional services. The changes introduced by the 2000 Mental Health Act 
were part of much more widespread shifts in organisation and practice within public 
services introduced by the Kim Dae-jung government. The government regarded 'carers' 
as an important resource in the provision of community care. In the aftermath of the 
economic crisis the government attempted to freeze budgetary allocation to personal 
social services, but local authorities used their relative autonomy from central control to 
protect personal social services and held spending at pre-existing levels. The 
government attempted to encourage and recommend a new local authority department, 
providing a community-based and family-oriented service, which would be available to 
all. The policy shift of mental health services into the community has been driven by a 
number of forces including the idea that people with mental health problems should be 
treated in the same way as all other members of society. 
Between 1993 and 1997 government reports and White papers, as mentioned in chapter 
6, were unanimous in setting targets to accelerate the shift from hospital to community 
care. This period was characterised by consensus about the direction of policy and a 
slow but consistent expansion of state welfare services, making alternatives to hospital 
care possible and ensuring a gradual decline in the population in institutional care. The 
community care remit expanded to include other groups requiring long-term support 
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without medical care, and the policy focus expanded to include the prevention of entry 
to institutional care as well as rehabilitation in it. 
The many social reintegration programmes have been a solution in Western European 
and North American countries. True to adopting Western mental health forms, the 
relatively few Korean community-based mental health programmes that exist frequently 
voice the same goal. The appropriateness of this goal is questionable in the Western 
context, but it is incomprehensible in the Korean context, where an individual's 
relationship to the social group is so important. 
Another option would be 'to reintegrate people with mental health problems into a viable 
subculture. However, the subcultures that exist in Korean society are not officially 
recognised, or certainly not recognised as viable. Individualism, sub-cultural or group 
identity is to be avoided. Those who opt for independence or subculture in Korea pay a 
tremendous social and emotional cost for it because Korea retains a very strong social 
stigma towards mental illness, people with mental health problems, and families with 
mentally ill members. This excludes people with mental health problems from being 
considered a part of the social group. Consequently, people with mental health problems 
have little chance at survival in the community outside of the family. 
In addition, the overall concern of mental health policy needed to change from the 
maintenance of social order to something else - treatment or rehabilitation through 
reconstructing mental health policy. In this circumstance, it could be argued that this 
policy making towards community based mental health policy has been highly driven 
by economic situation. 
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9.1.2.4. Family-based Service Provision?: Continuity of Fostering Confucianism 
and Family Responsibility 
Since the late 1990s, the Korean government has established welfare provision for 
enhancing the caring functions of families for people with mental health problems. It 
means that the government began to respond to the problem of mental health because it 
became a social rather than a family problem when Korea's increased industrialisation 
led to greater urbanisation and increased population mobility. These social trends meant 
that families were less able to care for, or provide home confinement for, mentally ill 
family members. 
The family is basic to the life of every human being. Its importance in Korea has for 
centuries been greatly reinforced by Confucian philosophy, received from China and 
fully accepted into Korean culture by the fifteen century. This philosophy emphasises 
family relationships as fundamental to the entire social fabric and includes relatives far 
beyond the simple parent-children household. Although the nuclear family (father, 
mother, children) as a living unit is becoming the norm in the big cities, the traditional 
Confucian view of family relationships and responsibilities continues as a strong 
influence on individual attitudes and behaviour (Macdonald, 1996). 
In Korea, family responsibility is still the main source of the individual's social security. 
Governmental and private responsibility for the welfare of the unrelated individual is a 
new idea and only beginning to develop, as in Korea's universal medical insurance and 
limited pension system (Macdonald, 1996). 
The government would have to be willing to assume a social welfare responsibility for 
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people with mental health problems, taking this responsibility from the family. While 
there has been a willingness to do this for other populations (for example the elderly) 
the government has displayed a consistent ambivalence about assuming this 
responsibility for people with mental health problems. 
This ambivalence is again reflected in the 2000 revisions to the mental health law. The 
revised law first asserts that local and central government has the responsibility to 
promote the independence of people with mental health problems. It then creates health 
and welfare benefits for people with mental health problems that parallel similar 
benefits for people with physical disabilities and for those with developmental 
impediments. 
If the reforms in the law were truly aimed at the rehabilitation and reintegration of 
mental health problems, one would expect to see a significant portion of financial 
support for people with mental health problems. However, central and local government 
has yet to mount serious efforts in this area. Consequently, although the 2000 law and 
National Mental Health Plan 2000 create significant policies for people with mental 
health problems, the limited number of programmes available in the community limit 
the usefulness of the provision. 
9.1.3. Current Issues and Future Challenges 
As examined in Chapter 8, a number of issues have arisen concerning the quality of the 
experience of service users and their carers within the framework of a community care 
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policy. It is clear that the next decade will see a continuation of the shift to community 
care that has characterised previous decades. The Korean government has recently 
released a mental health policy statement that reaffirms their commitment to decreasing 
hospital beds and establishing more community support. The challenge will be to 
implement these policies on a widespread basis so that the goal of community 
integration for those with severe mental health problems becomes a reality rather than 
rhetoric. As implementation proceeds there are a number of issues and trends that will 
need to be addressed. 
Policies related to mental health care have made great strides towards promoting 
humanistic ideals and community care as a worthwhile goal. A major shift has occurred 
from the concept of custodial care to one that emphasises care and treatment. However, 
a huge gap remains between the rhetoric of this new policy and its implementation. For 
example, the Korean value system regarding individual rights, responsibilities, and 
community attitude towards people with mental health problems is not congruent with 
accepting people with serious mental health problems as members of the society. In the 
community, people with mental health problems commonly face barriers in gaining 
access to housing and employment. Stigmatisation is a serious concern not only for 
affected individuals but also for their family members. In addition, the resource 
infrastructure for mental health care is rudimentary and systemic advances that have 
taken place are largely due to political will and commitment. 
Moreover, the danger is that the rhetoric of community of care can also result in an 
abrogation of responsibility. While the mental hospitals may not be appropriate, 
community values and resources may not be prepared to provide the services that are 
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needed. A well-meaning policy without the resources needed to back it up could mean 
that a person with mental health problems could be on the street, bereft of all services. 
In addition, having people with mental health problems living in the community and 
listening to their voices may have the most significant impact on changing community 
attitudes, enhancing understanding of the process of recovery from mental health 
problems, and improving the mental health care system. In so doing, policy-makers can 
learn from the experiences of countries advanced in deinstitutionalisation in order to 
advance their own efforts in building a community-based mental health care system. 
Several principles of implementation of comprehensive community-based services have 
been identified, including (a) an appropriate place to live; (b) an adequate income; (c) a 
varied social life; (d) employment and other day activity; (e) help and support; (f) 
respect and trust; (g) choice and consultation (Mental Health Foundation, 1994) (see 
Section 9.3). 
Moreover, mental health policy should be planned on the basis of the needs and interests 
of both those giving and receiving care. The dual focus of caring suggests that the focus 
of welfare intervention can not placed exclusively on those with mental health problems 
or the carer. Current welfare provision focuses on only people with mental health 
problems, not on carers, In the process of allocating services for those with mental 
health problems, the carer's voice thus needs to be heard. Where there are potential 
conflicts of interest between these, service providers have to make decision in a way 
that the needs and interests of each are best considered together. However, it may not be 
easy for them to recognise the carer's needs and interests because carers are reluctant to 
ask for help for a variety of reasons and because service providers may make 
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assumptions about the care given by the carer. Social providers need to work with carers, 
respecting their needs, their values, their commitment to care and their feelings about 
continuing with caring (These will be suggested in great deal in Section 9.3.7). 
9.2. Insights and Implications for Study on Policy Analysis 
9.2.1. Insights and Contributions to Social Policy Analysis 
This study found that mental health policy making in Korea has been primarily driven 
by two crucial structural changes in modern Korean history: industrialisation and the 
economic crisis of 1997. In the last three decades, both developed and developing 
countries have cut back on their social expenditure and retrenched state welfare. The 
dominant economic philosophy, heavily influenced by neo-liberalism, is antagonistic to 
state intervention. It is widely believed that government involvement is an impediment 
to economic growth. In this respect the Korean government has considered that the new 
direction for social policy cannot ignore fundamental commitments to economic policy. 
This is characterised by a commitment to low inflation and stable conditions of growth. 
It is clear that the next decade will see a continuation of the shift to community care that 
has characterised previous decades. Most of the provinces (regions) in Korea have 
recently released mental health policy statements that reaffirm their commitment to 
decreasing hospital beds and establishing more community support. The challenge will 
be to implement these policies on a widespread basis so that the goal of community 
integration for those who are most severely ill becomes reality rather than rhetoric. As 
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implementation proceeds there are a number of issues and trends that will need to be 
addressed. 
9.2.1.1. Structural and Cultural Influences in Emergence of Mental Health Policy 
In Korea the issue of mental health care was the result of demographic, social and 
economic changes caused by modernisation and the increasing need for a welfare state. 
The tradition of family care and the relatively small numbers of mentally ill people in 
the total population made family care and carers invisible in the Korean welfare system. 
Families were always regarded as resources available to support and care for those with 
mental health problems. As discussed in Chapter 5, rapid and comprehensive changes 
which have occurred in Korean society since the 1960s gave rise to increasing public 
concern over the care needs of people with mental health problems and the capacity and 
availability of families to provide such care. The Korean government began to respond 
to this issue. 
The literature on the welfare state has recently explored the uniqueness of the East 
Asian or Confucian welfare model as distinguished from that of the Western welfare 
states. The analysis of Korean social policy for those with mental health problems 
demonstrates some features of the former, particularly in relation to the interplay of the 
cultural tradition in making social Policy. The Confucian tradition sees the family as the 
unit primarily responsible for social welfare. The Korean government has used this 
Confucian tradition as its political rhetoric to rationalise the development of welfare 
policy as an integral part of economic development and to avoid public pressure on it to 
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develop certain welfare provisions, especially for those with mental health problems. 
The government has also attempted to encourage families to take care of their mentally 
ill members and puts the main responsibility for caring on them through policies 
promoting the Confucian tradition. 
9.2.1.2. Mental Health Policy under the Globalising Process 
This study found connections between globalising processes and mental health policy 
making in Korea. The policy making has been highly influenced by globalising 
processes even though there have been some progressive developments of welfare 
provision in the aftermath of the economic crisis in 1997. However, this is mainly in the 
area of social security benefits for the unemployed and not health and social services 
provision. Some commentators (Kim, Y. M., 2001; Kwon, H., 2000; Shin, 2000a) claim 
that Korea has experienced welfare expansion. Kwon, H. (2001) provided an interesting 
test case for the debate on the globalisation hypothesis which suggests that the role of 
the state will decrease. He concluded that `although globalisation acts as a downward 
pressure on expenditure in some countries, it has exerted an upward pressure in the case 
of Korea' (Kwon, H. 2001, p. 213). Shin (2000a, p. 104) also points about that `the 
changes to the social security system in Korea in the wake of the financial crisis are 
paradoxical from the perspective of globalism enthusiasts'. 
The reforms have proceeded as a crucial measure in coping with soaring 
unemployment as well as alleviating the insecurities associated with structural 
adjustments. They have not been limited to the establishment of a social safety net. 
Rather, they have been developing towards a more redistributive and comprehensive 
welfare system. All these reforms have taken place at the same time as the Korean 
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economy has been fully integrated into world markets (Shin 2000b, p. 104). 
However, they have just attempted to generalise from social security benefits to the 
welfare state. There is no evidence from this study to support the view that Korea has 
developed towards a more redistributive and comprehensive welfare system. For 
example, there has been ` the globalisation-driven pressure on the increasing role of the 
private sector in the health care system' (Kwon, S. 2002, p. 280). 
Globalisation provides both opportunities and challenges to mental health policy in 
Korea. Through the diffusion of policy innovations, other countries' experience 
provides important lessons for mental health reform in Korea. However, when 
globalisation provides an external pressure towards more competition and market 
mechanisms without taking into account the unique institutional context of Korea, it 
becomes a challenge. The recent economic crisis and its impacts on mental health and 
mental health care in Korea is a good example of global pressures. More markets or 
privatisation in the mental health care system, which vested interest groups strongly 
support, is likely to result in deteriorating solidarity in Korea, for the role of the public 
sector is very limited. 
In this respect, the discussion presented here has some clear implications for an 
understanding of the relationship between globalisation and mental health policy. The 
impact of globalisation on mental health policy will not necessarily be harmful but will 
be dependent on the structure of the social foundation. Indeed, Confucian governance 
still matters in the development of the welfare state even in an era of globalisation. 
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9.2.2. Contributions to Comparative Mental Health Policy Analysis 
Chapter 3 reviewed the strengths and weakness of theoretical approaches to 
understanding and interpreting policy formation and development in the mental health 
field. However, as Goodwin (1997) has pointed out in his analysis of mental health 
policy in Western Europe and North America, traditional theoretical frameworks have 
failed to analyse policy developments within late capitalist welfare states accurately. In 
this respect, this study might have contributed to comparative mental health policy 
analysis in terms of the advantage of engaging and learning from the specific experience 
of different countries. As Rogers and Pilgrim (2001, p. 16) have argued `comparative 
analysis of systems of cultural beliefs about mental health are also important in 
understanding prevailing systems of care and the adoption of particular policy and 
practice'. Also Lefley (1999) has also pointed out the importance of cultural belief 
systems in understanding mental health policy developments: 
Cultural belief systems inform whether deviant behaviours are identified and classified 
as illness, the concepts of etiology and cure, and the designation of appropriate healers. 
In any cultural system, modal concepts of mental illness, help-seeking paths, and 
utilisation patterns are intermeshed with the organisation and structure of service 
delivery systems.... Additionally, a culture's assessed needs for social control and 
order, its prevailing philosophies and legal protections, and its economic organisation 
and resources all have had a significant impact on the structure of mental health 
service delivery systems. (Lefley 1999, p. 567) 
Accordingly, this study has provided an opportunity to draw attention to and learn about 
the specific experience of Korean mental health policy making in terms of its cultural 
belief system. Also the study has presented the point that over the past three decades 
Korea has incarcerated many more patients on an involuntary basis than European 
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countries. Perhaps this reflects the gravity with which transgressions of social norms are 
viewed in Korean society. 
Through an examination of Korean mental health policy developments this study found 
that relatively few resources are currently available which enable this research to 
examine mental health programmes and policies from a comparative standpoint. Given 
the diversity of cultural values, political and economic structures, and social welfare and 
health policies around the world, it is not surprising that major differences exist between 
nations in the treatment they provide to people with mental health problems (Benson, 
1996). However, literature on comparative mental health policy mainly focuses on 
North American and West European countries, which may be less relevant to East Asian 
countries, such as Korea. Another often-missed point in this literature is the importance 
of cultural factors on societies and social policy provision. Welfare state policies and 
culture are mutually interrelated in a very complex way and sometimes also 
contradictory ways. It could also lead to a way of analysing the impact of Confucianism 
on East Asian Welfare regimes. Furthermore, the fabric of the Korean welfare system is 
determined by a number of ideological influences. The Confucian welfare legacy is, of 
course, dominated by Confucian ideology. Korean society has always emphasised a 
dependence on family rather than the state. The values underlying the Korean welfare 
system are an amalgam of traditional and contemporary ideologies. The Confucian 
welfare legacy of family dependence rather than government dependence has been 
promoted by the Korean governments as a means of lessening the welfare burden on the 
state. 
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9.2.3. Contributions to Theoretical Perspectives for Mental Health Policy 
Developments 
In Chapter 3, a wide range of perspectives exploring mental health policy developments 
has been examined in terms of their relevance as the theoretical rationale for 
understanding Korean mental health policy developments: the humanitarian perspective 
represented by Jones, and the Marxist approach represented by Scull. None of these 
provides a satisfactory explanation for Korean mental health policy developments. 
Foucault's early writings on mental health began quite close to the Marxian emphasis on 
social control (Foucault 1961; 1965). However, he diverged from Scull's analysis on 
two counts even at this stage. First, he puts the beginnings of segregation at an earlier 
point, the `great confinement' of the mid-seventeenth to mid-eighteenth century. Scull 
argues that most of the mad were still roaming free in society at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century and it was not until the mid-nineteenth century that the state asylum 
system was well established to segregate madness. Second, Foucault emphasized the 
moral, not economic, order. Whereas Scull argued that psychiatry functioned to aid and 
abet economic efficiency, Foucault argued that psychiatry existed primarily to deal with 
those who offended bourgeois morality and rationality. For Foucault, segregative 
psychiatry was not concerned with either medical cure or economic efficiency per se 
but with moral regulation (Pilgrim and Rogers 1999, p. 109). 
Critical histories therefore challenge self-congratulatory versions of history, which tend 
to mask the interests of powerful sections of society, such as the psychiatric profession 
and the central capitalist State. However, Rothman (1983) suggests that there are 
problems with critical, as well as Whig, histories because in both accounts `conception 
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triumphs over data'. According to Rothman, a focus on ideology, whether it is 
humanitarianism (Jones), capitalism (Scull) or surveillance (Foucault), can divert the 
historian's attention from the complex empirical reality of specific individual cases. For 
example, Scull's emphasis on the economic, Rothman claims, is overstated. The early 
American system of asylums appeared in the absence of a market economy. Ideas about 
madness, he suggests, can be influenced by idiosyncratic factors other than those 
associated with a capitalist mode of production (for example, ideals related to localised 
political activity and religious doctrine). (Pilgrim and Rogers, 1999) 
This study has traced the development of policy initiatives that have directly and 
indirectly affected care of people with mental health problems since the 1960s. Also the 
study has examined some of the consequences of those policies, both intended and 
unintended, and pointed out how a concern about social order is a theme that can be 
commonly detected running through them. 
Since the 1960s there has been an increased need for formal health and social services 
for those with mental health problems who have no informal carers. Despite the 
country's rapid demographic, economic and social changes, there has been a widening 
gap between the population's expectations and needs, and health and social service 
provision in the mental health arena. Neither long-term care services nor personal social 
services are well developed for those with long-term mental health problems. In 
addition there is a marked disparity between the acute services, which are 
predominantly provided by private sector organisations in a highly competitive market 
and broadly achieve high standards, and public primary care and rudimentary residential 
services in the mental health arena. In this context, it could be argued that Korean 
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mental health policy has been concerned with maintaining social order rather than care 
and treatment for those with mental health problems. 
This study also found that one of features in Korean mental health developments is the 
emergence of the `psy complex'. Mental health professions have been of particular 
interest to poststructuralists. Rogers and Pilgrim (1999, p. 105) point about that the `psy 
complex' has `a chronic surveillance role in relation to mental patients'. They also 
present two types of discourse about the role of the `psy complex': `the first of these 
emphasised segregation and acting on the body (psychical treatments) and the second 
emphasised the construction of the self via a set of psychological accounts (counselling 
and psychotherapy) (Rogers and Pilgrim 1999, p. 105). In this respect, it can hardly be 
denied that Korean mental health policy has not been concerned with either medical 
cure or economic efficiency per se but with segregative and surveillance apparatus for 
maintaining social order. 
9.3. Towards `Positive' Mental Health Services: Conclusion 
While support for the principle of community care has been almost universal, 
community care policy has offered to the government the means of managing people 
with mental health problems and there is little sign that this will change. Thus, a range 
of in-patient treatment services are being developed, including secure hospital provision, 
psychiatric units in general hospitals, community mental health centres and a number of 
smaller initiatives. Treatment is also being made available in day hospitals, out-patient 
clinics, general practitioner clinics and other dispensaries, and by private office 
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psychiatrists. In this respect, a further set of issues that have arisen concerns the way in 
which service provision should be developed. Here this study intends to suggest 
`positive' mental health services: 
Mental health is a state of well-being in which the individual realises his or her own 
abilities, can cope with the normal stresses of life, can work productively and fruitfully, 
and is able to make a contribution to his or her community (World Health 
Organization, 1999). 
In so doing, integrated mental health services should be developed. 
9.3.1. Integrated Mental Health Services 
Policy-makers can learn from the experiences of countries advanced in 
deinstitutionalisation in order to advance their own efforts in building a community- 
based mental health care system. Several principles of the implementation of 
comprehensive community-based services have been identified, including (a) an 
establishment of a single authority with responsibility for planning, implementing, and 
financing services; (b) consolidation of available funding sources for medical and social 
services; and (c) reallocation of human and financial resources from hospital to 
community-based programmes (MoHW, 2000). 
In the framework of the Korean mental health care system, no core entity exists that can 
co-ordinate the psychiatric treatment, rehabilitative and social service needs of people 
with mental health problems and take the initiative in planning and implementing a 
comprehensive care system. `Continuity of care' or `service integration' will become a 
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concern as more and more people with serious and persistent mental health problems 
are treated in the community. An authority with responsibility for these activities is 
required to implement the goal articulated in the letter of the law. 
An important problem in facilitating the system transition in Korea is the low cost of 
hospitalisation that provides little economic incentive to reduce the use of long-term 
inpatient care. The expenditures for involuntary hospitalisation subsidies have already 
gone down since the revision of the Mental Health Act in 2000. Given that the relatively 
high fee for ambulatory services might not reduce the cost significantly even within the 
health care system, not to mention the expected increase in social service cost, 
acquisition of new funding sources is needed to develop community support services in 
Korea rather than the redistribution of existing funding. 
Furthermore, Korea is facing the problem of reorganising the private service delivery 
system. Private medical institutions are the major players in the mental health delivery 
system. The psychiatric hospitals have expanded their service boundary, providing 
residential and rehabilitative services as well as ambulatory psychiatric services. A 
question that needs to be examined is whether the medical institutions can design and 
implement services based on the philosophy of community integration of people with 
mental health problems, while redefining their role in the total system of care. To 
promote integrated mental health services some suggestions should be addressed: 
(a) Formulating policies designed to improve the mental health of populations; 
(b) Assuring universal access to appropriate and cost-effective services, including 
mental health promotion and prevention services; 
(c) Ensuring adequate care and protection of human rights for institutionalised 
patients with most severe mental health problems; 
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(d) Assessment and monitoring of the mental health of communities, including 
vulnerable populations such as children, women and the elderly; 
(e) Promoting healthy lifestyles and reducing risk factors for mental and behavioural 
disorders, such as unstable family environments, abuse and civil unrest; 
(f) Supporting stable family life, social cohesion and human development; 
(g) Enhancing research into the causes of mental and behavioural disorders, the 
development of effective treatments, and the monitoring and evaluation of mental 
health system (WHO, 2001). 
9.3.2. Getting an Early Start to Mental Health: Promoting mental health activities 
as part of public health services 
In Korea, general health centres are more and more involved in mental health activities 
after the recommendation was made by the Ministry of Health and Welfare in January 
2000. The recommendation asked general health centres in Korea to play a central 
administrative role to develop mental health programmes in the community. An average 
general health centre serves a population of around 100,000 to 150,000. One of the 
important programmes carried out at general health centres has been education for 
families of people with mental health problems. These developments at general health 
centres should be promoted as a positive step to promoting community-based mental 
health services in Korea. 
9.3.3. Lifestyle Supporting Mental Health 
The recent mental health and public health policies are directed towards the community 
integration of people with mental health problems. However, the Korean value system 
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regarding individual rights, responsibilities, and community attitude towards people 
with mental health problems is not congruent with accepting people with serious mental 
health problems as members of the society. In the community, people with mental health 
problems commonly face barriers in gaining access to housing and employment. 
Stigmatisation is a serious concern not only for affected individuals but also for their 
family members. The possible way to reduce stigma attached mental health problems 
will be to increase their treatment in the community. This could be realised through the 
introduction of a financing system favouring community care. 
Furthermore, special programmes should be developed for most of the groups listed 
below as a positive step to promoting mental health services in terms of lifestyle 
supporting mental health in Korea: 
(a) People in need of long-term mental health care 
(b) Homeless people with severe mental health problems 
(c) People with drug abuse 
(d) Victims of sexual abuse or domestic violence 
(e) Children with mental health problems 
(f) Elderly people with mental health problems (e. g. dementia) 
In more recent years the issue of population, however, has been attracting more and 
more attention in Korean policy planning. This attention is not so much related to the 
number of the people, however, but rather to the structure of it. That is, the ` problem' of 
ageing. Korea has seen a growth in the proportion of older people in its population, 
which has been much more rapid that that of many other comparative countries 
Over the last 30 years, falling fertility and rising life expectancy rates have caused the 
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proportion of children in the population to fall and the proportion of the working-age 
population to rise. The proportion of the aged rose slightly. The result has been a sharp 
fall in the overall dependency ratio. The old age dependency ratio is still relatively low, 
ranging mostly between 8-9 per cent. However, this is projected to double over the next 
20 years, reaching the current old age dependency ratio of OECD economies (1995), 
and to triple in 30 years, reaching about 26 per cent by 2030 
- 
this is approaching the 
projected levels in Europe and Central Asia, and well above other developing regions. 
Due to the rapid increase in the geriatric population, and changes in family structure, 
services for geriatric patients, particularly for senile dementia, have become the priority 
all over Korea. The government should develop the following activities: 
(a) Consultation on geriatric mental health: consultation activities with families with 
senile dementia at general health centres; 
(b) Financial support to geriatric care centres; 
(c) Training for general physicians and public health nurses in the management of 
senile dementia; 
(d) Support to the in-patients rehabilitation facilities for senile dementia patients; 
(e) Development of comprehensive community care systems for senile dementia 
including health, medical treatment and social rehabilitation. 
9.3.4. Employment and Work 
Supporting people with serious mental health problems to work in the competitive 
labour market remains a difficult task in Korea. However, in Western countries, there 
has been an underlying belief that `everyone ought to work to their capacity, both for 
their own benefit and in order to minimize their dependence on their nation's 
340 
increasingly grudging generosity' (Baron 2000, p. 375). 
In this respect, the mental health system should acknowledge the importance of 
employment as a goal and the vocational rehabilitation system should focus on 
employment. Baron (2000) has presented a `best case' scenario for promoting 
employment for people with mental health problems: 
Public policies recognise the benefits 
- 
to the client, to their communities, and to 
national economies 
- 
of promoting economic independence for people with mental 
health problems. This would require consistent public policies that support work, 
substantial increases in funding for rehabilitation programming, the reformulation of 
medical insurance programmes that can continue to cover those with mental health 
problems even after they are hard at work, and the creation of job opportunities that 
are both flexible and sufficiently remunerative to motivate people to work (p. 389). 
9.3.5. Protection of Human Rights of People with Mental Health Problems 
Regarding human rights and responsibilities, it is indicative that Korea has no 
specialised legal provision for criminal offenders with mental health problems. Criminal 
offenders acquitted because of insanity are treated in the same manner as any other 
involuntarily admitted patients. Treatment and discharge is carried out completely in 
accordance with the Mental Health Law and the criminal court will no longer intervene 
in the management of patients. The preference for custodial care of people with mental 
health problems is intertwined with Korean cultural and social characteristics. 
The neglect of human rights of psychiatric patients has a long history in Korea. There 
have been reports of widespread abuse in mental hospitals and conditions in hospitals 
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reflect the custodial nature of the care provided. Although the Mental Health Act 1995 
implemented protective measures and the majority of patients have been voluntarily 
hospitalised since then, nearly half of the voluntary patients are still treated in locked 
wards. Moreover, the effectiveness of psychiatric review boards has been questioned. 
For example, only a small number of appeals for discharge to psychiatric review boards 
were approved (7%) (Suh, 2000). Suh (2000) argued that psychiatric review boards tend 
to reject discharge of applicants unless they have a place to go to with their family's 
consent, even if they are clinically suitable for discharge. These issues were addressed 
in the revision of the Mental Health Act 1995, which required the Ministry of Health 
and Welfare to revise the guidelines regarding treatment of a voluntarily admitted 
patient in a locked ward and the psychiatric review board. It is too early to discuss 
practical implications of the most recent revision of the law at the time of the writing. 
9.3.6. Empowering Users and Carers 
The process of system transition is not likely to accelerate in the near future within the 
cultural, social, and political context. However, significant change is occurring as an 
increasing number of individuals with mental health problems are organising and 
speaking publicly via the mass media, and at symposiums, conferences, and fund raising 
events. Having people with mental health problems living in the community and 
listening to their voices may have the most significant impact on changing community 
attitude, enhancing understanding of the process of recovery from mental health 
problems, and improving the mental health care system. In order to develop `positive 
mental health', users and their carers should be empowered and involved in the policy 
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making process. 
Due to the strong stigma attached to mental health problems, the involvement of users 
in the planning and evaluation of mental health problems is still at a very early stage. 
The weakness of consumer involvement is based on a paternalistic cultural background. 
In Korea, `good mental patients' are viewed as patients who obediently follow the 
instructions of doctors and nurses. 
In addition, consumer participation needs more attention. In Western countries, 
especially in the USA, consumers have played an important role in the development of 
mental health care models (Salzer, 1999). Salzer (1999, p. 75) has pointed out that `the 
concerns and perspectives of mental health consumers are more frequently voiced and 
heard, and are influencing service delivery concepts and how services are evaluated'. 
However, in Korea, consumers' power and influence on the present services are far less 
pronounced. The Association of Families with Mental Patients runs an internet website 
for the education of family members on mental health problems, which is now used at 
health centres. Consumer involvement in mental health will be an important area to be 
promoted in Korea in the future. 
9.3.7. Caring about Carers 
Carers play a vital role in helping to look after service users of mental health services, 
particularly those with severe mental health problems. Providing help, advice and 
services to carers can be one of best ways of helping people with mental health 
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problems. 
While caring can be rewarding, the strains and responsibilities of caring also have an 
impact on carers' own psychological and physical health. These needs must be 
addressed as a positive step to promoting community-based mental health services in 
Korea. There has evolved a 10 Point Plan for Carers suggested by the Carers National 
Association in the U. K. This plan would be very helpful for promoting positive 
community mental health services: 
(a) Recognition of their contribution and of their own needs as individuals in their own 
right. 
(b) Services tailored to their individual circumstances, needs and views. 
(c) Services which reflect an awareness of differing racial, cultural and religious 
backgrounds. 
(d) Opportunities for a break, to relax and have time to themselves. 
(e) Practical help. 
(f) Someone to talk to about their own emotional needs. 
(g) Information about available benefits and services. 
(h) An income which covers the cost of caring. 
(i) Opportunities to explore alternatives to family care. 
(j) Services designed through consultations with carers, at all levels of policy and 
planning. 
Furthermore, the legislation for caring about carers should be formulated to meet the 
needs of carers. For example, the Carers (Recognition and Services) Act 1995 in the 
U. K. gives carers who provide a substantial amount of care on a regular basis a right to 
assessment of their needs as carers. It is important that social workers bring this 
provision to the attention of carers, and that local authority eligibility criteria is 
designed with the needs of carers in mind. 
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Appendix I: List of Interviewees 
PAGE/PAGES 
EXCLUDED 
UNDER 
INSTRUCTION 
FROM 
UNIVERSITY 
c9 38 )- 
Appendix II: Informal Interview Questions 
1. What first alerted the Government to the need to develop its mental health policies? 
2. What was a prepared set of major alternative policies, including some `good one'? 
3. How did you identify, design and screen the alternatives? 
4. Did you compare the predicted benefits and costs of the various alternatives and 
identifying the ` best' ones? 
5. Did you evaluate the benefits and costs of the `best' alternatives and deciding 
whether they are `good' or `not'? 
6. Having identified that a problem existed can you please advise how the CMHC 
model came to be adopted? 
7. Were other service models considered that were discounted? 
8. How demands are advanced by stakeholders (such as Professional groups, Owners 
of mental sanatorium, Consumer groups, etc)? 
9. What was the form of government involvement in policy-making 
- 
e. g. responding 
to initiatives from elsewhere or driving change? 
10. What were the established operational goals, with some order of priority? 
11. Were there any established sets of CMHC's significant values, with some order of 
priority? 
12. Resources and constraints (the formulation of alternative policies or combinations 
of policies goes forward on the basis of resources available, and constraints upon 
choice)? 
13. How did you allocate resource to CMHC initiatives and if so on what basis? 
14. How did you predict the future environment on operation context? 
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Appendix III: Key Mental Health Policy Developments in South Korea 
Year Key Developments 
1984 
- 
The First-ever Planning Report for Mental Health 
1986 Subsidiary Programme for Asylum 
Survey of Treated Prevalence of Mental Health Hospital (I) 
1987 
- 
OECF Fund for Restructuring of Mental Hospitals 
1988 
- 
Survey of Treated Prevalence of Mental Illness (II) 
1994 
- 
Mental Health Policy Research 
1995 
- 
Task Force Committee of Mental Health Act Legislation 
- 
Insurance Coverage for Day Hospital 
Enactment of Mental Health Act 
1997 
- 
Establishment of Division of Mental Health within the Ministry of Health 
and Welfare 
1999 
- 
Mental Health Facility Survey 
- 
Community Mental Health Project of Central Government 
2000 
- 
National Mental Health Delivery System Research 
- 
Technical Supporting Committee of CMH of Government 
- 
Standard Guideline of Community Mental Health Centre 
- 
2nd Amended of Mental Health Act 
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